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The development of affordable housing often involves a contentious siting 
process. Proposed housing developments frequently trigger concern among 
neighbors and community groups about potential negative impacts on 
neighborhood quality of life and property values. Advocates, developers, and 
researchers have long suspected that some of these concerns stem from racial or 
class prejudice, yet, to date, these assumptions lack empirical evidence. My 
research seeks to examine the roles that perceptions of race and class play in 
shaping opinions that underlie public opposition to affordable housing. Such 
opposition often earns the label “Not in my Backyard” (NIMBY). The application 
of a mixed-methods approach helps determine why the public opposes the 
development of affordable housing in their neighborhoods and towns. The focus 
group and survey results provide a rich understanding of the underlying attitudes 
that trigger opposition to affordable housing when proposed nearby. This study 
demonstrates that stereotypes and perceptions of the poor and minorities are 
particularly strong determinants of affordable housing opposition. This research 
improves our understanding of public attitudes toward affordable housing 
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attitudes, leading to a more focused and effective policies and plans for the siting 
of affordable housing. The results provide advocates, planners, developers, and 
researchers with a more accurate portrayal of affordable housing opposition, 
thereby allowing the response to be shaped in a more appropriate manner.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The cost and quality of one’s housing are among the most important 
factors influencing quality of life in America. Housing represents the largest 
expense as well as the largest investment for most households (Burchell and 
Listoken 1995). When housing is unaffordable, overcrowded, or unhealthy, it 
can affect the financial, educational, and emotional well being of individuals 
and families (Bratt 2002; Dunn 2000; Rivkin 1994). When poor households 
and low-quality housing is concentrated in a single area, the negative 
ramifications of individual housing challenges substantially increase (Galster 
2005; Jargowsky 2006; Squires and Kubrin 2005). Furthermore, such 
concentration of poverty often correlates to a concentration of racial and 
ethnic minorities (Briggs 2005; Katz 2006; Massey 1996). The resulting racial 
and economic segregation limits residents’ access to goods and services, 
including poor public education and decreased access to employment centers 
(Jargowsky 2003; Wilson 1987). Developing affordable housing in non-poor 
areas promotes both racial and social integration, promoting access to 
opportunity and mitigating many of these negative outcomes. Despite 
widespread recognition of the need for affordable housing, federal attempts to 
develop and implement policies to provide adequate housing for all 
Americans have not succeeded (Orlebeke 2000; Shlay 1995).  
According to the 2008 State of the Nation’s Housing report, 39 million 
households have serious trouble affording housing and affordability remains 
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America’s most pervasive housing challenge (Joint Center for Housing 
Studies 2008). Furthermore, low-income households are those most likely to 
bear a large housing cost burden, with 47 percent of such households 
spending more than 50 percent of their income on housing at last measure 
(Joint Center for Housing Studies 2008). All in all, approximately 90 million 
people currently suffer from “shelter poverty” – where housing costs are so 
high that other needs cannot be met (Stone 2006). 
The combination of three factors exacerbates an already severe and 
widespread housing affordability crisis in this country. First, the federal 
government has not focused on the production of affordable housing in recent 
decades, and has devolved power to state and local governments; second, the 
Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) budget 
authority has steadily declined relative to other social service and health 
programs; and finally, the private market has not provided nearly enough 
housing that is affordable to low-income Americans (Dolbeare and Crowley 
2002). Consequently, the affordability crisis negatively impacts the economic 
and social well being of millions of households, particularly the elderly, young 
families, single women, and minorities (Stone 2006). Continuing the current 
trend of devolving power to state and local governments, decreasing federal 
subsidies for housing for the poor, and relying on the private-sector to provide 
affordable housing will exacerbate the existing economic and spatial gap 
between the rich and poor as well as whites and non-whites. 
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Problems in the housing market can have widespread effects beyond 
household finances. The United States is currently in a fiscal crisis some have 
called the worst since the Great Depression (Tatom 2008). The primary cause 
of this crisis was a massive upheaval in the housing market due to widespread 
foreclosures (Gerardi et al. 2008). The current financial crisis comes at the 
end of a period of unprecedented growth in the housing market (Ho and 
Pennington-Cross 2006; Tatom 2008). The 1990s enjoyed the highest 
homeownership rate in American history, as well as the greatest increase in 
homeownership rates since the 1940s (HUD 2004). Many of these new 
homeowners were minority and low-income individuals (Bond and Williams 
2007; Haurin, Herbert, and Rosenthal 2007). This increase directly resulted 
from a combination of public policies encouraging homeownership and poorly 
regulated mortgage brokers and lenders (Bond and Williams 2007; Haurin, 
Herbert, and Rosenthal 2007; Shlay 2006; Stone 2006; Weicher 2007). As 
the homeownership rates increased in the 1990s, so did the subprime (or non-
traditional) mortgage market, swelling from, “$3 billion in subprime 
mortgages in 1988 . . . to $38 billion in 1996 and then to over $500 billion by 
2004” (Weicher 2007, 4).  As home values stagnated and decreased, many 
households went into foreclosure, and many large financial institutions failed 
alongside them (Gerardi et al. 2008; Tatom 2008). The resulting uncertainty 
and instability in the housing market placed enormous pressure on vulnerable 
households, as well as causing upheaval in both U.S. financial markets and 
others worldwide.  
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Housing has such far-reaching impacts because it affects individuals 
and families in several important ways. 1) Housing is the primary living space 
and environmental hazards present a substantial threat to public health 
(Dunn 2000; Krieger and Higgins 2002). 2) Housing stability is key to 
emotional, educational, and social development. Frequent moves due to 
affordability considerations disrupt families’ lives, children’s schooling, and 
employment prospects (Bratt 2002; Buerkle and Christenson 1999; Crowley 
2003). 3) Housing is also a “bellwether for community well-being” (Davis 
2006).  The health of neighborhoods and the health of households are 
intrinsically intertwined. Thus, it is not only individual characteristics, but 
also the characteristics of neighborhoods, that comprise the key determinants 
of socioeconomic achievement (Collins and Margo 2000; Goering 2003; 
Jargowsky 1997). 
Context: Developing Affordable Housing in Non-Poor 
Neighborhoods 
Federal policies currently emphasize deconcentrating poverty to 
encourage equal access to opportunity (Imbroscio 2008). The equitable 
distribution of affordable housing across regions represents a key factor in 
encouraging equity and opportunity (Briggs 2005; Galster and Killen 1995; 
Rosenbaum 1995). Furthermore, providing adequate housing options for low 
and moderate-income families in every region is vital to our nation’s 
communities (Shlay 1995; Squires and Kubrin 2005). On an individual level, 
an unstable housing situation has a negative impact on family well-being, 
     
5 
child development, stress, economic achievement, and self-sufficiency 
(Acevedo-Garcia and Osypuk 2004; Braconi 2001; Bratt 2002; Evans et al. 
2000; Shlay 1993). On a broader level, ensuring affordable options for all 
income strata creates healthier communities – economically, socially, and 
environmentally (Iglesias 2007; Katz et al. 2003; Davis 2006). 
The spatial access to opportunity has been said to be, “the great 
emerging social challenge of the 21st Century” (Jargowsky 2006, 29). As long 
as structural factors including, “discrimination or institutionalized racism 
within the private and public sectors” (Pendall 2000, 1), influence housing 
choices, access to opportunity will continue to elude poor and minority 
households. The forces that shape individual housing location decisions 
include constraints placed on the individual by outside forces, including 
realtors, lending agents, and federal or local housing policies (Hardman and 
Ioannides 2004; Denton 1999; Yinger 1999; Tisdale 1999; Carr 1999). These 
structural forces shaped a long history of segregation and poverty 
concentration that excluded minorities from the broad range of housing 
options available to Whites (Massey and Denton 1993; Jargowsky 2006; Nier 
1999).  
Literature in the housing and community development fields 
demonstrates that housing can act to promote economic mobility and self-
sufficiency (Galster and Killen 1995; Musterd and Andersson 2005; 
Rosenbaum and Popkin 1991). Improved housing conditions increase the 
physical safety and well being for low-income households (Eaddy et al. 2003; 
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Mueller and Tighe 2007; Rosenbaum 1995). As Chester Hartman stated, 
housing “is at the core of one’s social and personal life, determining the kinds 
of influences and relationships one has and access to key opportunities and 
services (education, employment, health care). Housing exemplifies an 
outward sign of status and affects the health and well-being of the 
surrounding community” (Hartman 1998, 229). Safe, affordable and 
accessible housing encourages increased self-esteem and decreased stress 
(Bratt 2002; Tatom 2008). Conversely, poor quality and unaffordable housing 
represents a significant barrier to achievement (Jencks and Mayer 1990; 
Shlay 1993). When such housing remains concentrated in particular areas, it 
magnifies barriers to opportunity.   
The spatial concentration of rich and poor is commonly referred to as 
“residential segregation” (Collins and Margo 2000; Zhang 2003; Darden 
2003; Farley 1977; Clark 1986; Massey 2001). While this term is typically 
associated with the racial characteristics of neighborhoods, it also applies to 
economic characteristics. Residential segregation results in unequal access to 
resources and opportunities for the poor and minorities (Anderson 2002; 
Briggs, Darden, and Aidala 1999; Jargowsky 2006; Wilson 1991). 
Furthermore, residential segregation by income negatively impacts school 
quality, (Rivkin 1994) access to jobs (Galster 1991; O'Regan and Quigley 1998) 
and health outcomes, (Acevedo-Garcia and Osypuk 2004) among poor and 
minority households. Moreover, segregation limits contact between racial and 
class groups, exacerbating the effects created by, “inadequate access to jobs 
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and job networks, the lack of involvement in quality schools, the 
unavailability of suitable marriage partners and the lack of exposure to 
informal mainstream social networks and conventional role models” (Wilson 
1987, 641).  
Spatial inequality also limits democratic participation and undermines 
democratic principles (Anderson 2002). As Darden points out, “Residential 
segregation creates and perpetuates inequality on the basis of race by 
maintaining differential quality of life in such neighborhoods. In a 
“democratic society,” residential segregation by race is considered unjust 
because it violates a principle of equality of opportunity and therefore liberty 
as a basic value” (Darden 2003, 339). Not only does segregation violate the 
principles of equal opportunity by producing and reinforcing unjust 
disadvantages, but also “the processes of segregation obscure the fact of their 
privilege from those who have it. The social and spatial differentiation 
produced by this privilege makes political communication among the 
segregated groups difficult” (Young 1999, 240). Thus, segregation prevents 
different classes and races from recognizing, much less combating, the 
injustices it incurs (Cashin 2004; Massey, White, and Phua 1996).  
Problem: Local Opposition to Affordable Housing 
One of the solutions both to the affordability crisis and to segregation 
by race and class is the development of affordable housing in non-poor 
neighborhoods (Koebel 2004; Briggs 2005; Anderson et al. 2003; Squires and 
Kubrin 2005). However, the implementation of this goal presents a number of 
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challenges. High land costs, inflexible zoning codes, and lack of adequate 
financing all limit the successful implementation of low-income housing 
policies (Cowan 2006; Goetz 1993). Exacerbating these structural forces are 
individual preferences for homogeneous neighborhoods and reluctance on the 
part of homeowners to take personal risks in order to achieve racial and 
economic integration (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; Orfield 2006; Cashin 2004). 
The combination of structural barriers and individual preferences has led to 
neighborhood settlement patterns segregated both by race and by class, which 
presents a formidable challenge to equality of opportunity for all Americans 
(Briggs 2005; Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; Farley et al. 1994; Clark 1992). 
Even when developers or policymakers overcome the financial and 
regulatory barriers created by the present system of affordable housing 
development, public opposition can sink a project before it even begins (Dear 
1991; Koebel 2004; Stein 1992). This neighborhood opposition, often referred 
to as “Not in My Backyard” or “NIMBY” opposition, can cause delays, force 
changes to the residential make-up of projects, and make untenable demands 
that can serve to undermine the successful development of affordable housing 
(Galster et al. 2003; Gibson 2005). When such opposition succeeds, it limits 
the effectiveness of public policies driving the development of affordable 
housing, hindering access to opportunity for moderate- and low-income 
families (Kean 1991; Pendall 1999; Stein 1996).  
Research on NIMBY opposition to affordable housing finds that 
NIMBY attitudes are complex and often stem from an individual’s ideology, 
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level of trust in government, and the extent to which they agree with the 
necessity of the proposed development (Pendall 1999). Since a NIMBY 
response is characterized as a neighborhood-level response to local costs 
(Dear 1991; Lake 1993), researchers and writers typically portray opposition 
to affordable housing as self-interested neighborhood-level concerns 
regarding the potential negative effects of housing and its residents upon their 
community (Galster 2002; Kean 1991; Stein 1992). Individuals who articulate 
such opposition often resist any new development that may carry potential 
negative impacts (Cowan 2003; Lober and Green 1994; Piat 2000; Somerman 
1993; Wolsink 1994). 
In the case of affordable housing siting, an additional factor often 
comes into play: the character of the future residents. Research on housing 
attitudes demonstrates that those who oppose the development of affordable 
housing often are suspicious of those slated to live in the new units. Often, the 
extent to which these future residents are perceived as undesirable strongly 
shapes the neighbors’ support or opposition for the project (Dear 1992; 
Takahashi 1997; Wilton 2002). This body of research has not successfully 
examined the underlying reasons for housing opposition, yet numerous 
researcher speculate as to the underlying causes. As one study stated, 
“Primarily, the contest is rooted in several interrelated factors that contribute 
to the NIMBY reaction: fear of adverse impacts on property values, anti-
government sentiment, anti-poor sentiment, and racial prejudice and 
segregation” (Koebel 2004, 3). Others suggested that concerns regarding 
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property values have become a proxy for racial prejudice (Pendall 1999; 
Wilton 2002) or that, “Not In My Back Yard has become the symbol for 
neighborhoods that exclude certain people because they are homeless, poor, 
disabled, or because of their race or ethnicity” (Ross 2000, i). However, no 
studies have definitively studied and empirically linked opposition to 
affordable housing with racial prejudice or anti-poor sentiment. 
Approach: Identifying Determinants of Opposition 
Numerous researchers’ investigations focus on the extent to which 
racial stereotyping influences attitudes toward both explicitly racialized public 
policies – such as affirmative action and school desegregation (Alvarez and 
Brehm 2002; Kluegel and Smith 1983) – and ostensibly race neutral policies 
– such as welfare and food stamps (Bobo 1991; Gilens 1995; Hasenfeld and 
Rafferty 1989). This research shows that public policies with explicit racial 
connotations – such as affirmative action – receive considerable public 
opposition, and that this opposition is often based on negative perceptions of 
racial minorities (Reyna et al. 2005; Kluegel and Smith 1983). However, 
public policies with implicit racial connotations – such as welfare – also 
receive little support amongst the public. Studies show that such attitudes 
often stem from negative perceptions of minorities, despite the race-neutral 
nature of the policy (Alesina 2001; Gilens 1995, 1999; Henry and Reyna 
2004). In this study, I apply the findings of this research to the field of 
affordable housing.  
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Throughout the history of neighborhood integration, policies designed 
to promote racial and economic equality have met with neighborhood 
opposition. Blockbusting exacerbated racial tensions in the 1950s (Keating 
1994); minority households who moved into White neighborhoods in the 
1960s were harassed (Farley et al. 1994); school buses bringing minority 
students into White schools in the 1970s were blocked (Lukas 1985; 
McConahay 1982); attempts at developing affordable housing in the suburbs 
in the 1980s and 90s were protested (Field 1997). Today, the first African 
American president enters the White House amidst a popular culture nearly 
devoid of overt racism (Erikson and Tedin 2003; Gilens 1999), and public 
opinion polls demonstrate a significant decline in support for segregation and 
discriminatory practices (Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Clawson and Kegler 
2000). However, it is not clear whether twenty-first century attitudes will 
reflect the widely professed desire for equality in institutions and 
communities or whether they continue to harbor misgivings and suspicions 
based on lingering twentieth-century stereotypes and perceptions.  
Should it be demonstrated that prejudice toward the potential 
residents of proposed housing shapes or influences opposition to affordable 
housing, the current research and advocacy paradigm will not succeed in 
changing the minds of neighbors. If concerns about property values and crime 
simply mask negative views toward minorities and the poor, community 
outreach and education efforts will fail to resonate with the public. 
Furthermore, by continuing to acquiesce to community opposition to 
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affordable housing, planners and policymakers may inadvertently validate 
racial and class prejudice. As Rolf Pendall (1999) stated, “Such racist and 
classist antihousing action—still a common occurrence—must be 
distinguished from other opposition to housing, if only because policy 
responses to prejudice-based opposition will differ markedly from those based 
on the real impacts of new housing on neighborhood quality” (p. 115). Public 
opinion research can contribute substantially to this body of literature by 
providing planners and policymakers with a greater understanding of why 
Americans oppose affordable housing.  
Research Questions 
In order to address the gaps in our current knowledge of affordable 
housing attitudes, I pose the following questions: 
1. How do attitudes toward minorities relate to attitudes toward 
affordable housing? 
2. How do attitudes toward the poor relate to attitudes toward 
affordable housing? 
3. How do attitudes toward government relate to attitudes toward 
affordable housing? 
 
I apply focus groups and a detailed attitude survey to investigate the extent to 
which minority stereotyping, poverty stereotyping, and attitudes toward are 
associated with attitudes toward affordable housing. Because the existing 
literature and secondary data fail to provide adequate evidence regarding the 
links between stereotyping, ideology, and the siting of affordable housing, it is 
appropriate that a public opinion survey serves as the primary research 
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instrument. Utilizing a survey methodology of this type advances our 
knowledge of public opinion toward affordable housing. Doing so will 
significantly increase our understanding of how these opinions are shaped, 
leading to a more focused and appropriate response when opposition arises. 
By focusing on determinants of housing attitudes, and in particular, 
identifying the role of ideology, race perceptions, and class perceptions in 
shaping those attitudes, this study breaks new ground in the field.  
Hypotheses 
1. Stereotypes about racial minorities directly and positively 
influence the propensity for individuals to oppose affordable 
housing. 
2. Stereotypes about the poor directly and positively influence the 
propensity for individuals to oppose affordable housing. 
3. Egalitarian ideology directly and negatively influences the 
propensity for individuals to oppose affordable housing. 
4. Trust in Government directly and negatively influences the 
propensity for individuals to oppose affordable housing. 
 
Contribution 
This study introduces a new and replicable measure of affordable 
housing opposition, which policymakers and planners can apply in a variety of 
settings. The development of this index, which measures the propensity for 
people to view affordable housing as a threat, will provide a valuable tool to 
future researchers interested in community attitudes toward affordable 
housing. While various surveys have asked questions regarding attitudes 
toward housing policy or needs, the researchers conducting such studies 
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typically use them for descriptive purposes, to identify the most appropriate 
terminology to use for affordable housing, or to identify the extent of support 
or opposition to various types of housing (Belden, Shashaty, and Zipperer 
2004; Baldassare 2004; Belden and Russonello 2003; Realtors 2006; Goetz 
2008). The existing survey research does not provide a basis for analyzing 
public attitudes and their determinants. By developing a dependent variable 
that captures a more nuanced and accurate reading of neighbors’ concerns 
regarding affordable housing, we can better analyze the underlying causes for 
their apprehension. 
The crux of this study is to measure empirically the extent to which 
racial or class stereotyping is related to opposition to affordable housing. 
Numerous studies point out instances where respondents have voiced racial 
and class-based stereotypes as their primary concern about affordable 
housing (Belden, Shashaty, and Zipperer 2004; Koebel 2004; Pendall 1999). 
Furthermore, even when a racial element to opposition is not overt, the 
reasons given for such opposition – lower property values; increased crime; 
negative impacts on schools –remain the same as those voiced in past decades 
regarding racial integration. This led many researchers to suspect that NIMBY 
opposition may simply be a façade disguising racial and class discrimination 
(Fischel 2001; Hartman 2008; Pendall 2000). Such parallels suggest a need 
to study the connections between opposition to affordable housing and racist 
or classist sentiment in order to definitively determine the extent to which 
such attitudes factor into neighborhood opposition to affordable housing.  
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Understanding public attitudes, and the driving factors behind them, is 
a key step toward establishing policies, education campaigns, and outreach 
mechanisms that speak to the real issues driving neighborhood fears and 
concerns. The delays, project changes, and siting compromises resulting from 
neighborhood opposition to affordable housing undermine the policy and 
planning goals of increased integration and access to opportunity for poor and 
minority households. Pursuing public opinion research of neighborhood 
opposition will fill a considerable gap in the literature by providing a frame 
and method for examining the underlying determinants of opposition. 
The broader impacts of this study include providing developers and 
planners with a greater understanding of public attitudes, from which they 
can produce informed approaches to community opposition. Should it be 
found that, like attitudes toward other social policies, negative perceptions of 
the poor and minorities are strongly linked to attitudes toward affordable 
housing, local political leaders may be more willing to resist neighborhood 
opposition and support the development of affordable housing. Furthermore, 
planners and policymakers may be more willing to pursue regulatory changes 
at the state and federal levels, such as inclusionary zoning, that encourage and 
enable more equitable development and distribution of affordable housing. 
Finally, should it be shown that policy goals are impeded by race-based 
stereotypes, it may be appropriate to strengthen fair housing laws to make 
them more applicable to local siting conflicts. Each of these outcomes will 
enhance the ability of practitioners and researchers to pursue more effective 
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siting strategies in the future and to prompt local governments to enact 
policies that promote greater equity in affordable housing siting and 
development.  
Summary of the Chapters 
Chapter 2 discusses the history of housing policy and social policy in 
the context of the United States. Here, I emphasize the importance of both 
ideology and race in framing housing policy throughout U.S. history. In large 
part, the actual and perceived failures of public housing initiatives in the past 
shape attitudes toward affordable housing. The chapter also reviews past and 
current housing policies geared at both poor households and middle-class 
households, and how such policies contribute to and perpetuate racial and 
class segregation. This chapter also discusses the history of laws and 
regulations that first caused, and later discouraged, discrimination in housing 
development and lending. While some programs and policies exist that 
encourage equality of opportunity, these are limited. Devolution and 
retrenchment by the federal government over the past thirty years made it 
more difficult for cities and towns to develop adequate affordable housing for 
their residents. The history of segregation and discrimination in urban and 
social policy has shaped the way that planners, policymakers, and the public 
approach integration and inclusion today.  
Chapter 3 discusses the current policy environment related to 
developing affordable housing in non-poor areas. For the most part, 
affordable housing today is publicly subsidized, privately developed, and 
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locally regulated. This creates a number of obstacles to the successful 
implementation of equitable housing policies, including financial, regulatory, 
and public opinion challenges. These challenges are discussed in detail, 
focusing on the role that neighborhood opposition plays in the planning and 
development process. 
Chapter 4 provides a detailed explanation of the theoretical 
underpinnings of public opinion research, including how social policy 
attitudes are shaped by views regarding the target populations of those 
policies. Such constructions manifest into stereotypes and common beliefs via 
framing by the media and elites. This chapter also reviews previous research 
and literature on housing attitudes and opposition, as well as studies that 
measured various facets of housing opposition. Finally, I discuss gaps in the 
literature and how detailed opinion research on housing attitudes can fill 
these gaps in knowledge.  
Chapter 5 is a discussion of the research methodology applied in this 
study. In this chapter, I discuss the research approach and model. The focus 
group design and implementation is explained, as well as how these results 
were used to hone the survey instrument. This chapter includes a detailed 
explanation of the development of the survey instrument, sampling, and 
implementation. It concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the study.  
Chapter 6 provides a description of the focus group and survey 
results. Using both descriptive and interpretive statistical methods, I explain 
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how I tested my hypotheses, and present the detailed results of data analysis 
and my statistical models.  
Chapter 7 presents an interpretation of the results, a discussion of the 
importance of the research findings to both public policy and planning 
practice, and presents next steps in researching housing attitudes and land 
use conflicts.  
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CHAPTER 2: HOUSING IN THE U.S.CONTEXT 
Throughout the history of housing policy in the United States, racial 
mistrust and ideological concerns about dependency hampered attempts to 
provide housing for the poor (Briggs 2005; Field 1997; Tisdale 1999). Each 
period of U.S. housing policy wrestled with questions about where and how to 
provide housing for different segments of the needy population (Vale 2000). 
Housing policy, and policy relating to urban areas in general, tends to be 
reactive rather than proactive (Cowan 2006; Iglesias 2002; Tisdale 1999). 
There has never been a significant long-term planning process attached to 
federal housing policy, as new programs typically stem from the perceived 
failure of a previous program or in response to economic, social, or political 
crises (Hays 1985; Orlebeke 2000; Vale 2000). Because of this nature of 
urban policymaking, housing programs and policies have evolved 
considerably. An important component of this evolution involved a transfer of 
federal control to state and local governments – with increasing responsibility 
and power of implementation resting with cities and towns (Katz et al. 2003; 
Nenno, Brophy, and Barker 1982; Mueller and Schwartz 2008).  
The history of housing policy ties closely to the history of civil rights 
and racial discrimination. During the first half of the twentieth century, 
segregation, exclusion, and limited opportunity for racial minorities was the 
norm (Briggs 2003; Carr 1999; Massey and Denton 1993; Seitles 1998). Legal 
regulations excluded minorities from White neighborhoods, cleaving 
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communities along racial and class lines and limiting spatial and social access 
to opportunity for these populations (Cowan 2006; Fischel 2004; Ihlanfeldt 
2004; Pendall 2000). More recently, irresponsible and predatory lending 
resulted in widespread foreclosures that were disproportionately borne by 
low-income and minority homeowners (Eaddy et al. 2003; Haurin, Herbert, 
and Rosenthal 2007; Shlay 2006).  
Roots of Housing Policy: Ideology & Housing in America 
Property, and more specifically, the home, has historically been 
identified with liberty (Iglesias 2007; Marcuse 1978), an association that 
contributed to the formation of a social hierarchy where property ownership 
resides at the top (Hays 1985; Vale 2000). The constitutional right to own and 
enjoy one’s property without outside interference is cherished by Americans, 
and the protection of private property remains one of the most staunchly 
defended roles of the government (Hartman 1998; Iglesias 2007; Alesina, 
Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001). As John Locke wrote, “The great and chief end 
therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves 
under government, is the preservation of their property” (Locke 1690, ch. 9, 
sec. 124). Because of this emphasis on private property rights, government 
policies designed to aid the poor through housing have had to balance the 
need for such housing with a desire to protect private property and existing 
neighborhoods. 
Throughout U.S. history, two tenets of American ideology – equality 
and individualism –competed for supremacy in debates over social policies 
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and anti-poverty programs (Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Peele 2005). The ideals 
of equality and individualism have shaped American views on work, property, 
and poverty. These views reflect the broader Protestant Ethic, which assures 
citizens that through hard work and determination everyone can enjoy 
success and self-sufficiency (Stein 1996). As Walt Whitman wrote, 
“Democracy looks with a suspicious, ill-satisfied eye upon the very poor, the 
ignorant, and on those out of business. She asks for men and women with 
occupations, well-off, owners of houses and acres…and hastens to make them” 
(Whitman, 1871 quoted in Vale 2000, p. 93). The belief that the failure to 
achieve self-reliance can only be the fault of the individual pervaded 
policymaking throughout American history, and remains so in contemporary 
society (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001; Borinstein 1992; Wilson 1996; 
Zucker and Weiner 1993). This combination of ideology and perceptions of 
the poor shaped social policies from tenement reform to welfare reform, and 
has contributed greatly to the formation of housing and land use policies 
(Hays 1985; Pendall 2000). 
All social policies are subject to arguments about the nature of poverty 
and the poor (Abramovitz 2001; Banfield 1968; Gilens 1999; Jencks 1992; 
Katz 1996). Public support for such policies often hinges on the perception of 
whether the poor are perceived to be at fault for their situation, or whether 
they are instead victims of societal or economic failures (Bobo 1991; Wilson 
1996; Zucker and Weiner 1993). In either case, policymakers and the public 
commonly view the poor as different or distinct from the remainder of society 
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(Katz 1993; Orfield 2006). As a result, public policies aimed at, “improving 
‘human capital,’ correcting ‘community pathology,’ breaking the ‘culture of 
poverty, healing the ‘broken family’ all tended to restrict the problem to a 
‘disadvantaged’ population outside what was considered a basically sound 
‘mainstream’” (Jackson 1993, 416). The characterization of the poor as a 
group culpable for, rather than victims of, their station in life serves to 
perpetuate both their social and spatial isolation (Briggs 2003; Jargowsky 
2003; Katz 2006). 
Despite widespread subscription to the tenets of individualism and 
self-reliance, American individuals, communities, and governments also 
commonly recognize the need to assist the poor (Henry and Reyna 2004; 
Hirshmann 2002). However, because of strong adherence to American 
ideology, this assistance “has always been limited in scope and hedged with 
conditions and restrictions” (Hays 1985, 370). Therefore, while Americans 
widely support aid for those who cannot help themselves, the methods, 
means, and extent of such aid are fiercely contested (Berinsky 2002; Erikson 
and Tedin 2003; Schneider and Ingram 1993). This rings particularly true 
when applied to housing policy, for the home holds extremely strong symbolic 
and economic value to most Americans, whether it is defined as an investment 
vehicle, a shelter, the foundation of the family, or a part of a neighborhood or 
community (Hays 1985; Jackson 1985). As a result, government policies 
designed to improve housing for the poor have always been viewed as 
contrary to American values.  
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Ideology and perceptions of the poor have impeded the development of 
a consistent and sound housing policy in the United States (Hartman 1998; 
Lang and Sohmer 2000; Listoken 1990; Nenno, Brophy, and Barker 1982). 
Debates arise over who should receive aid, where housing should be built, and 
the proper role of government – issues that remain a virtual constant in 
housing policy debate (Carr 1999; Hays 1985; Shlay 1995; Stein 1996; Vale 
2000). From the early settlement of the US, through Industrialization, 
Depression and Post-War policies, to more recent devolution and financial 
crisis, each phase of American housing policy reflects the conflict between an 
adherence to American values and providing for the needs of American 
citizens. 
Evolution of U.S. Housing Policy 
As early as the first New England Puritan settlements, there has been 
debate surrounding how – and even if – the poor should be housed (Katz 
1996; Vale 2000). This debate discriminated between the “worthy” and the 
“unworthy” poor. The worthy were those whose poverty was not their own 
doing: widows, orphans and the disabled, for example. Such members of 
society received care and assistance from the community (Hirshmann 2002). 
The unworthy were those whose own behavior or lifestyle choices contributed 
to their poverty: alcohol and drug addicts or those simply unwilling to work. 
The Colonial American view held that care of the worthy poor was a collective 
responsibility, while care of the unworthy poor was a personal responsibility 
(Katz 1996). Even for those “worthy” of aid, however, work was expected in 
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return. The poor lived in unpleasant work and settlement houses, that was 
isolated from the community and included strict behavioral requirements as a 
condition of aid (Vale 2000). 
Community housing policies during this period distinguished between 
the worthy and unworthy poor both in quality and in location. While 
placement for widows and orphans consisted of almshouses integrated into 
the community, “colored persons, insane and idiots, syphilitic patients” (Vale 
2000, 45-46) and others who did not fit the criteria of the “worthy” poor were 
institutionalized away from the community. Even at this early point in the 
nation’s history, non-White residents and immigrants were lumped in with 
the unworthy poor, regardless of their background, potential for community 
contribution, or personal character (Vale 2000). Therefore, while 
discriminating between the worthy and unworthy poor reflected American 
society’s firm belief in self-reliance, independence and hard work, it also 
firmly placed minorities in the “unworthy” category regardless of their work 
ethic or capacity for self-sufficiency (Marcuse 1978; Vale 2000). As we review 
major changes in national housing policy, it is clear that these early attitudes 
and ideologies regarding the location of housing for low income and racially 
and ethnically distinct households remain important factors in shaping how 
housing for the poor is perceived, discussed, and developed. 
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The first federally sponsored housing policy – the Homestead Act – fell 
squarely in line with American ideology (Iglesias 2007). Its mission was 
twofold: settlement and control of the western frontier; and relief of the 
concentration of poverty and blight in congested urban areas (Hartman 1998; 
Vale 2000). This was the federal government’s first step in dealing with the 
housing conditions of the poor, and part of its goal was to reward those who 
were willing to work. The Homestead Act “was charity in the service of 
Jeffersonian liberty: freely given, yet paired with a carefully constructed sense 
of future responsibility” (Vale 2000, 101). Moreover, the opportunity to gain 
prosperity through hard work and property ownership provided the worthy 
poor a way to remove themselves from the negative influences of the 
increasingly unsavory living conditions found in the cities (Marcuse 1978). 
However, the Homestead Act failed in its mission. Few city-dwelling 
immigrants possessed the resources or the ability to farm, ranch, and conquer 
the American west, and speculators consolidated most of the parcels offered 
     
26 
by the government and sold them for profit (Vale 2000, 98-100). 
Furthermore, immigrants continued to flock to America’s cities, crowding into 
rapidly deteriorating tenement-housing districts.  
The Progressive Era 
Jacob Riis’s “How the Other Half Lives” (1890) documented the run-
down tenements and squalid living conditions, which did much to increase 
public awareness of the growing housing crisis in American cities (Krieger and 
Higgins 2002). However, there continued to be little consensus regarding the 
prudent political action necessary to combat the problem (Bauman et al. 
2000; Krumholz 2004; Marcuse 1978). By the late 19th century, journalists, 
social reformers, and some policymakers were calling for reforms to alleviate 
the dismal conditions of worker housing and urban tenements. However, 
these calls did not resonate nationally, so the predominant government action 
still transpired at the local level (Krieger and Higgins 2002; Marcuse 1978). 
New York City passed the first Tenement Reform Act in 1867, serving as a 
model for other cities around the country (Krieger and Higgins 2002; 
Marcuse 1978). Such regulations, however, did little to alleviate conditions in 
tenements, since the urban populations continued to grow. As a result, 
organizers and advocates continued to lobby for federal action to improve 
tenement conditions (Bauman et al. 2000; Marcuse 1978). 
Tenement reform was one element of the broader Progressive 
Movement (roughly 1890-1920), which sought to increase government 
regulation of private enterprise. Until the reforms of the late 19th and early 
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20th centuries, the free market ran largely unchecked by government (Dreier 
2005). During the Progressive period, the labor movement, anti-trust laws, 
and the establishment of building and fire codes played their part in 
establishing a precedent for government intervention on behalf of its citizens 
over free-market interests (Krumholz 2004). Tenement reform marks the first 
significant instance of government oversight and interference in the private 
housing market and remains the policy precedent for government regulation 
of shelter for the urban poor (Marcuse 1978). However, government 
involvement remained staunchly local and communities’ participation 
voluntary since regulations lacked state or federal mandate (Piven and 
Cloward 1971). 
By the 1920s, tenement reformers had successfully disseminated the 
idea that “housing reform was necessary to solve the social problems related 
to urban poverty” (von Hoffman 1996, 425). Despite this recognition, there 
was no consensus on action. Tenement and housing reformers argued that 
government intervention was the only way to ensure quality housing for the 
poor and that improving housing conditions would work to reform the poor 
and improve quality of life. They “firmly believed that the slums of the city 
were a malevolent environment that threatened the safety, health, and morals 
of the poor who inhabited them” (von Hoffman 1996, 442). The idea that 
desperate poverty was not widespread and that such issues were limited to 
certain urban neighborhoods in only a few cities reinforced this perception. 
When the public recognized that the deteriorating conditions of tenement 
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housing threatened the greater public health, policymakers and the public 
seriously considered reform (Hall 1988; Krieger and Higgins 2002).  
Private sector actors countered the Progressive activists, arguing that 
philanthropy and charity could address housing problems without 
government action (Krumholz 2004). Their opposition was rooted in the 
belief that the responsibility for poverty lay with individual; thus slum-
clearance and reform would do nothing to “improve” the urban poor (Vale 
2000). Ultimately, most political leaders “believed that the private market, 
with some help from generous philanthropies, could solve the problems of 
housing the poor” (Krumholz 2004, 1). Furthermore, there existed no 
historical or political basis for such governmental action in an arena typically 
viewed as the exclusive domain of the free market (Alesina, Glaeser, and 
Sacerdote 2001; Burchell and Listoken 1995; Hays 1985; Shlay 1995). 
As perception of the tenements’ increasingly negative impact on society 
spread, calls for reform grew louder. Policymakers were driven to action by 
the “fear of what an excluded, alienated, disgruntled, badly housed 
population, to a large extent immigrant and not imbued with “American” 
ideals and patterns of acceptable behavior, might produce, particularly if 
crowded together in congested neighborhoods with only their like” (Marcuse 
1978, 73). Therefore, even as newly enacted policies strove to improve their 
plight, the tenement-dwellers were perceived largely as being the source, 
rather than the victims, of the public health and safety threats emanating 
from the slums. As a result, both activists and policymakers, “translated the 
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conditions and activities that alarmed or disturbed them into questions of 
behavior, character, and personality, which they approached 
through…institutionally based programs directed at personal transformation” 
(Katz 1993, 454). Thus, the emphasis of tenement reform involved not only 
improving the physical structure of the buildings, but also changing the 
tenants’ behavior and their familial and social structures.  
Depression-Era Housing and the New Deal 
The Great Depression created a housing crisis that transcended the 
tenements and immigrant ghettos, thereby compelling government 
intervention. “The Depression helped make the reformers’ point that the 
private market, even assisted by private philanthropy and charity, could not 
solve the economic and housing problems of the poor” (Dreier 2005, 244). 
Despite this acknowledgement, philosophical and political disagreements 
continued to hinder government action (Vale 2000). On one side, public 
housing advocates sought to reform and aid the poor by creating a living 
environment, “antithetical to the urban slum” with proper light, heat, and 
plumbing (von Hoffman 1996, 426). On the other, the real estate lobbies 
vehemently opposed government involvement in housing production. Most 
policymakers shared the views of the latter group, repeatedly blocking the 
establishment of a public housing program (Bratt 1989). 
Even at this early stage of government intervention, public opinion 
played a large role in shaping public policy. Government-sponsored housing 
earned the moniker of “socialism” – a strong charge at a time when the term 
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was associated with revolution, anarchy, and generally contrary to “American” 
values and principles (Krumholz 2004; Marcuse 1978). Policymakers sought a 
solution to poor housing conditions that focused on individual responsibility, 
not wanting to create a large, public housing program like those emerging in 
European countries (Bratt 1989; Vale 2000). Furthermore, private real estate 
interests viewed public housing as unfair competition that “would destroy the 
private housing industry [and] the self-reliance of tenants” (Krumholz 2004, 
2). Those policymakers swayed by such concerns continually thwarted 
attempts at establishing a public housing program, and Congressional debates 
surrounding its establishment took on an increasingly ideological tone. In 
1935, a proposal for government provision of housing came under attack for 
“[exuding] the stench of gross inefficiency and Russian Communism” (Vale 
2000, 170). To avoid such charges, the early stages of publicly-provided 
housing emphasized individual rehabilitation: getting the poor to a point 
where they were self-sufficient and no longer in need of public assistance 
(Friedman 1978).  
Lacking a strong voice in support of public housing, the New Deal did 
not include any direct housing production element (Hays 1985; Marcuse 
1978). Instead, the first major Depression-Era housing action was the creation 
of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in 1934. The primary purpose 
of the FHA was to stem foreclosures and spur home construction by insuring 
loans (Hays 1985; Schill and Wachter 1995). The FHA also established a 
secondary mortgage market, known now as Fannie Mae, making FHA both 
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insurer and investor. After WWII, Fannie Mae was reorganized to remove 
direct federal funding, and later transitioned into a semi-privatized 
organization. The growth of the secondary market necessitated the 
establishment of Ginnie Mae to manage the ever-growing mortgage portfolio 
in the evolving secondary market (Lea 1996).  None of these provisions, 
however, directly aided low-income households. 
Together, the creation of these institutions and instruments from the 
Great Depression to the end of the Second World War dramatically reduced 
the risk of lending and consequently made homeownership available to a 
much larger segment of American households than under the former system. 
Furthermore, these changes “stabilized the flow of funds to housing during 
the Depression and set the stage for strong growth in the immediate postwar 
years” (Lea 1996, 163). The policies and insurance mechanisms implemented 
by the agency changed the way that homeownership was financed in the U.S. 
and dramatically increased the availability of mortgage financing to 
households (Shlay 2006). FHA mortgage lending, in conjunction with other 
policies that promoted and enabled suburban homeownership (including the 
GI Bill and the National Highway Act), increased the homeownership rate 
increased from 47 percent before the FHA to 62 percent in 1960 (HUD 2004). 
By expanding homeownership by the greatest percentage in U.S. 
history, the FHA also served to expand the tax benefits of the Mortgage 
Interest Tax Deduction (which had been available to homeowners since 1913) 
to a broader section of the population (Hays 1985). This system enabled an 
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entirely new class – the middle class – to become homeowners. However, it 
did little to address the needs of the most disadvantaged populations. Despite 
the dramatic expansion in the availability of mortgage credit, discriminatory 
practices codified in FHA regulations allowed only White residents to utilize 
the new system of mortgage finance. As Hays points out, “the FHA program 
did not, however, address the problems of those too poor to purchase a home, 
and during its subsequent history, this shift toward service to the white 
middle class was accentuated” (Hays 1985, 85-86).  
Not only were many minority borrowers excluding from obtaining 
home loans, but entire neighborhoods were off-limits to potential investors 
(Bond and Williams 2007). In order to obtain a mortgage, lending rules 
required that the home be located in an area occupied with “substantial, law-
abiding, sober-acting, sane-thinking people of acceptable ethnic standards” 
(Vale 2000, 169). These regulations, commonly known as “redlining,” utilized 
a hierarchical rating system to rank neighborhood suitability for mortgage 
investment (Briggs 2005; Jackson 1985; Massey and Denton 1993). This 
system used four color-coded ratings to determine the health of a 
neighborhood, and therefore the risk in providing a mortgage in that 
neighborhood (Burchell and Listoken 1995). Most Black neighborhoods 
received the least desirable “red” rating, preventing prospective buyers from 
obtaining financing to purchase or upgrade properties in those neighborhoods 
(Nier 1999). Together, lending discrimination and redlining excluded 
minority households from the opportunities afforded whites. Instead, 
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upwardly mobile Black families, trapped in increasingly poor neighborhoods, 
received no access to capital for improving their homes or establishing 
businesses (Bond and Williams 2007; Shlay 2006). 
The new system of housing finance left few options for poor and 
minority families living in neighborhoods suffering from rapid disinvestment. 
Federally sponsored housing was one of the few options left for those who 
could not qualify for homeownership. Ultimately, in spite of ideological 
opposition and economic concerns regarding public housing’s impact on the 
private housing market, the government established a limited program in 
1937. The goal of public housing was to provide shelter for the “submerged 
middle class” until they could purchase their own home (Bratt 1989). The 
creation of this program represented a huge step forward for government 
involvement in housing, and by 1960, it facilitated the construction of 
400,000 public housing units to accommodate the poor (Burchell and 
Listoken 1995; Bratt 1989). However, these projects tended to be located on 
marginal tracts of land on the outskirts of town, in undesirable neighborhoods 
(Bickford and Massey 1991; Vale 2002). The spatial isolation of public 
housing deepened the marginalization of its residents. As Bartelt explains, 
“These new housing units lacked traditional linkages to either available jobs 
or new housing within the local community. They took on a character of a 
“warehouse” or, less pejoratively, a “safety net” for the poor, rather than a 
temporary stop on the road to independence” (Bartelt 1993, 150).  
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FHA programs centered around assisting the most mobile households 
to move into homeownership (Hays 1985; Bratt 1989). However, as these 
upwardly mobile residents left the cities, public housing residents eventually 
came to represent the poorest and most indigent citizens (Vale 2002; Bartelt 
1993). Because the residents of public housing consisted of the working poor, 
the program’s design entailed that rents from residents would cover operating 
expenses (Orlebeke 2000). However, as the most upwardly mobile poor 
moved out of public housing, they were replaced by more indigent tenants, 
reducing the funding for maintenance in public housing (Bratt 1989; Lane 
1995; Burchell and Listoken 1995). Furthermore, racial discrimination both in 
lending and in investment hastened the deterioration of urban 
neighborhoods. These demographic trends also reinforced the perception that 
racial minorities overwhelmingly comprised the “unworthy poor” and that 
they lacked the self-sufficiency necessary to propel themselves into the middle 
classes (Bartelt 1993; Clawson and Kegler 2000; Freeman 2000). 
Redlining and segregation created a differential housing market for 
Blacks and Whites. The lack of credit meant that housing in minority 
neighborhoods actually cost more than in white neighborhoods. (Jackson 
1985; Squires and Kubrin 2005) Redlining and FHA rules so constrained the 
supply of housing and housing finance in black neighborhoods, that white 
neighborhoods, where prices were lower, drew upwardly mobile blacks 
(Mehlhorn 1998). This unique economic situation led some real estate agents 
(known as “blockbusters”) to target white neighborhoods, spreading fear 
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among the residents that Blacks were soon to move in. Once one or two Black 
families did purchase homes, the remaining White families would sell quickly, 
at low prices, thus allowing the agents to sell at much higher prices to Black 
households (Massey and Denton 1993). Real estate agents enjoyed large 
profits, achieved by fear mongering and taking advantage of the lack of 
housing options in Black neighborhoods and for Black families (Lang and 
Sohmer 2000; Massey and Denton 1993; Mehlhorn 1998; von Hoffman 
2000). These practices formed the basis for the view that property values go 
down when minority families move into a neighborhood. 
Suburbanization 
The realities created and reinforced by public policy and housing 
finance regulations, in which the white homeowners live in the suburbs while 
minority tenants reside in the declining cities reinforced the view that tenancy 
walks hand in hand with dependency, while homeownership fosters self-
reliance (Rohe and Stewart 1996; Stone 2006; von Hoffman 1996). The 
housing boom following WWII resulted in an increase of some 30 million 
units of housing, many of which were located in the burgeoning suburbs 
(Stone 2006). These new suburban communities felt safe, offered accessibility 
to jobs, and, due to the wealthier tax base, provided superior access to 
education and city services (Briggs 2005; Jackson 1985; Keating 1994; Orfield 
et al. 1986). As cities and their suburbs became increasingly segregated by 
both race and class, differences in service provision became starker.  
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The economic boom following World War II eliminated much of the 
impetus for housing and poverty programs. As America’s inner cities became 
increasingly associated with blight and crime, the public, members of the 
business community, and policymakers began to take interest in the 
revitalization of their urban commercial centers (Cutler and Glaeser 1999; von 
Hoffman 2000). As a result, urban policy shifted its focus to economic 
development and growth in America’s cities, seeking to reverse the 
deterioration of urban neighborhoods and job centers (Jackson 1985; 
Orlebeke 2000). These new priorities manifested in the Housing Act of 1949, 
designed to provide measures to improve the public perception of American 
cities and to combat the fact that publicly built housing failed to offer relief to 
those in the greatest need (Lang and Sohmer 2000; von Hoffman 2000). The 
act is primarily remembered for the laudable goal of providing “a decent home 
and a suitable living environment for every American family” (Lang and 
Sohmer 2000, 291). The means to accomplish this were threefold: slum 
clearance, increased authorization of FHA loans, and the development of 
more than eight hundred thousand public housing units (Lang and Sohmer 
2000). Unfortunately, the strong rhetoric failed to yield the same results.  
The majority of the funding stemming from the 1949 Housing Act went 
into the slum clearance portion of the program (generally known as “Urban 
Renewal”) (Dreier 2000; Krumholz 2004). In place of the slums and 
disinvestment that blighted American neighborhoods, the housing act 
authorized the construction of thousands of brand new housing units. 
     
37 
However, the implementation of the urban renewal program landed in the 
hands of private developers, with very little federal oversight. Consequently, 
these measures seldom constructed as many units as they condemned 
(Bennett, Smith, and Wright 2006; Krumholz 2004; Lane 1995). 
Furthermore, the housing constructed in place of those demolished was 
generally reserved for middle and upper class households, while housing for 
low income families followed the previously established pattern of public 
housing siting – namely, placement in isolated areas far from established 
residential and job centers, as well as their previous neighbors and 
community ties (Gans 1962; Bartelt 1993).  
By the mid-1960s, one million poor and working class residents of 
urban neighborhoods had been displaced by Urban Renewal (Marcuse 1978). 
As Katz points out, “the federal government had subsidized urban freeway 
construction; guaranteed low-interest mortgages in the suburbs; sanctioned 
redlining in cities; and, under the banner of urban renewal, destroyed far 
more of the poor’s housing than it had replaced” (Katz 1996, 256). 
Furthermore, the destruction caused by Urban Renewal combined with 
discriminatory lending and investment policies led to even more poor Blacks 
moving to the projects. (O'Connor 2000) As a result, “stigmas of cultural 
difference, race and poverty blended very early in images of the undeserving 
poor” (Katz 1993, 11).  
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Civil Rights and the War on Poverty 
Public housing and its increasing deterioration soon became a symbol 
of urban poverty, blight, and crime. As units built in the 1940s aged and the 
wealth of the tenants decreased, less money was available for maintenance 
precisely when the buildings required significant repair (Bratt 1989). By the 
1960s, the crisis escalated to such a point that HUD had two options that 
could salvage public housing: continue escalating rents in order to cover costs, 
leaving the neediest families outside of the benefit structure; or re-work the 
program to increase coverage of operating costs through federal subsidies 
(Bratt 1989; von Hoffman 1996). It did neither. The Brooke Amendment, 
passed in 1969, capped public housing payments by residents at 25 percent of 
their annual income, limiting revenues even further.  While the onus of 
maintenance and operation costs fell on the federal government’s shoulders, 
lack of direct budgetary appropriation led to chronic under funding of public 
housing operation and maintenance (Lane 1995; Bratt 1989). These economic, 
demographic, and policy changes directly resulted in the rapid deterioration 
of many public housing projects while the population in the projects became 
substantially minority (Schill and Wachter 1995). This led many to believe 
that, “[Blacks were] to blame for public housing’s problems” (Vale 2000, 235). 
As it became clear that the public housing program could not meet the 
needs of those who lacked adequate housing, the federal government 
embarked on numerous experimental housing programs under the umbrella 
of the War on Poverty (Katz 1996). These programs included voucher 
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programs, demonstration mobility programs, and production programs for 
both rental and owner-occupied low-income housing (Bauman et al. 2000; 
Bratt 1989). However, even these new high-volume production programs 
failed to supply units fast enough for the growing demand (Colton 2003; 
Hartman 1998). Furthermore, as the Civil Rights movement gained 
momentum, it became clear that federal housing programs could not combat 
the racial segregation that was deeply entrenched in metropolitan areas. In 
many areas, housing programs compounded, rather than rectified, racial 
segregation. 
The legal impetus toward the goals of desegregated neighborhoods and 
institutions was the momentous 1954 Supreme Court Decision in Brown v. 
the Board of Education. The Brown decision began to dismantle the 
institutional structures that marginalized and isolated minorities, stating that 
“separate educational facilities are inherently unequal” (Orfield et al. 1997, 5). 
Brown overturned decades of racial policy instituted as a result the 1892 
Plessy v. Ferguson decision, and as such, de jure racial segregation was ruled 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. In a follow-
up case a year later, the court delegated implementation of Brown to the 
district courts with instructions that they promote compliance, “with all 
deliberate speed”(Orfield 2004).   
After little movement over the subsequent decade, the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act finally bolstered these steps by expanding equal opportunity and 
protection to all sectors, not only education (Burchell and Listoken 1995; 
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Anderson 2002). Furthermore, the Act provided a number of mechanisms to 
ensure compliance with Brown (Anderson 2002). The Civil Rights Act 
outlawed discrimination by any public agency, and threatened loss of 
financing by any public or private entity receiving federal money for lack of 
compliance. It also authorized the U.S. Attorney General’s office to file suit 
against entities in violation. (Civil Rights Act 1964) Despite these gains, the 
actual process of desegregating schools and neighborhoods still fell on local 
entities, and still fell short of the goals set by Brown (Anderson 2002; Orfield 
2004). 
The precedent set by Brown and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, along with 
the widespread violence in U.S. cities following the assassinations of Robert 
Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr., eventually led to the enactment of the 
1968 Fair Housing Act (Yinger 1999; Connelly 2005; Kennedy 1999). This act 
took the strides made by the Civil Rights Act and applied them specifically to 
housing. As such, the Fair Housing Act represents the legal foundation for 
residential racial desegregation. The act outlaws discrimination based on race, 
color, religion, or national origin in housing searches, purchasing, renting, or 
financing (HUD 2006). This legislation banned racist housing practices such 
as redlining, separate public housing projects for different races, and outright 
discrimination in housing searches.   
However, this elimination of de jure segregation did not mean that de 
facto racial discrimination disappeared from the practice of housing searches, 
development, and financing (Burchell and Listoken 1995; Yinger 1998). The 
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Fair Housing Act did not provide strong policy tools to implement its lofty 
goals. Instead, the onus for rectifying discrimination falls upon the wronged 
party. Thus, those seeking integration via the application of Fair Housing 
standards often have “had to confront the inherent conflict between the right 
of all people to choose where to live and the right of owners to dispose of their 
property as they wish—rights that compose the two sides of the American 
dream” (Yinger 1999, 93). As a result, discriminatory practices, though now 
illegal, continue to pose a threat to true racial equality in the housing market 
(Yinger 1998; Bond and Williams 2007; Haurin, Herbert, and Rosenthal 
2007).  
Meanwhile, increasing violence and instability in America’s inner cities 
resulted in political pressure to de-concentrate poverty and minority 
households in the urban ghettos. “In the wake of urban disturbances in 
several larger American cities, no fewer than four national and presidential 
commissions called for a greater dispersion of federally subsidized housing 
and, more specifically, for greater development of such housing in suburban 
areas” (Briggs 2005, 249). While the public and policymakers largely agreed 
that the de-concentration of poverty should be a core goal of housing policy 
and government action, they also needed to combat the widespread 
perception that the poor – particularly those receiving government aid – 
constitute a negative influence upon mainstream society (Gilens 1996; Feagin 
1975; Henry and Reyna 2004; Katz 1996). “From the standpoint of a society 
that wants at once to protect lower-class people from each other and to 
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protect itself from them, there are advantages to having them…scattered in a 
way such that they will not constitute a “critical mass” anywhere” (Banfield 
1968, 257). This viewpoint harkens back to the similar concerns expressed 
through every housing policy since the Homestead Act: that the poor are not 
the same as mainstream society, are usually a negative influence on society, 
and therefore must be separated from it to the greatest extent possible.  
By the late 1960s, blockbusting and redlining were illegal, but decades 
of institutionalized racism had created segregated metropolitan areas across 
the country (Cashin 2004; Massey and Denton 1993; Seitles 1998; Wilson 
1987). Residential integration was one of the primary goals of the civil rights 
movement, yet the obstacles seemed daunting, and the tools limited. 
(Anderson 2002; Cashin 2004) Local attempts at compliance faced vehement 
opposition from residents of neighborhoods forced to deal with integration 
policies such as mandatory busing to integrate school districts (McConahay 
1982; Lukas 1985). Such vehement community opposition to forced 
desegregation hindered the realization of the principles embodied in the Civil 
Rights Act and:  
“Fifty years after Brown v. Board, we now profess to believe that 
the United States should be an integrated society and that 
people of all races are inherently equal and entitled to the full 
privileges of citizenship. Here is the reality: While we accept 
these values in the abstract, we are mostly pretending that they 
are true” (Cashin 2004, x).  
Although the goals of integration are still far off, the public largely 
views racial discrimination as a phenomenon of the past, and not particularly 
pervasive in today’s society (Sears et al. 1997; Kinder and Sanders 1996). 
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Brown and the Civil Rights Act remain powerful symbols representing 
equality in America, despite the evidence that real, measurable progress was, 
and continues to be minimal (Cashin 2004; Orfield 2004). 
Devolution and Retrenchment 
By 1970, the public and policymakers’ attitudes about federally 
sponsored housing grew so negative that the programs held little chance to 
succeed. (Krumholz 2004) Faced with increasing costs and little evidence of 
success, the Nixon administration placed a universal moratorium on all 
federal housing production programs, effective January 1, 1973 (Orlebeke 
2000; Marcuse 1978). In the American consciousness, the destruction of 
Pruitt-Igoe later that year – a project considered an architectural masterpiece 
in its prime, and the most notorious public housing project at its termination, 
confirmed the failure of public housing (Krumholz 2004; von Hoffman 1996). 
Stemming in part from the negative outcomes of the concentration of public 
housing, federal housing programs today typically aim to produce mixed-
income housing or dispersing poor households throughout metropolitan 
regions.  
Most programmatic shifts during the post-moratorium period involved 
a process of devolution and federal retrenchment, consolidating multiple 
programs and removing the federal government from direct program 
oversight or management (Davis 2006; Marcuse and Keating 2006). During 
this period the government consolidated and largely decentralized funding for 
all housing programs (Haynes and Stough 1997; Nenno, Brophy, and Barker 
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1982). The federal programs currently in place for the development of mixed-
income and affordable housing provide funding to state and local 
governments through housing vouchers, tax credits, and block grants (Lang 
and Sohmer 2000; Orlebeke 2000; Shlay 1995; von Hoffman 1996). The 
Housing Choice Voucher program aims to facilitate mobility for low-income 
households (McClure 2008); Block Grants (primarily CDBG and HOME) 
provides funding for housing construction and development without the 
direct oversight of the federal government, while the Low Income Housing 
Tax Credit (LIHTC) allocates tax benefits to states in order to spur investment 
through tax relief. 
Vouchers 
Vouchers appeal to many policymakers because they, “Involve less 
active interference in the production of housing by the private market than 
any other type of public subsidy” (Hays 1985, 140). From a conservative 
standpoint, vouchers provided a good alternative to the costly and intrusive 
government-sponsored production programs of the 1960s (Burchell and 
Listoken 1995; Krumholz 2004). Liberals, on the other hand, value their 
flexibility, as well as the effect of de-concentrating the poor by removing them 
from public housing (Hays 1985; Marcuse and Keating 2006). 
Vouchers enjoy popularity because they are recipient-based, providing 
direct assistance to those most in need. They also take advantage of private-
sector housing, not requiring direct construction of management of housing 
by the government (Turner 2003). However, they have yet to succeed in 
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providing mobility to most of their holders, limiting the positive benefits they 
might have in the realm of poverty deconcentration and access to opportunity 
(McClure 2008). While theoretically, voucher holders can settle anywhere in 
the metropolitan area, research shows that recipients, “are no more likely 
than nonsubsidized households to penetrate discriminatory market barriers 
and find rental accommodations in integrated living environments” (Carr 
1999, 143). This primarily stems from the fact that the law does not require 
landlords (in most states and cities) to accept vouchers. Furthermore, the 
rent-ceiling imposed on the program prevents most recipients from moving 
into non-poor neighborhoods (Krumholz 2004).  
Block Grants 
States and municipalities receive Block Grants to use, for the most part, 
at their discretion (Orlebeke 2000). While certain parameters exist regarding 
income targeting and some preferences for location, states and cities maintain 
significant control over how they choose to utilize their block grant funding 
(Burchell and Listoken 1995).  Two grant programs specifically address 
housing affordability: the Community Development Block Grant (CDBD) and 
the HOME program. The passage of the CDBG in 1974 represents one of the 
earliest steps in the retrenchment process, eliminating much of the federal 
oversight and guidelines for housing development and instead distributing 
funds using specific formulae to states and cities (Orlebeke 2000). But in 
practice, CDBG did little to stimulate affordable housing production. (Goetz 
1995)  
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As a result, the Reagan administration created a separate, housing-only 
block grant (Orlebeke 2000). The plan took shape in the 1990 Housing Act as 
the first installment of the HOME program, which strove to remove the 
bureaucratic entrenchment of HUD and reinstate local authority over housing 
(Burchell and Listoken 1995). Today, HOME is, “the largest federal block 
grant to state and local governments designed exclusively to create affordable 
housing for low-income households” (HUD 2004). Rental housing programs 
comprise more than half of the nearly $2 billion in annual funding, which is 
split equally between production and preservation programs (Arigoni 2001). 
Tax Credits 
With voucher programs in place to aid low-income families without 
production, and block grants supplying flexible spending to local 
governments, the federal government eventually used tax incentives to 
increase opportunities for private development. Since its inception in 1986, 
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) evolved into the principal 
mechanism for the production of affordable housing in the United States 
(Burchell and Listoken 1995; Orlebeke 2000). By providing tax credits as 
incentives for the production of affordable housing, the federal government 
codified the desire to “bring the efficiency and discipline of the private market 
to the building of affordable rental housing” (Cummings and DiPasquale 
1999, 252). 
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) stimulates housing 
production, while simultaneously removing the federal government from the 
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role of overseer. Qualifying LIHTC properties must contain at least 20 percent 
units affordable to households earning 50 percent or less of Area Median 
Income (AMI) or 40 percent to households earning less than 60 percent of 
AMI (Cummings and DiPasquale 1999; McClure 2000). Unit affordability 
must be maintained for at least 15 years, but in some instances, the term of 
affordability is longer (Wallace 1995). “For developers, syndicators, and 
limited partners, investing in low-income housing is a way of doing well by 
doing good” (Goetz 1995).  The program theoretically encourages mixed-
income development, thereby avoiding the poverty concentration and 
isolation issues associated with public housing. In practice, however, 
developments using LIHTC funding are nearly always fully income restricted 
(McClure 2008). The LIHTC also contains a preference for development in 
“qualified census tracts” (QCT) – an area where at least half of the households 
earn less than sixty percent of the area median income (Cummings and 
DiPasquale 1999; Mueller and Schwartz 2008). This requirement ostensibly 
promotes the development of affordable housing in communities where it is 
most needed, yet it runs counter to the goal of dispersing housing and 
promoting its construction in non-poor areas to avoid concentrating the poor. 
As a result of such program guidelines as well as community pressures, 
development occurs primarily in low income, metropolitan neighborhoods 
(Cummings and DiPasquale 1999).  
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Poverty Deconcentration and Access to Opportunity 
The trend in social policy, including housing policy, over the past 30 
years has been one of steady federal retrenchment and power devolution. 
Beginning with the Nixon administration, the federal government 
progressively withdrew from direct provision of housing for low- and 
moderate-income households (Goetz 1995; Orlebeke 2000). The 1970s and 
1980s also witnessed a conservative reaction against entitlement programs of 
any kind, which many viewed as fostering dependency. Devolution of power is 
consistent with a conservative view of federalism, but part of the goal of the 
transfer of authority was retrenchment. (Goetz 1995) By devolving control and 
limiting funding, many of the programs would simply vanish, particularly 
those aimed toward the neediest households 
However, some important policies were passed during this time – most 
notable were the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). While not explicitly a housing policy, the 
CRA aims to combat redlining and discrimination in housing lending and 
finance by spurring investment in low-income and heavily minority 
neighborhoods (Schill and Wachter 1995). The Housing Mortgage Disclosure 
Act (HDMA), instituted in 1974 to measure progress toward racial equality 
and integration, aimed to gather information on mortgage accessibility and 
racial steering. The CRA ensures that banks invest in low-income and 
predominately minority neighborhoods, open branches in “marginal” areas, 
and provide equal lending opportunities to low-income and minority 
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borrowers.  The CRA remains one of the few methods with which the federal 
government regulates the private banking and finance sector to ensure equal 
access and opportunity (Davis 2006).  
Despite numerous efforts to strengthen the regulatory tools of CRA, 
significant inequality remains in lending and access to credit for minority 
owned-business – particularly those located in predominately minority areas 
(Immergluck 2002, 2008). In the 35 years of accrued HMDA data, numerous 
reports analyzed the status of racial discrimination in the housing market 
(Bond and Williams 2007; Farley et al. 1994; Munnell et al. 1996; Yinger 
1998). While their data demonstrates a decrease in segregation by both race 
and class nationwide as well as overall improvement in access to credit for 
minorities and low-income households, most analyses suggest that such 
improvements are not indicative of the elimination of either racial 
discrimination or racial segregation (Burchell and Listoken 1995). Thus, 
despite policy initiatives designed to improve access to opportunity, weak 
implementation at the local level continues to result in discrimination and 
unequal outcomes. 
Furthermore, devolution did little to combat the institutionalized 
segregation that pervades America’s cities. “The linkages among place, race 
and privilege are shaped by three dominant social forces – sprawl, 
concentrated poverty and segregation – all of which play out in large part in 
response to public policy decisions and practices of powerful private 
institutional actors” (Squires and Kubrin 2005, 48). Due in large part to the 
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devolution of responsibility to local governments, no court-mandated urban 
desegregation strategies came down until the 1970s, and each of those met 
with considerable opposition by local policymakers and community members. 
(Piven and Cloward 1967) Court-ordered dispersal programs, particularly the 
Yonkers, Gautreaux, and Mount Laurel decisions, induced municipalities to 
develop scattered-site housing to desegregate their neighborhoods. However, 
“The public resistance to (and essentially limited efficacy of) such efforts 
…each of which sought to force racial or socio-economic residential diversity 
results beyond antidiscrimination remedies — seem to be ample evidence of 
the futility of any such government action at this point in time” (Eaddy, et. al 
2007, 14).  
Despite barriers to integration, federal housing policy can be 
characterized as having a strong formal position favoring the dispersal of 
affordable housing options throughout the community, but major structural 
and institutional barriers remain (McClure 2008). These policies seek to limit 
concentration of poverty and racial segregation through mixed income 
development strategies and vouchers (Imbroscio 2008; Squires and Kubrin 
2005). Two programs – Chicago’s court-ordered Gautreaux program and the 
HUD demonstration program, Moving to Opportunity (MTO) – test the 
effects of moving poor families into non-poor neighborhoods. They provide 
low-income people with access to better schools and services in non-poor 
neighborhoods and of exposure to middle class peers and social norms 
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(Galster and Killen 1995; Jencks and Mayer 1990; Levanthal and Brooks-
Gunn 2000).  
The programs, while limited in scope, illustrate that improved 
neighborhood conditions do often result in benefits for many families (Galster 
2005; Kleit 2001; Krumholz 2004; Rosenbaum 1995; Rosenbaum and Popkin 
1991). Gautreaux, in particular, emphasized the improved educational and 
employment outcomes for the children who participated in the program 
(O'Regan and Quigley 1998; Rosenbaum and Popkin 1991). The MTO 
program demonstrated that moving to a non-poor neighborhood provides 
families with safer and higher quality housing. (Goering 2003; Orr and al. 
2003) Improved housing promotes economic mobility and self-sufficiency, 
enhances safety, and promotes financial stability for low-income households. 
(Braconi 1999; Bratt 2002; Briggs, Darden, and Aidala 1999; Collins and 
Margo 2000; Darden 2003; Freeman 2003; Goering 2003; Jargowsky 1997; 
Jencks and Mayer 1990; Rosenbaum and Popkin 1991) Thus, “housing policy 
can be a tool for enhancing families’ economic opportunities.” (Shlay 1995, 
490) Conversely, poor-quality and unaffordable housing presents a significant 
barrier to achievement and self-sufficiency. By improving the housing of low-
income families, both adults and children can achieve greater success in work 
and in school activities (Braconi 1999; Bratt 2002; Katz et al. 2003; Morra 
1994; Rumberger 2003; Sanborn et al. 2003; Wilson 1991; Young 2001). 
Despite the findings from the MTO and Gautreaux programs 
demonstrating the importance of providing equal access to opportunity, the 
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federal government continues to prioritize homeownership incentives over 
polices promoting rental housing affordability. One of the most aggressively 
pursued strategies during the past decade strives to increase access to 
mortgage credit for low-income and minority households. (Shlay 2006) While 
such a promotion represents a worthy attempt to increase opportunity among 
these populations, the means of doing so lacked planning and regulation (Ho 
and Pennington-Cross 2006; Tatom 2008).  
Policy priorities designed to increase access to opportunity and to 
promote mixed-income development also pervade the public housing 
program. While no new public housing is produced under the original 
program, existing public housing developments continue to operate. Many of 
these projects have been revitalized through the HOPE VI program, enacted 
in 1993. HOPE VI aims to relieve the social isolation that plagued public 
housing over the first 50 years of its existence by attracting working and 
middle-class households into “the projects.” Over time, such redevelopment 
of public housing projects resulted in the complete revitalization of some 235 
housing developments into mixed-income communities (Katz 2006). The 
program aimed to, “transform public housing communities from islands of 
despair and poverty into a vital and integral part of larger neighborhoods” 
(Orlebeke 2000).   
Dispersal programs are not without their critics, who argue that the 
HOPE VI program aims not to help public housing residents, but to 
deconcentrate them in a way that undermines existing communities and 
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neighborhoods and diminishes the networks and social capital of the poor 
(Bennett, Smith, and Wright 2006; Imbroscio 2008; Smith 1998). In many 
aspects, the HOPE VI program achieved great success, yet it also resulted in 
the net loss of 60,000 housing units for the most needy families and 
individuals (Bratt, Hartman, and Stone 2006) 
Housing Policy Today 
 American poverty policy has a strong history of seeking to reward hard 
work and encourage self-sufficiency (Piven and Cloward 1971; Jencks 1992; 
Katz 1996; Feagin 1975). Today, the vast majority of federal housing initiatives 
promotes and protects homeownership. American housing policy today 
reflects its historical roots in trying to distinguish between the worthy and 
unworthy; encouraging the “submerged middle class” yet discouraging 
permanent dependency (Bratt, Hartman, and Stone 2006; Friedman 1978; 
Hays 1985; Jackson 1985; Radford 1996; Vale 2000; Iglesias 2007; Bond and 
Williams 2007; Stone 2006; Orfield 2006; Jargowsky 2006; Squires and 
Kubrin 2005). Policies designed to do so, such as the mortgage interest tax 
deduction, are not perceived as a “handout,” despite the enormous outlay of 
federal tax dollars involved. (Bratt 1989; Colton 2003) Such policies fall in 
line with the desire to promote stable middle-class communities, yet do little 
to aid families who are “shelter poor” (Stone 2006). Such public policies also 
often result in continued racial and economic segregation and exclusion 
(Pogodzinski 1991; Pendall 2000; Fischel 2004; Cowan 2006). 
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Furthermore, changes in the mortgage market – including 
deregulation in the secondary markets – resulted in the creation of a sub-
prime mortgage market (Bond and Williams 2007). The subprime market 
originated loans to households who did not fit the criteria required by 
standard mortgage lenders. While these changes resulted in greater access to 
capital for low-income and minority borrowers, many of the lenders took 
advantage of their clients by pushing them into mortgages they had little 
ability to pay back. These “predatory” lenders charged grossly high interest 
rates to vulnerable populations, particularly poor and minority families 
(Haurin, Herbert, and Rosenthal 2007). Spurred on by a mortgage system 
that diluted the risk of lending to marginally qualified applicants, the 
subprime market grew by 900 percent during the 1990s. By 2008, subprime 
loans comprised a substantial portion of the housing market, making up 
nearly 15 percent of all loans in 2008 – increasing from only 7 percent in 1989 
(Bond and Williams 2007).  
Furthermore, between 2006 and 2008, the foreclosure rate increased 
by 225%, largely as a result from defaults in the subprime sector 
(RealtyTrac.com 2009) and a  disproportionate number of these foreclosures 
occur in low income and minority communities (Haurin, Herbert, and 
Rosenthal 2007; Immergluck and Smith 2006). As foreclosures increased and 
the value of homes fell, the mortgages held by banks and the quasi-public 
institutions Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae lost tremendous value (Wheelock 
2008; Tatom 2008; Gerardi et al. 2008). As banks across the country close 
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and the federal government institutes bailouts, national debate once again 
centers on housing policy. The current housing crisis demonstrates not only 
the importance of housing policy to the overall U.S. economy, but also how 
minority and low-income households routinely pay the price for poor 
policymaking.  
The housing policies of the past forty years reflect a view of the poor 
similar to that of the puritans, and a belief that “the delivery of housing 
services must … eventually foster family economic self-sufficiency” (Shlay 
1993, 457). This perspective, along with, “a growing public opinion that 
recipients were abusing income-maintenance programs” (Rohe and Kleit 
1999, 335), all contributed to federal budget cutbacks and continued 
devolution.  In the United States, the widespread image of the ‘welfare queen,’  
“who sits at home watching television while her AFDC checks come pouring 
in, having baby after baby as a way to fill her coffers, has dominated reform 
efforts of the past two decades” (Hirshmann 2002, 341). These views shape 
debates over social policy in Congress, classrooms, and coffee shops, and are 
indicative of the desire to limit dependency on government programs and 
encourage individualism and self-reliance.  
The continued contraction of federal subsidies and HUD 
appropriations signifies the ambivalence felt by both policymakers and the 
public toward providing housing for poor and low-income households 
(Burchell and Listoken 1995; Hays 1985; Marcuse and Keating 2006; Shlay 
1995). While there is widespread recognition that affordability and lack of 
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adequate housing present major obstacles to economic success, a return to 
direct federal provision of housing in the form of public housing lacks support 
(Belden, Shashaty, and Zipperer 2004; Field 1997). Furthermore, racial and 
class segregation and concentration of poverty continue to present a major 
problem for U.S. communities (Eaddy et al. 2003; Orfield 2004; Bond and 
Williams 2007). The tools and policies in place do not provide a strong 
impetus to achieve equal access to opportunity for low-income and minority 
households, as the federal government continually shies away from policies 
and programs that might achieve such equity.  
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Chapter 3: Developing Affordable Housing in Non-Poor 
Areas 
The principles of self-reliance, limited government, and the free market 
clearly shaped housing policy over the past century. While funding for 
affordable housing comes from the federal level, siting and development 
decision-making occurs locally. Today, as in Colonial times, the responsibility 
to respond effectively to the housing needs of the poor rests with each 
individual community (Pendall 2000; Goetz 1995; Nenno, Brophy, and Barker 
1982; Stegman and Holden 1987). In the current policy context, “Affordable 
Housing” is most often privately built and publicly subsidized. While 
politically expedient and in line with American values, this system does not 
perform without challenges. Implementation of federal housing goals 
necessitates the construction of delicate financing systems, the navigation of 
local regulatory systems, and the assessment and mitigation of public 
opposition. 
The obstacles to the development of affordable housing in non-poor 
areas are many and varied. In the wake of federal retrenchment and 
devolution, municipalities struggle to promote policies and projects that 
balance their need to expand their tax base with the provision of adequate and 
affordable housing for all segments of their population. The reliance on 
private developers to produce affordable housing presents a situation where 
those with the most capacity and capability to develop adequate housing are 
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steered – through policy guidelines or profitability constraints – to produce 
housing at the top-end of the affordability spectrum. This leaves the 
production of very low income housing to CDCs and other non-profit 
providers who often lack the capacity to overcome exclusionary land use 
regulations or public opposition (Bratt 2009). 
As both financial and land use constraints make the development of 
affordable housing increasingly difficult, developers remain extremely 
vulnerable to any delays or changes to their plans. Requirements for public 
participation in the siting process mean that a well-organized opposition can 
have considerable power over siting decisions (Stein 1996; Galster et al. 2003; 
Stover 1994; Gibson 2005; Connelly 2005). If a community perceives a 
project to have a negative impact on neighborhoods and communities, 
opposition can prevent its success.  
Throughout the twentieth century, challenges to implementation 
thwarted the success of public policies designed to alleviate poor and 
unaffordable housing conditions (Cowan 2006; Davis 2006; Dear 1991; 
DiPasquale and Cummings 1990; Euchner 2003; Fischel 2004; Galster et al. 
2003; Goetz 1995; Heudorfer 2002; Iglesias 2002; Johnson and Pacific 
Institute for Public Policy 1982; Koschinsky and Swanstrom 2001; 
Pogodzinski 1991; Stegman and Holden 1987). The most difficult challenges 
arise when attempting to develop affordable housing outside of poor areas. 
Financial challenges and local capacity constraints (Stone 2006; Davis 2006; 
Stegman 1989; Stegman and Holden 1987; Wallace 1995), local regulations 
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(Goetz 1993; Heudorfer 2002; Katz et al. 2003; Pendall 2000; Cowan 2006; 
Ihlanfeldt 2004; Nenno, Brophy, and Barker 1982), and public opposition 
(Pendall 1999; Kean 1991; Ross 2001; Dear 1992; Iglesias 2002) can all 
impede the development of affordable housing. These challenges become 
particularly problematic when attempting to build such housing in non-poor 
neighborhoods and communities.   
Financial Challenges & Local Capacity Constraints 
The steady decline in funding from the federal level over the past thirty 
years resulted in a shift in authority to municipal governments.  
Municipalities today possess significant discretion over federal funds, but they 
receive pressure from many sides including the development community, 
local interest groups, and the public itself. Municipalities must balance 
housing needs with economic development, debates over land use, and public 
attitudes about growth (Basolo 2000; Mueller and Schwartz 2008). Such 
pressures create a difficult political environment for implementing housing 
policy at the local level, and each proposed project invites scrutiny from 
neighbors, local businesses, and other interest groups.  
As the federal government continues to withdraw from direct provision 
of housing for low-income households in favor of devolution to state and local 
jurisdictions, housing policy becomes more fragmented and increasingly lacks 
direction and clarity of purpose (Bratt 1994; Bratt, Hartman, and Meyerson 
1986; Colton 2003; DiPasquale et al. 1990; Dolbeare and Crowley 2002; 
Dreier and Keating 1990; Friedman 1978; Goetz 1995; Haynes and Stough 
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1997; Koschinsky and Swanstrom 2001). Despite the efforts of non-profit and 
community development agencies to step into the void, the lack of simple or 
clear financing mechanisms impedes their ability to provide housing for low 
and moderate-income households. As a result, the goals of improving housing 
for the poor, increasing opportunity for poor and minority households, and 
establishing guidelines that limit discrimination in the housing market 
remain unfulfilled (Bratt, Hartman, and Stone 2006; Briggs 2005; Hays 1985; 
Iglesias 2007). 
The historic lack of a coherent vision for housing policy at the federal 
level adversely affected municipalities’ abilities to determine adequate 
administrative processes for program implementation (Mueller and Schwartz 
2008). Furthermore, the shift from public to private sector housing provision 
places the responsibility for the implementation of housing policy on the 
private, market-driven sector, which seeks profit maximization, and nonprofit 
housing agencies, which have limited capacity (Bratt 2009; Herbert and 
Wallace 1998; Keyes et al. 1996; Koschinsky 1998). Finally, realities on the 
ground often can produce outcomes that run counter to the stated goals of 
federal policies and funding mechanisms. Each of these challenges inhibits 
the production of enough affordable housing to meet the needs of low and 
very-low income households. 
Local Government Capacity and Resource Constraints 
The shift from federal to state and local control over affordable housing 
production is intended to produce innovative programs which can respond to 
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local and regional needs better than oppressive, federal policies (Orlebeke 
2000). However, when devolution pairs with retrenchment and considerable 
cuts in funding, as it was during the 1980s, municipalities lack the requisite 
resources for developing innovative programs, (Goetz 1995; Davis 2006; 
Mueller and Schwartz 2008) resulting in local housing policies plagued by 
inadequate production, cost overruns, and poor planning (Buki 2002). A lack 
of state action further compounds this problem, leaving municipalities on 
their own to develop housing plans and policies in line with their needs 
(Downs, DiPasquale, and Keyes 1990; Katz et al. 2003). Studies show that, 
“states are not using their discretion to target income groups below those 
specified at the federal level” (Mueller and Schwartz 2008, 131). Thus, the 
increased flexibility resulting from devolution did not result in more housing 
targeted to the neediest populations. 
Furthermore, devolution of power to cities and states results in 
opportunities for local interest groups to have a larger influence on funding, 
siting, design, and income targeting decisions than when policy rules are 
made at the federal level. Mueller and Schwartz (2008) find that local 
government programs are those least likely to produce housing for the poor, 
due in large part to “the difficulty of raising substantial funds for 
redistributive purposes at the local level, and the opposition of middle-class 
residents to siting affordable rental housing in their neighborhoods” (p. 133). 
In short, devolution has resulted in “less money for lower-income housing; 
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less targeting for lower-income people and lower-income communities, and 
more political clout for interests inimical to both” (Davis 2006, 385). 
“Creative Finance” and Challenges for Nonprofit Developers 
There are numerous factors that influence the use of debt and equity in 
developing affordable rental housing and these depend largely upon the 
financing practices of individual lending institutions (Vandell 2000). For 
decades, the federal government held the role of primary provider of very low-
income rental housing via public housing (Wallace 1995). Today, nonprofit 
and private developers are the principle providers of federally subsidized 
housing. Nonprofit housing agencies currently provide nearly 1.5 million 
households with affordable housing – nearly 25% more than the current stock 
of public housing (Bratt 2009).  
Recent research also demonstrates that nonprofit developers are much 
more likely than for-profit entities to provide housing to low and very-low 
income households (Bratt 2008). Nonprofit housing agencies also tend to 
develop larger units that can be made available to families (Bratt 2008). 
These agencies also are more apt to redevelop distressed areas and develop 
housing with little to no profit potential (Keyes et al. 1996; Koebel 1998; 
Herbert and Wallace 1998). However, the challenges of housing finance often 
limit smaller nonprofits’ ability to obtain funding for such projects 
(Bockmeyer 2003; Cummings and DiPasquale 1999). Instead, for-profit 
developers obtain the vast majority of the public and private funding available 
for housing construction (Bratt 2009) and these entities typically produce 
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smaller, more expensive units, in areas with strong or healthy housing 
markets. In other words, nonprofit housing agencies target households and 
neighborhoods with the greatest need for affordable housing, yet they are at a 
disadvantage when competing for funding and are extremely vulnerable to 
delays or loss of financing mechanisms that might sink a project (Bratt 2009; 
Keyes et al. 1996; Stoecker 1997). 
The LIHTC, with HOME and CDBG grants, are the principle financing 
mechanisms in the development of affordable housing (Cummings and 
DiPasquale 1999; McClure 2000). However, federal funds alone are not 
sufficient to develop housing affordable to low income renters. Because of 
programmatic regulations, high land costs, and limited profit margins, 
developers must often utilize numerous funding streams in order to finance 
affordable housing (Wallace 1995). This system of layering or “creative 
finance” is a, “Highly inefficient, costly, and labor-intensive means of 
producing low-income housing” (Stegman 1989, 358). In order to provide 
adequate financing, developers of affordable housing need to combine – on 
average – between six and eight funding sources (Koebel 1998; Koschinsky 
1998). Such requirements put small, nonprofit developers at a disadvantage: 
“The ability of for-profit developers to cover the costs of acquiring land or 
buildings, as well as the up-front development costs, often allows them to 
move more quickly and efficiently than nonprofits” (Bratt 2008, 336). The 
difficulties in layering financing put immense pressure on these agencies 
     
64 
whose organizational capacity is already stretched due to budgetary and 
personnel constraints.  
Developers often cite high land costs as the primary constraint on their 
ability to develop affordable housing (Estes 2007). This is particularly 
problematic when developing housing in non-poor neighborhoods where by 
definition, the land costs are higher than in lower-rent areas. The lack of 
innovation in local policies, coupled with increased reliance on private and 
nonprofit developers highly dependent upon traditional financing, limits 
developers’ ability to target their projects to very low-income households or to 
build units suitable for poor families (Bratt 2009; Stoecker 1997). 
Furthermore, the need for multiple financing mechanisms makes affordable 
housing development extremely vulnerable to cost overruns, delays, and other 
financial woes (Bockmeyer 2003; Herbert and Wallace 1998; Koschinsky 
1998). While numerous organizations (many of which are federally-funded) 
exist to aid community development corporations (CDCs) and other nonprofit 
housing agencies, including NeighborWorks America, LISC, and the 
Enterprise Foundation (Bratt 2009), they cannot always help small 
community enterprises address issues inherently local in nature. 
Federal Funding Rules and Impediments 
Federal policy today emphasizes the development of housing outside of 
poor areas; however, this typically means higher land and construction costs. 
Furthermore, rules and regulations in major federal housing programs often 
run counter to the overarching goals of economic integration and providing 
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greater access to opportunity. For example, the LIHTC program provides 
added incentive for developers to build in “qualified census tracts.” A 
qualifying tract must consist of at least 50 percent households with an income 
less than 60 percent of the area median family income (McClure 2000). As a 
result of this preference, 54 percent of LIHTC developments are located in 
central cities (McClure 2000). Furthermore, research concludes that “the 
program has been used most often to provide better housing in poor 
neighborhoods rather than housing opportunities for poor households in 
higher-income neighborhoods” (Cummings and DiPasquale 1999, 303). While 
improving housing in poor neighborhoods is truly valuable, tax credits have 
not directly succeeded in deconcentrating poverty or in providing 
opportunities for the poor in more affluent areas. 
Devolution and retrenchment at the federal level resulted in an overall 
decrease in subsidies, meaning that developers feel more pressure to develop 
projects likely to succeed. Today, developing affordable housing requires even 
more careful financial and political management to avoid any costly delays in 
permitting or acquisition – skills that many small, nonprofit developers 
simply do not have (Koschinsky 1998; Herbert and Wallace 1998). Since these 
organizations provide housing for the neediest populations, the housing 
targeted for poor families is that which is most vulnerable to financial failure. 
Thus, even when developers are motivated to build affordable housing in non-
poor neighborhoods, efforts can be undermined higher land costs and 
program regulations such as those in LIHTC limit the ability of developers to 
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compete for tax credit financing thereby restricting the number of units 
targeted to very low income households (Cummings and DiPasquale 1999). 
HOME financing also includes provisions that can prove challenging 
for developers. HOME rules stipulate that projects obtain local approval and 
that municipalities proactively involve the community in decisions regarding 
distribution of HOME funds (Nyden et al. 2003). While the HOME program 
does not contain explicit language regarding the location of projects using its 
financing, the requirement for community support introduces the potential of 
neighborhood opposition to projects sited in more affluent neighborhoods. As 
Hamilton (Nyden 2003) states, “local level decision-making can be impacted 
by activists or advocacy groups who may be pursuing their own narrow 
interests. This adds a dimension to public policy decision making as the 
agendas of these activists and neighborhood groups may be contrary to the 
broader needs of the area” (p. 37).  
The financial rules of federal funding programs drive production of 
affordable housing. Furthermore, the need to layer multiple financing 
mechanisms presents a challenge when the rules of those programs conflict. 
Many state and local–level financing mechanisms provide funding for 
projects at 100% of AMI, or even 120%, but developers wishing to use HOME 
or LIHTC financing must target most of their units at 60% of AMI. Thus, 
instead of providing flexibility to produce a mix of units at a variety of income 
levels, most affordable housing is produced for those earning 50%-60% of 
AMI. While very little housing for low income households would be 
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constructed without the subsidy provided by these programs, some have 
criticized the income targeting criteria while claiming that the program rules 
produce a glut of housing at certain income levels and ignore the needs of 
many millions of needy Americans (Nelson 1994).  
The current system of housing finance is extremely inefficient and 
costly. Nonprofit agencies play an increasingly prominent role in the 
development of affordable housing.  As the government removes itself from 
direct production, the difficulties in layering financing puts immense pressure 
on these agencies. As a result, nonprofits are pressed, “To focus their creative 
energies on financial packaging rather than on ensuring that the families who 
will occupy their housing receive the services they need to be more 
productive, self-sufficient members of the community” (Stegman 1989, 358). 
Furthermore, such challenges limit the ability of developers to successfully 
navigate other obstacles to housing development, including local land use 
regulations and opposition from neighbors and communities. 
Regulatory Challenges 
Property rights and homeownership are revered and protected through 
numerous regulatory and legal mechanisms that present obstacles to the 
development of affordable housing in non-poor neighborhoods (Pendall 
2000; Ihlanfeldt 2004). Such regulatory mechanisms historically deepened 
segregation by both race and class, and continue to do so, albeit in a less 
obvious and explicit manner than the overt policies of the pre-Civil Rights Act 
era (Orfield 2006; Seitles 1998). Zoning and land use regulations, which 
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receive very little oversight from higher levels of government, comprise some 
of the most effective legal mechanisms to separate the poor from other parts 
of society. While such regulations are designed to protect the property of all 
Americans, they limit the ability of minorities and the poor to move out of 
inner-city neighborhoods and into suburban areas (Pendall 2000). While 
state governments sometimes enact guidelines to encourage municipal 
governments to regulate in certain ways, specific land use regulations fall 
under the purview and responsibility of individual cities and towns (Nenno, 
Brophy, and Barker 1982). 
Zoning  
Land use and zoning ordinances lie at the heart of the protection of the 
public’s health, safety, and welfare. Zoning has been the dominant form of 
local land control since it was first applied in the early 20th century (Valente et 
al. 2001). Before zoning laws, only nuisance laws – a strictly reactive measure 
that dealt with noise, safety, or health complaints from neighbors – regulated 
use of private property. Zoning, in contrast, is inherently proactive and 
preventative in that it identifies and codifies allowable uses for private 
property. While zoning fulfills the task of protecting residential areas from 
environmental and noise hazards, it is important to note that, “all local zoning 
ordinances affect the cost and supply of housing” (Valente et al 2001, 370). 
Local zoning regulations influence the location and type of jobs available in a 
community as well as the type and location of housing available in the 
community.  
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Before 1950, zoning regulations explicitly prevented minority 
households from moving into White neighborhoods (Pendall 2000; Fischel 
2004). However, due to the legal changes and mandates proscribed by Brown 
and the Civil Rights and Fair Housing Acts, “anything that looked like racial 
zoning was almost never tolerated by the courts. Zoning could, however, be 
used to reduce potential contact between races, or between high- and low-
income people, by the facially neutral expedient of insisting on large lots and 
single family homes in residential districts” (Fischel 2004, 330). While some 
states limit large lot zoning, most cities and towns may zone however they 
wish, so long as the language does not include any overt references to 
exclusion of any protected classes, including members of any specific races, 
genders, or religions. 
Restrictive zoning measures can effectively exclude lower income 
residents from moving into a community by limiting residential development 
at a scale affordable to them (Cowan 2006; Ihlanfeldt 2004). Towns widely 
employ such policies to ensure that residential areas stay separate from 
industrial and commercial developments in order to avoid undue exposure to 
the potentially harmful health, safety, and environmental externalities 
associated with many commercial or industrial uses (Pogodzinski 1991; 
Fischel 2004). However, since zoning regulations commonly group multi-
family residences together with commercial and industrial uses, multi-family 
developments are typically severely restricted in primarily residential areas 
(Ihlanfeldt 2004). Furthermore, multi-family housing does not enjoy the 
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same status and protection from any deleterious effects associated with 
proximity to industrial or commercial facilities accorded single-family homes. 
For the most part, multi-family housing is much more affordable than its 
single-family counterparts (Cowan 2006). Therefore, zoning multi-family 
residential separate from single-family residential not only separates renters 
from homeowners, but also serves to restrict the amount of affordable 
housing that can be developed in suburban and rural areas in which a very 
small percentage of the land is zoned for commercial development (Ihlanfeldt 
2004). 
Growth Patterns and Management Policies 
While suburban growth initially reflected increased opportunities, 
urban sprawl exacerbated economic separation in metropolitan areas. 
Unchecked growth during the middle part of the 20th century and reactions 
from the burgeoning environmental movement contributed to widespread 
public attitudes favoring growth management by the 1970s (Fischel 2004). 
Growth management encourages the implementation of regulations to limit 
or stop growth outside of the city centers thereby limiting sprawl and 
protecting the environment as well as agricultural uses and open space 
(Downs 2004; Buki 2002). While such techniques limit sprawl, checks on 
development “will not always benefit low-income of minority residents. It may 
instead promote gentrification” (Pendall 2000, 125-6). The “smart growth” 
regulations that seek to protect low-density land and limit sprawl include 
growth boundaries, building permit caps, utility district lines, and zoning 
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restrictions on multifamily housing (Downs 2004). While these measures 
ensure environmental protection and limit the ability for cities to grow 
unsustainably, they also can increase the cost of living substantially 
(Danielson, Lang, and Fulton 1999; Downs 2004; Arigoni 2001). 
Exclusionary land use mechanisms have a profound effect upon the 
supply and location of affordable housing:  
State and local regulations have a powerful role in shaping the 
housing market. Traditional, exclusionary land use and zoning 
policies – such as banning the development of multi-family 
housing and zoning to require large lots – and growth controls, 
which impose strict limits on housing supply without 
accommodating projected growth, can be big deterrents to 
building affordable housing and frequently excludes lower-
income and minority households from parts of a metropolitan 
area” (Katz et al 2003, xi).  
While growth management mechanisms can, and have been designed to 
accommodate housing for all income levels, more often, “the mottos of no-
growth, slow growth, managed growth and (currently) smart growth are all 
facially neutral watchwords which nonetheless are effective substitutes for 
more selective means of keeping the poor out of the suburbs” (Fischel 2004, 
332). By adopting “smart growth” techniques and mechanisms, local 
governments can effectively, whether intentionally or not, restrict entire 
regions from access by the lower classes. 
Racial Segregation and the Politics of Exclusion 
The preservation of racially segregated communities has long been 
recognized as one of the motives behind exclusionary land use ordinances 
(Massey and Denton 1993; Pendall 2000). Exclusionary zoning practices and 
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poorly designed smart growth plans often serve to maintain and even to 
deepen racial and class-based divisions:  
By prohibiting the development of housing that only the better 
off can afford, these local policies effectively exclude the poor 
and people of color from the places that erect those policy 
fences. Together with fragmented school districts that 
institutionalize the racial segregation of students, practices such 
as exclusionary zoning unnecessarily burden both the affected 
individuals and metropolitan regions (Orfield 2006, 1270).  
Despite civil rights and fair housing laws designed to prevent de jure 
segregation, research shows that exclusionary land use regulations continue 
to contribute to de facto racial segregation.  
Furthermore, since the advent of smart growth and anti-growth 
regulations, spatial segregation actually increased. Until the mid-1970s, 
spatial isolation was declining – Americans were increasingly likely to live in 
mixed-income as well as mixed-race neighborhoods. However, since the mid-
1970s, this trend reversed – at least in terms of income, creating by 1990, “a 
social environment that was far more homogeneously privileged than at any 
other time in the previous 20 years” (Massey 1996, 395). While class (or 
income-based) segregation technically is legal, racial discrimination and 
exclusion is not, and it has been shown that, “Low-density only zoning has 
historic and current connections with racial exclusion” (Pendall 2000, 140).  
The groundwork for the segregation of U.S. cities and suburbs was 
established decades ago through numerous mechanisms, including the public 
housing program and FHA lending policies (Briggs 2005; Collins and Margo 
2000; Squires and Kubrin 2005). Various structures and institutions, 
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exacerbated by public policy, kept the poor and minorities from moving 
outward and upward, and caused stagnation and disinvestment in low-income 
neighborhoods (Jargowsky 2006; Squires and Kubrin 2005). Those same 
policies enabled working and middle class Whites to obtain housing in 
communities far superior to those they left behind in the inner cities. “This 
isolation is perpetuated not only by the concentration of existing affordable 
housing in central cities and older suburbs, but by the barriers to developing 
affordable housing in most outlying suburbs” (Orfield 2006, 102). Such 
barriers limit contact between classes and races, resulting in increased 
mistrust and reducing the ability for people in different neighborhoods to 
recognize and address common goals (Young 1999). 
Further complicating the goals of those seeking residential integration 
through the development of affordable housing are the limited legal tools 
available to promote inclusionary policies. Over the past thirty years, the 
courts steadily reversed many of the desegregation and civil rights advances of 
the 1950s and 1960s (Anderson 2002; Orfield 1995, 2004) and in the 1990s 
the Supreme Court handed down three major decisions that authorized the 
reversal of schools desegregation plans. “In School Board of Oklahoma City v. 
Dowell, Freeman v. Pitts, and Missouri v. Jenkins, the Court permitted a 
return to segregated neighborhood schools, in part because of the belief that 
desegregation was neither feasible nor democratic” (Orfield 1995, 825). As the 
courts back away from desegregating schools, residential integration remains 
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the most promising method of promoting equality of opportunity (Rivkin 
1994; Cashin 2004; Ellen 2000). 
However, just as de facto school segregation continues, residential 
integration also faces considerable legal obstacles. “Federal constitutional 
case law suggests that even if a land use control system has racially 
exclusionary effects, it will survive challenges unless plaintiffs can prove that 
the local government in question explicitly intended to exclude suspect classes 
when it adopted the regulations” (Pendall 2000, 126). Therefore, segregation 
does not qualify as explicitly illegal unless it can be demonstrated that it 
results directly from a discriminatory act. These changes in tone and content 
indicate that, “the courts have turned away from racial integration as a 
positive ideal for civil society, narrowing their focus merely to remedying 
discrimination. This narrowing of vision ignores the ways segregation 
operates as an independent race-based barrier to equality of opportunity that 
is properly addressed by state intervention” (Anderson 2002, 1198). As a 
result, racial segregation remains a barrier to equal opportunity and the 
mechanisms available for dismantling it are steadily disappearing. 
Public Opposition 
Because the federal government does not directly regulate housing 
production, private and non-profit developers must amass numerous 
financing mechanisms in order to create a viable proposal (Mueller and 
Schwartz 2008; Stegman 1989; Wallace 1995). Restrictive local zoning and 
other land use regulations often make it very difficult to site affordable 
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housing without obtaining zoning variances (Euchner 2003; Field 1997; 
Koebel 2004). Such variances often require public approval, and the process 
of obtaining a variance through public hearings can be quite contentious 
(Cowan 2006). Public opposition tends to be more sophisticated in middle 
and upper class neighborhoods, where community engagement and agency 
are stronger (Gibson 2005; Nyden et al. 2003; Stein 1996; Pendall 1999; Kean 
1991). Because affordable housing development involves such a delicate 
process, even a slight delay can sink a project. Often a sophisticated public 
opposition spurs such delays, and as a result, neighborhood opposition can be 
a significant factor in preventing the development of affordable housing – 
particularly in non-poor areas (Iglesias 2002; Wilton 2002; Wolsink 1994). 
Americans almost universally value equal access to opportunity and 
racial integration at the neighborhood level (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 
2001; Erikson and Tedin 2003; Krysan 2000). However, they seldom show as 
much support of the specific policies designed to achieve those goals. This is 
particularly true when the means to that end is the development of affordable 
housing in suburban or middle-class neighborhoods (Schaffer and Saraf 
2003; Dear 1992; Stein 1992). Americans take action when their property is 
threatened, and subsidized housing is almost always perceived as a threat 
(Koebel 2004; Stover 1994). As Pendall concludes, “New housing 
developments, both market rate and subsidized, sometimes also look harmful. 
Every community has and needs housing, but the effects of a new residential 
development can spill over its borders to be borne by the entire community. 
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Consequently, established residents have long been vigilant about and even 
opposed new houses” (Pendall 1999, 113). This community opposition, termed 
“Not in My Backyard” (NIMBY) has been the focus of much academic debate.  
NIMBY and Non-Housing Facilities 
The term “NIMBY” was originally coined to describe struggles over the 
siting of contentious environmental and energy facilities, namely waste 
disposal and energy facilities. (Dear 1992; Lake 1993) The term is applied to 
debates over the siting of land uses that are typically viewed as societal 
necessities, yet produce local costs and therefore elicit concern when they are 
placed nearby. (Galster 2002; Pendall 1999) As outlined in Dear (1992), the 
main areas of concern for NIMBYs include threats to property values, decline 
in public safety, and burdens on neighborhood amenities. When proposals 
include energy facilities (Dear 1992) or waste management sites (Lober and 
Green 1994) such concerns are primarily voiced in terms of health or safety, 
thus the conflict often revolves around the potential environmental or health 
impacts of the facility. Yet when human services facilities – including mental 
health facilities (Piat 2000), housing for AIDS patients (Takahashi 1997), or 
housing for the homeless (Somerman 1993) are proposed, the environmental 
argument is replaced by concerns regarding the prospective residents or 
clients of the facility.  
Dear identifies a number of factors that contribute to the likelihood of a 
NIMBY response, as well as the strength of that response. These include client 
characteristics, the type and size of the facility, the structure of the community 
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and local program considerations (Dear 1992). Dear also finds that siting 
unwanted land uses in more homogenous communities elicit a stronger 
NIMBY response than more diverse areas. This typically means that suburban 
areas with more homogeneous populations and land uses are more likely to 
notice a different proposed land use, and are more likely to oppose it. (Dear 
1992) Much of the literature on non-housing NIMBY attitudes cites this 
framework established by Dear. The studies find that larger facilities, facilities 
catering to a less-desirable clientele (e.g. the poor or homeless) or clients seen 
as culpable for their situations (e.g. drug users or AIDS patients) will elicit a 
stronger NIMBY response. Thus, programs and facilities that cater to 
populations the public identifies as “unworthy” will receive less support than 
those providing aid to the worthy.   
Applying the term “NIMBY” to a land use conflict elicits a number of 
assumptions about those voicing opposition. Wolsink (1994) outlines the 
most ubiquitous of these. The first assumption Wolsink questions is that the 
facility or land use carries significant local costs, yet produces broad public 
benefits that are more spatially diffuse. Thus, people living in the targeted 
neighborhood perceive themselves as being unfairly burdened by negative 
externalities. The second assumption is that the siting process is pursued in a 
rational and scientific manner to select the ideal location for the facility. Thus, 
the neighborhood selected must bear the burden because it represents the 
ideal location for the land use. The third assumption is that there is universal 
agreement that the proposed facility or land use is desired by the community 
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as a whole, and fulfills a significant need. Thus, opposition to these proposed 
facilities are characterized as being self-interested, “free-rider” responses to a 
universally acknowledged public need. (Wolsink 1994) Wolsink cautions 
planners to take care with the terminology applied in such cases, arguing 
applying the term “NIMBY” unfairly or excessively could erode public 
agencies’ legitimacy in the future. 
Over the past two decades, other researchers have also questioned 
these assumptions. Studies in three different fields: wind energy (Wolsink 
1994) waste management (Lober and Green 1994), and deinstitutionalization 
of mental health patients (Piat 2000) found that agreement with the “public 
good” argument toward the facility were far from universal. Furthermore, it 
became clear that the siting process for such facilities was seldom perceived to 
be either scientific or rational. Instead, these authors find that what had 
previously been characterized as NIMBY can often represent perfectly 
legitimate opposition to the decision-making process, disagreement that the 
facility is “necessary” or skepticism regarding the “rationality” of the siting 
process. This realization has had a profound effect on the academic literature 
on NIMBY opposition to energy and hazardous waste facilities. Authors 
focusing on these land uses no longer presume universal agreement on 
whether a proposed facility is perceived to be a public or societal good. 
(Koebel 2004; Wolsink 1994)  
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NIMBY and Housing 
Stemming from such studies is additional research regarding the 
underlying reasons for NIMBY response that involve ideological or value-
driven attitude determinants. Such research approaches are particularly 
prevalent in the field of human services facility siting (Somerman 1993; 
Wilton 2002) but also have appeared in studies relating to hazardous waste 
facilities (Lober and Green 1994). This body of research concludes that, in 
general, NIMBY responses are complex, and dependent on respondents’ trust 
in government, ideology, and their views about the need for the proposed 
facilities (Pendall 1999). In the case of human services siting, one of the most 
important influences on NIMBY attitudes is the perception of the character or 
anticipated behavior of the residents or clients of proposed facilities (Dear 
1992; Takahashi 1997; Wilton 2002). 
Since a NIMBY response is characterized as a neighborhood-level 
response to negative local effects, (Dear 1991; Lake 1993) researchers and 
writers typically portray opposition to affordable housing as neighborhood-
level concern regarding the potential negative effects of housing and its 
residents upon their community. (Galster 2002; Kean 1991; Stein 1992) Such 
opposition is often resistant to any new development that might carry with it 
negative impacts (Cowan 2003; Lober and Green 1994; Piat 2000; Somerman 
1993; Wolsink 1994). Research focusing on the potential negative externalities 
brought by affordable housing in order to determine the validity of such 
concerns, and consequently, the legitimacy of the opposition emerged from 
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these findings (Freeman 2002; Galster 2002; Galster et al. 2002; Nguyen 
2005; Werwath 1996). 
Declining property values is the most oft-stated concern of those living 
nearby a proposed affordable housing project. For the most part, research on 
the potential negative effects of affordable housing on neighborhoods has 
shown that there are few demonstrable negative outcomes that result from the 
construction of affordable housing, and that it often can improve, rather than 
depress, the value of neighboring properties.  (Freeman 2002; Galster 2002; 
Nguyen 2005) One review of the connection between affordable housing and 
property values finds that any adverse impacts on property values depend on, 
“Design and management of affordable housing, compatibility between 
affordable housing and host neighborhood, and concentration of affordable 
housing” (Nguyen 2005, 1). Despite the evidence that affordable housing does 
not typically result in lower property values, crime, traffic, or overcrowded 
schools, these assurances do little to placate opposition that is concerned with 
the potential effects of the proposed housing.  
Overcoming NIMBY Opposition 
When confronted with neighborhood opposition, it is common for 
planners, developers, and policymakers to present a case for affordable 
housing that demonstrates its value to the community as a whole, and shares 
evidence demonstrating the lack of negative externalities. (Dear 1991; Field 
1997; Stover 1994) However, such outreach efforts seldom calm neighbors’ 
fears, and local opposition to affordable housing continues to hinder the 
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successful implementation of federal housing goals. A number of studies 
provide guidance for municipalities, advocates, and developers to manage 
NIMBY opposition. (Dear 1992; Katz et al. 2003; Koebel 2004; Pendall 1999; 
Stein 1996; Stover 1994)Others present examples of cases where these 
techniques have been applied. (Dear 1991; Stover 1994; Field 1997) Advocates, 
planners, and developers have utilized various techniques to overcome this 
opposition, including education, negotiation, and litigation. 
Education 
Numerous states and cities have pursued educational campaigns to 
garner support for affordable housing. In Fort Collins, Colorado, posters and 
flyers were distributed showing the “faces of affordable housing” – including 
teachers, firefighters, and auto mechanics – and the “places of affordable 
housing” – portraying attractive single and multi-family affordable homes. 
(Koebel 2004, 3) Advocacy groups in Chicago, Minnesota, and elsewhere have 
applied similar strategies. (Belden and Russonello 2003) By highlighting 
working people who are essential components of communities, these 
strategies seek overcome the negative stereotypes typically voiced toward 
affordable housing. These education and advocacy campaigns portray 
affordable housing and its residents as average working Americans, not as 
dependent, jobless vagrants. Including pay rates for these types of workers as 
well as the amount needed to rent or own a home in the community presents 
evidence that affordable housing is targeted to the “submerged middle class” 
– people who simply need a leg up to succeed, not those who might abuse 
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government subsidy. (Belden and Russonello 2003; Dear 1991; Goetz 2008; 
Koebel 2004) 
While education might be effective as a proactive measure, there is 
little evidence to show that it effectively counters an already established 
opposition. As Pendall (1999) points out, the opposition has little reason to 
trust those advocating for a particular development. Furthermore, some cases 
show that the opponents agreed with the basic premise that affordable 
housing was necessary in the area, but argued with the siting. (Koebel 2004, 
71) Thus, education on the community need for affordable housing would do 
little to mitigate this type of opposition. Consequently, a more typical first 
step is negotiation.  
Negotiation 
Numerous articles and studies have described negotiation strategies 
(Dear 1991; Stover 1994; Field 1997; Koebel 2004), yet not all provide cases 
where these techniques overcame opposition and explain how well they 
worked. Examination of these works reveals a number of general techniques 
applicable to overcoming or managing opposition. These include proactive 
and early meetings with citizens, education and media outreach methods; 
partnerships with local supporters and advocates of affordable housing; 
gaining support from political leaders where possible; and open and honest 
dialogue (Stein 1992).  
Many advocates and developers respond to opposition by making 
aesthetic changes, or otherwise altering the project to make it more acceptable 
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to neighbors, with varying degrees of success (Koebel 2004; Dear 1991; Stover 
1994; Dear 1992; Stein 1992; Iglesias 2002). In many cases, these changes 
increase the cost of development, reduce the number of affordable units, and 
generally decrease affordability – undermining public policy and planning 
initiatives (Heudorfer 2002; Stover 1994). Constant opposition or fear of 
opposition can also result in developers preemptively proposing more 
“acceptable” types of housing perceived to have fewer negative impacts, such 
as single family homes, housing for elderly populations, or housing for higher 
income residents (Galster et al. 2003; Koebel 2004; Stover 1994; Field 1997). 
Developers may also choose to site affordable housing in neighborhoods that 
offer less resistance – either in more peripheral areas with lower populations 
or in neighborhoods that lack the political and social capital to present a 
coordinated resistance (Estes 2007; Buki 2002). However, such strategies do 
not placate opposition that is concerned primarily with the residents, not the 
appearance or size, of the project.  
Litigation 
The courts have a long history of involvement in housing battles, 
whether based on discriminatory sale or rental practices (Shelley v. Kraemer; 
Jones v. Mayer Co.) to the overturning of exclusionary zoning (Mt. Laurel). 
Less well known, however, is the role of litigation – or the threat of litigation 
– in particular siting conflicts. In many cases, the race of the residents or 
other unconstitutional discrimination underlies opposition to affordable 
housing. One such example of this is a NIMBY battle that occurred in Yuba 
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City, California over proposed farm worker housing. According to the study, 
“Opponents, who had initially raised objections running from property value 
decline to the inappropriateness of spending federal funds on assisted 
housing, eventually focused their arguments on school overcrowding” (Stover 
1994, 52). This argument proved successful in blocking the permitting 
required for the development, despite the fact that the project met all the 
criteria set up by the city council. Because the rejection was based on the 
argument that the minority residents tend to have more school age children 
that their white counterparts, the non-profit developer sued based on 
discrimination and won.  
Litigation is typically considered a last-resort for developers of 
affordable housing, but in some cases, it has been used to excess, even 
“including preemptory threats of litigation to silence opposition” (Koebel 
2004, 46). While threats of lawsuits may quell some opposition, many 
perceive it to be an overly aggressive and unfair tactic. Furthermore, suits 
filed requesting monetary damages due to NIMBY delays largely failed 
(Koebel 2004, 47), suggesting that land use battles should be resolved at the 
project, municipal, or even state level rather than in the courtroom.  
Confronting Development Challenges 
Ensuring equitable distribution of affordable housing, rather than 
concentration in poor and minority neighborhoods, embodies an important 
component of successful housing policy. Doing so promotes racial and 
economic desegregation, deconcentration of poverty and overall equality of 
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access to opportunity (Anderson et al. 2003; Briggs 2003, 2005; Eaddy et al. 
2003; Freeman 2003; Galster and Killen 1995; Harkness and Newman 2000; 
Musterd and Andersson 2005; O'Regan and Quigley 1998). Despite housing 
policy’s emphasis on siting projects in a geographically equitable manner, 
implementation challenges and market forces thwart efforts to develop 
housing outside of poor areas. As a result, subsidized housing continues to be 
located primarily in central cities and low-income communities (Anderson et 
al. 2003; Briggs 2005; Cowan 2006; Turner 2003). 
The public continues to perceive affordable housing as a threat to 
neighborhoods – particularly non-poor neighborhoods – despite evidence to 
the contrary. None of the techniques typically applied to siting conflicts 
differentiate between self-interested, fear-based opposition and legitimate 
concerns regarding inappropriate development. Furthermore, the outreach 
mechanisms typically employed in land use conflicts seldom prove effective in 
countering opposition to affordable housing. Research on how and why the 
public opposes affordable housing can provide a greater understanding as to 
how to more successfully approach siting conflicts, whether through changes 
in policies framing siting goals or in the way that local governments set 
priorities and make siting decisions. 
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CHAPTER 4: PUBLIC OPINION and SOCIAL POLICIES 
Housing and race policies in this country were inexorably intertwined 
for nearly a century. While public support for the ideals of equal opportunity 
and integration has broadened over time, it remains unclear how strongly 
either the public or policymakers support the implementation of those ideals 
through policies and private action to plan, finance, and develop affordable 
housing. Public opposition, usually particularly strong in non-poor areas, 
often thwarts housing policy implementation. The existing literature on 
NIMBY attitudes generally does not draw upon public opinion research as a 
means of studying what the underlying determinants of such opposition are. A 
review of the existing literature, research, and surveys on the subject helps us 
determine how the public perceives both social and housing policies. By 
understanding what we do and do not yet know about public attitudes toward 
affordable housing, planners and policymakers can adjust their actions to 
more successfully achieve housing goals.  
A tangible connection between public opinion and government action 
legitimizes democratic government. “The study of public opinion is justified 
by the simple notion that democratic institutions should result in government 
decisions that reflect the views of everyday people” (Erikson and Tedin 2003, 
1).  Public opinion research denotes an important part of the democratic 
process in that it enables policymakers to understand public beliefs about 
governmental policies. However, political theorists, public opinion experts, 
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and political psychologists continue to debate the ability of “the masses” to 
make weighty and responsible decisions (Converse 2000; Mettler and Soss 
2004). Despite these misgivings, Americans place great importance on the 
idea that their government has the obligation to respond to public opinion 
when governing. Consequently, polls, surveys, and other measures of public 
attitudes continue to have a significant influence upon the formation of public 
policies (Mettler and Soss 2004). 
Public opinion research offers a valuable tool that influences both 
policymaking and planning practice. However, it is imperative to understand 
how attitudes are shaped, how values and ideology frame issues, and how 
stereotypes that may bear little resemblance to reality influence perceptions of 
target populations. Such factors strongly influence social policy attitudes, 
particularly when poor and minority populations are the beneficiaries. 
Understanding how each of these factors can shape the public’s opinion 
toward public policies is integral to any study seeking to analyze public 
attitudes toward affordable housing.  
Public Input and the Planning Field 
The field of urban planning strongly values the ideals of public 
participation and public debate (Arnstein 1969; Brooks 2002; Davidoff 1965; 
Forester 1993; Friedmann 1998). The code of ethics of the American Institute 
of Certified Planners states, “We shall give people the opportunity to have a 
meaningful impact on the development of plans and programs that may affect 
them. Participation should be broad enough to include those who lack formal 
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organization or influence” (American Planning Association 2005). Thus, 
planners seek and highly value public opinion and public input when 
managing the development process.  
However, urban planning during much of the twentieth century seldom 
lived up to these goals. During the 1950s and 1960s, many federal planning 
programs, including Urban Renewal and highway construction, destroyed 
vibrant urban neighborhoods despite strong neighborhood opposition (Gans 
1962; Hall 1988; Jacobs 1961). As a result, numerous researchers and 
practitioners contested the assertion that the planning process accurately and 
fully measures the attitudes of the entire affected population of a proposed 
plan or project (Davidoff 1965; Forester 1993; Imbroscio 1997; Krumholz 
1982). These authors argue that planning is not democratic enough in that it 
does not reflect the needs and desires of all affected parties, and even serves 
to exclude certain stakeholder groups from the deliberative process. This 
presents a huge challenge for those who value public input, for, “if the 
planning process is to encourage democratic urban government then it must 
operate so as to include rather than exclude citizens from participation in the 
process” (Davidoff 1965, 279).  
During the 1960s and 1970s, the planning field shifted toward more 
inclusive techniques, and to increased citizen activism aimed at protecting 
urban neighborhoods and the natural environment (Fainstein 2000; Gans 
1962; Jacobs 1961). Today, many planners seek, “to interpose the planning 
process between urban development and the market to produce a more 
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democratic and just society” (Fainstein 2000, 473). Despite these theoretical 
shifts, planners today tend to gather public input through public meetings, 
charettes, or focus groups – measures which tend to gather opinions from a 
small, self-selected group of individuals rather than the entire affected 
community (Carr and Halvorsen 2001). As a result, many individuals and 
groups continue to be excluded from the planning process (Alfasi 2003; 
Lowry 1997). 
When applying communicative and deliberative planning processes at 
the neighborhood level, regional needs – such as affordable housing or racial 
integration – can be overlooked. As Fainstein points out, planners are, 
“committed to equity and diversity, but there is little likelihood that such will 
be the outcome of stakeholder participation within relatively small 
municipalities” (Fainstein 2000, 460). Thus, when seeking the public’s 
opinion during the planning process, it is important to do so broadly, so as 
not to confine public participation to a self-selected, homogeneous population 
who may act in self-interest rather than the public interest. Broad public 
opinion surveys can rectify the narrow, local focus of many participation and 
outreach mechanisms. 
Attitude Formation and Application 
Public opinion research has the advantage of concrete sampling, data 
collection, and analysis techniques that provide a much more valid and 
legitimate understanding of public attitudes than the techniques commonly 
applied by planners. It is certainly not, however, a panacea: there are a 
     
90 
number of drawbacks that can hinder analysis of public attitudes. 
Inconsistent and unstable survey responses represent one of the biggest 
obstacles to gathering accurate data on public attitudes (Berinsky 2002; 
Converse 1964, 2000). Passage of time, changes in question wording, framing 
by the media or by the interviewer all can influence answers to survey or poll 
questions.  
Such inconsistencies can result from a lack of strong feelings on the 
given issue: survey respondents may simply choose a response when they 
have no concrete answer in mind (Converse 1964). A rival approach suggests 
that, while Americans do not necessarily consistently hold opinions on every 
topic at hand, they do hold “core values” that drive their reasoning on public 
policies (Alvarez and Brehm 2002). Yet another explanation asserts that 
individuals maintain sets of considerations, not fixed answers to questions, 
and factors such as question effects, wording, and ordering, most often 
produce variability and inconsistencies in survey responses (Zaller 1992). 
Each approach recognizes that information strongly shapes public 
attitudes. Experts in a particular subject will have much clearer, more distinct, 
and more nuanced opinions on a particular issue than someone only vaguely 
aware of the topic (Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000). For the most part, 
the public is largely uninformed about most issues, yet there is a high degree 
of variance in information levels across the population (Alvarez and Brehm 
2002; Converse 2000; Zaller 1992). Attention and information depend on the 
level of interest a particular individual has in a particular issue. Such interest 
     
91 
can depend on their personal stake in the issue, or on their background or 
ideology. Thus, “although citizens are often poorly informed about politics in 
general, they still manage to learn about matters that are especially important 
to them” (Zaller 1992, 18). When survey respondents perceive a particular 
policy or program to affect them directly, they will likely gather more 
information about that policy, thus leading to more refined opinions. 
Values and Ideology 
Numerous public opinion scholars argue that, while education and 
knowledge certainly shape responses, values and ideology are also important 
(Hurwitz and Peffley 1992; Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Chong, Citrin, and 
Conley 2001; Reyna et al. 2005). However, “identifying which value is 
relevant may not be obvious for the respondent. As a result, there is also a 
great deal of malleability or fickleness in public opinion. The malleability or 
fickleness may come from a simple lack of information about the issues...or it 
may come from conflict among values and beliefs” (Alvarez and Brehm 2002, 
9). This argument asserts that while Americans may not necessarily identify 
with an overarching ideology, core values and beliefs influence their opinions. 
Thus, when posed with a question on a policy or issue that the respondent 
knows little about, a respondent will fall back on their basic values and apply 
those values to their knowledge about the issue at hand (Alvarez and Brehm 
2002). 
For Americans, the core values and beliefs typically discussed in the 
political behavior literature are freedom (or liberty) and equality (Alesina, 
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Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001; Bobo 1991; Hurwitz and Peffley 1992; O'Connor 
2000). These two values clearly recur in the study of American public opinion, 
dating back at least to Tocqueville’s observations on nineteenth-century 
America (Alvarez and Brehm 2002, 7). The extent to which such values shape 
public attitudes has been studied at length in the public opinion literature 
(Hurwitz and Peffley 1992; Lippmann 1922; McClosky 1984; Page and 
Shapiro 1992). “In academic work, ‘freedom’ may more often be referred to as 
‘individualism,’ and ‘equality’ as ‘egalitarianism’” (Erikson and Tedin 2003, 
39). Ideology and values are almost universally recognized as significant 
determinants of public opinion (Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Erikson and Tedin 
2003). “Abstract values such as egalitarianism or conservatism are important 
to politics because they cause people to have opinions when they have no 
direct stake in a particular issue” (Erikson and Tedin 2003, 52). Therefore, 
even when respondents may not know much about a particular subject or 
have a personal stake in an outcome, they may still express and hold opinions 
that are consistent with a particular ideology or value set. 
Public opinion research supports the theory that core beliefs and 
ideologies heavily influence policy attitudes. This holds particularly true when 
dealing with social or anti-poverty policies. Gilens (1999) Alvarez & Brehm 
(2002) and Bobo (1991) each discuss the role of ideology in driving public 
opinion on social issues. Those with individualistic ideologies tend to view 
socioeconomic status as justified: material success demonstrates that a person 
made the most of their opportunities and worked hard. They also view 
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differences in socioeconomic status as necessary to provide incentives to “get 
ahead.” Individualists tend to view the economic system as working well and 
justly – they believe that business profits are distributed fairly and according 
to what has been justly earned. Therefore, interfering in business or industry 
will tend to reduce overall societal welfare (Hurwitz and Peffley 1992; Wilson 
1996; Bobo 1991; Zucker and Weiner 1993). Egalitarians tend to view the 
government as responsible for securing the basic needs of its people, 
including adequate job opportunities and affordable goods. They believe 
everyone deserves a dignified existence, regardless of the work effort 
expended. They also view success as dependent on family background, 
networking, or nepotism rather than hard work or pulling oneself up by one’s 
bootstraps (Berinsky 2002; Bobo 1991; Alvarez and Brehm 2002). 
A person’s ideological frame also influences how one views government 
action. “If people are to accept government decisions, they must believe that 
their political actions can be effective and that they can trust the government 
to respond to their interests. If political alienation becomes sufficiently 
intense and widespread, it may pose a threat to democratic stability” (Erikson 
and Tedin 2003, 143). Trust in government, in turn, affects how individuals 
view particular policies. If an individual does not trust the government to act 
in their interest on a particular issue, they will not support public policies that 
seek to remedy a particular social ill (Rahn 2001).  
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Stereotypes 
While information and ideology certainly influence the public’s ability 
to form opinions, this does not mean that those who lack information or a 
strong ideological stance do not hold opinions regarding social policies. Given 
the generally low levels of information among the public, how do people form 
opinions on issues they know little about? According to Lippmann, “The only 
feeling that anyone can have about an event he does not experience is the 
feeling aroused by his mental image of that event” (Lippmann 1922, 9). The 
research suggests that such respondents often rely on cognitive shortcuts in 
order to answer survey questions. These shortcuts include impressions, 
stereotypes, and beliefs about particular aspects of public policies, or 
perceptions of their target populations (Lippmann 1922; McConahay 1982; 
Sears et al. 1997). 
Perception – how we view the world – determines how we behave 
toward other people, how we identify our interests, and how we view politics 
and policies. Lippman describes perceptions as “the pictures in our heads.” It 
is the picture, rather than the reality, he argues, that determines how we form 
opinions. Public opinion research strives to see these pictures, and to identify 
how perceptions of reality contribute to the formation of attitudes toward 
people, places, and policies (Lippmann 1922). While perceptions influence 
our attitudes toward any number of things, considerable evidence exists in the 
literature that such cognitive shortcuts prove particularly influential in 
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attitude formation toward social welfare policies (Gilens 1996; Krysan 2000; 
Soss 1999). 
Stereotypes – generalizations of individuals or populations based on 
popular beliefs about their appearance, ethnicity, gender, class, sexual 
preference, or any other characteristic – often shape perceptions. These 
stereotypes, “are often uncomplimentary … motivated by an ethnocentric bias 
to enhance one’s own group and to disparage outgroups” (Sigelman and Tuch 
1997, 9). Therefore, perceptions based on stereotypes can, “also contribute to 
the development of ideologies that justify discriminatory behavior” (Sigleman 
and Tuch 1997, 88). Furthermore, “if people believe a particular group poses a 
threat to cherished values, they may be more willing to subscribe to a whole 
range of disparaging beliefs about the group in question” (Hurwitz and Peffley 
1992, 397). This research suggests that when studying perceptions and 
attitudes toward social policies, particularly those that seek to reduce poverty, 
it must incorporate both ideology and stereotyping, as they likely interact 
when respondents form opinions on particular policy prescriptions. 
Public Opinion and Social Policy 
Public opinion research indicates that values strongly shape attitudes 
toward public policies such as abortion (Alvarez and Brehm 2002), welfare 
(Gilens 1999), national health insurance (Erikson and Tedin 2003), and many 
others. However, there are often inconsistencies in public attitudes whereby 
the professed ideology of the respondent does not match up with the expected 
support or opposition to a particular policy proposal (Zaller 1992). 
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Researchers suggested that this inconsistency results in part from specificity. 
Vague values such as “equality” are easy to support, and have no negative 
connotations – while specific public policies such as “welfare” could affect tax 
rates and have negative societal impacts (Erikson and Tedin 2003; Sears et al. 
1997). 
Another explanation for the lack of support for policies designed to 
implement widely held values is that there might be a conflict between core 
values. People commonly may value both equality and self-reliance. Thus, an 
individual who values egalitarianism may desire equality, but the importance 
they place on self-reliance may cause them to oppose a program designed to 
achieve equality. This contradiction represents what Shuman, et al. (1985) 
refer to as the “principle-implementation gap” (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 
341), where there can be widespread support for the goal of alleviating social 
problems, yet strong opposition to specific tools or policies necessary to 
achieve that goal. Numerous studies present evidence of the principle-
implementation gap, but it is particularly pervasive in social policy attitudes. 
For example, Erickson and Tedin (2003) present data showing that over 90 
percent of White Americans agree that Black and White children should 
attend the same school; yet, less than 30 percent of those same respondents 
favor busing for integration (Erikson & Tedin, 2003, 88).  
Another factor impeding the implementation of social policies is the 
fact that those populations who are the natural supporters of egalitarian 
programs and policies are those most often left out of both the democratic 
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process and the survey process (Berinsky 2002). In his research on welfare 
attitudes, Berinsky argues:  
Both inequalities in politically relevant resources and the larger 
political culture surrounding social welfare policy issues 
disadvantage those groups who are natural supporters of the 
welfare state. These supporters - the economically 
disadvantaged and those who support principals of political 
equality - are less easily able to form coherent and consistent 
opinions on such policies than those well endowed with 
politically relevant resources. (Berinsky 2002, 1) 
Therefore, those who have the most at stake in the successful implementation 
of social welfare policies are neither included in the policy or planning 
processes that affect them, nor are typically studied by public opinion 
researchers analyzing relevant social policy attitudes. 
Like attitudes toward other public policies, social policy attitudes are 
largely influenced by perceptions, stereotypes, and ideology. In their review of 
the psychological literature surrounding how and why the public forms 
attitudes, Tourangeau, et al. (2000) suggest that when respondents do not 
have information regarding the specific question readily available, they rely 
on “impressions or stereotypes, general attitudes or values, [and] specific 
beliefs or feelings about the target” (p. 172). Surveys on determinants of social 
policy attitudes strongly suggest that stereotypes and perceptions regarding 
the worthiness of the beneficiaries of such policies strongly define social 
policy attitudes. Furthermore, when negative constructions of the target 
population interact with core values such as individualistic ideology or a lack 
of trust in government, levels of support for policies such as welfare (Alesina, 
Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001; Gilens 1999), affirmative action (Alvarez and 
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Brehm 2002; Kluegel 1986) or integration (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; 
Hurwitz and Peffley 1992; McConahay 1982) fall precipitously.  
Attitudes toward the Poor 
Research on policy preferences demonstrates that attitudes about the 
beneficiaries of public programs significantly influence support for or 
opposition to those policies. One of the most important manifestations of 
social constructions is the extent to which such perceptions shape the way 
people view the worthiness of themselves and others (Berinsky 2002; 
Schneider and Ingram 1993; Checkel 1999). This holds particularly true when 
discussing the beneficiaries of government policies: “The personal messages 
for the positively viewed, powerful segments of society are that they are good, 
intelligent people…when they receive benefits from government, it is not a 
special favor or because of their need but because they are contributing to the 
public welfare” (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 341). Such social constructions 
mirror the theme of worthy versus unworthy in social policy debates.  
One of the most common debates in the literature on poverty issues 
and perceptions encompasses the identification and perception of needy 
populations, often described as a debate over the “deserving” versus the 
“undeserving” poor (Erikson 2003; Vale 2000). Social policy in the United 
States has attempted to separate these two groups throughout history, a goal 
rooted in the values of individualism and self-reliance expressed throughout 
the history of this country (Vale, 2000). Americans remain largely optimistic 
about the American system and its advantages. While the beliefs of equal 
     
99 
opportunity are widely held among Americans, most also recognize that the 
rich are provided greater levels of opportunity than the poor are (Kluegel 
1996, 51). Furthermore, a majority of Americans agree that the rich tend to get 
richer while the poor tend to get poorer (McCall and Brash 2006). 
While equality of opportunity is a widely held value, fewer support 
equality of outcomes. Americans value equality and equal opportunity but 
may oppose specific measures intended to achieve those goals (Schneider and 
Ingram 1993). Furthermore, Americans regard with suspicion policies that 
seek to achieve equality of outcomes or redistribute wealth, such as 
affirmative action or welfare. Recent studies showed that these views not only 
transcend races and classes, but also that they remain highly stable over time, 
and seldom subject to significant variability based on such external factors as 
economic recessions (McCall and Brash 2006). 
Attitudes toward Minorities 
Perceptions of worthiness prove particularly salient when discussing 
public policies that directly benefit minority populations. Public opinion 
toward racial minorities, particularly African Americans, has evolved 
considerably in the last 40 years, with Americans moving from an attitude 
supporting nearly complete separation between the races to one promoting 
nearly complete desegregation (Page and Shapiro 1992, 68).  
One striking feature of public opinion in this domain is the 
paradoxical shift documented in Whites’ attitudes toward Blacks 
over the past several decades. White America is far more likely 
to reject racial segregation in housing schools, and public 
accommodations, and is far less likely to adhere to beliefs in the 
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inborn inferiority of Blacks compared to forty years ago 
(Hurwitz 1992, 397).  
However, “while opposition to racial discrimination is almost universal, 
attitudes about government intervention are anything but consensual” 
(Erikson & Tedin, 2003, 88). It is clear from public opinion surveys that overt 
racial antagonism has lessened over time, yet racial unease and distrust 
remains. Furthermore, shifts in attitudes do not necessarily translate into 
support for public policies designed to alleviate racial inequality. 
Erikson and Tedin (2003) suggest two rival explanations as to why 
support for policies designed to improve racial equality achieve little public 
support, despite increasingly widespread support for the goals of equality and 
integration. The first (evident in the research of Sears (1997) Green (Green, 
Staerkle, and Sears 2006), Tarman (2005), Henry (2002) and Reyna (2005)) 
suggests that the dramatic shift in public attitudes is partly due to political 
correctness. As a result of the Civil Rights Act and the criminalization of racial 
discrimination:  
People learned it was socially unacceptable to express overtly 
racist opinions. Instead, racial hostility is expressed indirectly 
by a glorification of traditional values such as “the work ethic” 
and “individualism,” in which blacks and some other minorities 
are seen as deficient” (Erikson 2003, 90).  
A rival explanation suggested by a number of researchers (most notably 
Sniderman and his colleagues (Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Sniderman et al. 
1991)) challenges this conclusion, suggesting that,  
The central problem of racial politics is not the problem of 
prejudice. [Rather], the agenda of the civil rights movement has 
changed from one of equal opportunity to equal outcomes…. in 
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the eyes of many, the new civil rights agenda of racial quotas 
and affirmative action very much clashes with the principle of 
equal treatment for all” (Sniderman and Piazza 1993, 90).  
These researchers suggest that the persistence of resistance to policies 
designed to promote racial equality result from the focus on equality of 
outcomes rather than equality of opportunity. 
The similarity of views toward both racial minorities and the poor lead 
many to conclude that Americans highly correlate poverty status with 
minority status (Branton and Jones 2005; Clawson and Kegler 2000; Gandy 
et al. 1997; Gilens 1999; Harris 1999; Hoyt 1998; Weeks and Lupfer 2004). 
Misconceptions about numbers and percentages of minorities in poverty, 
particularly African Americans, run rampant in this country. Gilens (1996) 
summarizes numerous surveys and studies that demonstrate the 
misconceptions Americans have about race and poverty. This data shows that 
“Americans substantially exaggerate the degree to which Blacks compose the 
poor.  
Evidence also exists of contradictory and conflicting attitudes toward 
social policy and race:  
On the one hand, a belief in equality encourages Whites to 
support racial integration (at least in principle). On the other 
hand, they often resent attempts to force racial integration on 
them because they feel it violates their individual freedom, and 
they often oppose preferential treatment because such largess is 
often seen as unearned” (Hurwitz and Peffley 1992, 396).  
Views regarding whether minorities deserve preferential treatment go hand in 
hand with suspicion toward policies aimed at helping the poor. White 
Americans with the most exaggerated misunderstandings of the racial 
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composition of the poor are most likely to oppose welfare” (Gilens 1996, 516). 
Research by Weeks and Lupfer (Weeks and Lupfer 2004) also finds that 
stereotyping depends highly upon class. Whereas lower class Blacks are 
primarily categorized by race, middle-class Blacks are primarily categorized 
by social class. This intertwining of race and class in America further 
complicates attitudes toward social policies and programs. 
Americans also vary in their views regarding the causes of racial 
inequality, some attributing them to societal or structural failures, and some 
to individual failures. Alvarez and Brehm (2002) analyzed a variety of 
measures and questions regarding racial status, racially targeted-public 
policies, and racial equality. They found that both racial prejudice and 
ideology influenced beliefs about racial policies. However, when studied 
together, racial stereotyping has been shown to have a stronger effect than 
ideology in determining social policy positions (Alvarez and Brehm 2002). 
Numerous other studies corroborate these findings, which show that racial 
stereotyping has a significant influence on public attitudes toward minorities, 
race-targeted policies, and social welfare policies. (Bobo 1991; Krysan 2000; 
Sears et al. 1997; Weeks and Lupfer 2004) 
Attitudes toward Integration 
Residential and institutional integration remains the most 
demonstrative symbol of racial equality. Yet economic or class integration is 
not something that is particularly desirous to most Americans. To some 
extent, neighborhood differences are part of America’s ideology: “Rising 
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above humble origins to make it in the new and better neighborhood is central 
to our social tradition” (Leven et al 1976 202-3 in Bobo 1996). However, when 
it comes to racial mixing at the neighborhood level, negative perceptions of 
minorities often obscure these ideological pillars. These negative stereotypes, 
“are simplistic, resist disconfirming evidence, and create self-fulfilling 
prophecies when mutually stereotyping groups interact” (Sigelman and Tuch 
1997, 87). The perception that minorities typically are poor leads many 
Americans to view neighborhood racial integration with skepticism and to 
believe that integration might have a negative affect on their property values 
and their quality of life. 
The spatial patterns of concentrated race and poverty reflect such 
attitudes. Despite an overall decrease in concentration of minorities in central 
cities during recent years, most Americans continue to live in homogeneous 
communities (Briggs 2005; Denton 1999; Jargowsky 1996). A recent study of 
fifteen large metropolitan areas found that 63 percent of Whites live in 
neighborhoods that are more than 90 percent White. Blacks and Hispanics 
are also spatially segregated in metropolitan areas, with 71 percent of Blacks 
and 61 percent of Hispanics living in largely minority neighborhoods (Orfield 
2006, 2). These numbers represent significant improvement from the levels of 
segregation found during the 1980s. However, research analyzing the 1990 
and 2000 census found that the deconcentration of race and poverty in 
central cities is largely the result of minority migration from the inner city to 
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the suburbs, and does not necessarily indicate strides toward Black-White 
integration (Katz 2006). 
It is widely accepted that segregated living patterns are largely the 
“market driven outcomes of individual preferences” (Hardman and Ioannides 
2004, 370). According to microeconomic theory, these preferences include a 
complex interaction between affordability, location, and amenities that 
comprise an individual’s “housing bundle” (Gyourko and Tracy 1999; Shlay 
1993). However, another aspect of the housing bundle that not captured in the 
economic literature is what sort of neighbors one prefers. Studies show that 
changes in the racial composition of neighborhoods often spurs property 
owners to move. Beliefs that property values go down when Black families 
move into the neighborhood contributes to White flight, lessening the 
possibilities for integration, and minimizing its benefits (Harris 1999). As 
more stable households flee the neighborhood, the value of property in the 
neighborhood may indeed go down, making the initial concerns a self-
fulfilling prophecy (Farley et al. 1994). All of these attitudes encompass some 
of the most influential elements in maintaining segregation. 
According to Bobo and Zubrisky (1996), three theories dominate 
discourse regarding why people prefer racially segregated neighborhoods, all 
of which are relevant to the study of income-homogeneity as well: 
1. Perceived or actual differences in socioeconomic status 
2. Ethnocentric preferences (in-group preference) 
3. Prejudicial attitudes toward non-like groups (out-group 
 avoidance) (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996, 883) 
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To determine which of these theories presents the strongest argument, Bobo 
and Zubrisky implemented an attitude survey. They find that perceived 
differences in socioeconomic status and in-group preference do indeed 
contribute, but neither demonstrates enough significance to be considered the 
primary determinant of segregation attitudes. Out-group avoidance presents a 
stronger correlation to segregation attitudes, particularly among Whites 
(Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996). Additionally, the study finds a high correlation 
between racial stereotyping and preference for segregated communities. 
Among all groups, stereotyping presented the strongest statistical case for 
why Americans segregate themselves. Finally, the authors show that these 
attitudes correlate highly to reported neighborhood composition – with those 
reporting preferences for segregated neighborhoods typically living in them 
(Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996). 
Attitudes toward Affordable Housing 
While housing policy generally falls within the purview of social policy, 
its uniqueness lies in its ties to a particular place: a neighborhood, a street, a 
community, and therefore it also adopts the properties inherent to land use 
policy. The construction of affordable housing is promoted as a tool to 
alleviate concentrated poverty, enhance access to opportunity, and improve 
affordability for many populations viewed as necessary or desirable to a 
community (Freeman 2003; Hartman 1998; Shlay 1995; Briggs 2003; 
Musterd and Andersson 2005; Pendall 2000; Rosenbaum 1995; Iglesias 
2007). How Americans view the beneficiaries of housing policies certainly 
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influences public perceptions of various government interventions in the 
housing market. However, some housing policies receive more opposition 
than others – a fact due in part to the way the perceptions of beneficiaries of 
such policies (Koebel 2004; Field 1997; Wheeler 1993; Belden and Russonello 
2003; Goetz 2008; Nyden et al. 2003),  
The perception of those capitalizing on affordable housing policies is 
even more important to those who live near proposed housing. Supporting 
increased spending for welfare, or for Medicaid requires little personal or 
household-level risk, but a much higher risk perception exists when affordable 
housing is proposed nearby (Chong, Citrin, and Conley 2001; Fort, 
Rosenman, and Budd 1993; Wassmer 2004). Whether such risks reside in fact 
or even a logical progression of thought does not necessarily lessen the 
perception of the risk-level. For, “under certain conditions men respond as 
powerfully to fictions as they do to realities, and that in many cases they help 
to create the very fictions to which they respond” (Lippmann 1922, 10). As the 
literature on environmental pollutants and property values explains, the 
perception of risk can have as much of an impact – if not more of an impact – 
on property values than actual harm or threat of harm (Mccloskey 1994, 42). 
Just as perception and fear fueled white flight during the blockbusting period 
when blacks first began moving into white neighborhoods, fear that affordable 
housing will lower neighboring property values can also become a self-
fulfilling prophesy if alarmed neighbors sell at below-market prices. Thus, 
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what may have been a benign threat to property values can become a very real 
phenomenon if owners act upon that fear. 
NIMBY is by no means a characteristic only of middle or upper class 
neighborhoods. Poor neighborhoods are also likely to oppose siting of 
unwanted land uses. In most cases, the motivation of poor neighborhoods is 
characterized responding to historical injustice, “in order to change the 
community identity from one of a ‘dumping ground’ or ‘site of least 
resistance’” (Takahashi 1997, 911). However, this study focuses primarily on 
how non-poor households and neighborhoods respond to the potential 
incursion of low and moderate-income neighbors.  
Anthony Downs (1957) suggested, “citizens translate information into 
opinions using the rules of instrumental rationality – that is, for the issue at 
hand citizens form opinions based on the personal costs and benefits that 
accrue to them” (Downs 1957, 56-7). This idea that self-interest drives opinion 
is one that quite commonly applied to affordable housing siting conflicts. The 
phrase, “Not in my Backyard” implies that those who oppose its construction 
do not necessarily disagree with the need for such housing, but take issue with 
the proposition that it be built near them. Pure self-interest is widely assumed 
to be the primary grounds for expressing such attitudes. (Dear 1992; Field 
1997; Koebel 2004; Schaffer and Saraf 2003) When affordable housing 
proposals surface, the most often voiced objections concern such issues as loss 
of property value, increased crime, unsightly design, and poor management 
(Belden and Russonello 2003; Belden, Shashaty, and Zipperer 2004). 
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Neighborhood Effects 
In response to concerns voiced by neighbors, housing researchers have 
committed considerable time and money to study the evidence supporting or 
refuting claims by those opposing the development of affordable housing 
nearby. For the most part, the research demonstrates that well-managed 
housing that fits the scale of the neighborhood seldom produces the negative 
impacts mentioned above (Freeman 2002; Galster et al. 2002; Nguyen 2005; 
Schaffer and Saraf 2003; Werwath 1996). Despite this evidence, 
neighborhood opposition continues to be a major barrier to the successful 
development of affordable housing. 
NIMBY attitudes are typically analyzed and discussed in a case-specific 
manner. However, it is important to understand broad public attitudes about 
affordable housing and its siting before making assumptions about its 
determinants. Debra Stein suggests three possible methods for understanding 
opposition to affordable housing – all of which have been employed: 1) “make 
wild guesses about what the community thinks”; 2) “rely on gut instinct and 
pray that it’s right”; 3) “use public opinion research” (Stein 1992, 101). 
Unfortunately, public opinion research is seldom employed in the field, so 
attitude information is gathered haphazardly and usually late in the siting 
process, from public meetings, editorials, and sporadic interactions with 
neighbors. Therefore, outreach techniques are applied with only a partial, and 
potentially false, understanding of neighborhood concerns, and very little 
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understanding of attitudes beyond the immediate neighborhood or study 
area.  
Results from Survey Research 
A number of national, statewide, and local surveys have been 
implemented to measure American attitudes toward affordable housing 
(Pendall 1999; Realtors 2006; Stein 1992). The results of these surveys show 
widespread acknowledgement of a considerable need for affordable housing, 
and demonstrate strong support for policies that promote affordable housing. 
One national study (Realtors 2006) found that 87 percent of Americans felt 
that affordable housing is a problem for families earning under $25,000. 
However, other surveys show significant support for housing policy as an 
abstract goal: 75 percent of Americans “support spending more on housing for 
poor people.” (Belden, Shastahay, and Zipperer 2004, 25) Yet, only 66 percent 
strongly or somewhat support “building more low and moderate income 
housing where I live” (p. 33), and only 56 percent strongly or somewhat 
support “changing local zoning laws to allow more apartment buildings in 
communities without many apartments” (p. 36). These findings may indicate 
the principle-implementation gap, where support is strongest for vague, 
value-laden statements, yet fades as policies become more specific, or are 
proposed closer to home (Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Berinsky 2002; Gilens 
1999). 
Despite declining with proximity, a full 65 percent of Americans say 
they would support affordable housing next door (Realtors 2006). However, 
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such attitudes do not appear to translate into behavior. There are a number of 
reasons for this. First, people may answer survey questions in a socially 
desirable manner, i.e. telling the interviewer what they think is the correct or 
appropriate answer (Alvarez and Brehm 2002). Second, the survey does not 
define affordable housing, so many may not truly grasp the meaning of the 
term. This leads to potential problems with the validity of the results. 
Furthermore, the questions include both homeownership and rental housing 
in the same sentence; other surveys revealed much lower support for rental 
housing than homeownership (Belden, Shashaty, and Zipperer 2004).  
While few surveys ask questions specifically relating to the 
determinants of opposition, those that do found that a variety of triggers 
cause concern among respondents. One study summarized their findings by 
stating that opposition to affordable housing is largely based on the following: 
• A reputation of poor maintenance; 
• The perception that crime accompanies affordable housing; 
• A sense of housing programs as give-aways; 
• The oft-repeated concern with property values; and 
• That it is unattractive. (Belden and Russonello 2003, 8) 
 
Many of these concerns – particularly those of property value decline, poor 
maintenance, and increased crime, are reminiscent of concerns regarding 
racially integrated neighborhoods. Such a coincidence leads a number of 
authors to suggest that NIMBY attitudes toward affordable housing may be 
shaped by negative attitudes toward minorities (Field 1997; Hartman 2008; 
Pendall 1999). 
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A general lack of salience for the issue itself also may influence 
opposition to housing policies. Housing consistently ranks lower in terms of 
importance than other social concerns such as health care, unemployment, 
education quality, and immigration (Belden, Shashaty, and Zipperer 2004). 
This indicates that housing is not a highly salient issue in the minds of 
Americans and therefore the public’s information levels may be particularly 
low. Low information and knowledge may influence the reliability of survey 
questions that do not definition their terms clearly. 
Numerous surveys on affordable housing attitudes find that people 
recognize the need for affordable housing and the public generally supports 
the idea of increased affordability in the housing market. However, it does not 
suggest that the public supports the construction of affordable housing in 
middle-income neighborhoods since opposition continues to plague the 
implementation of housing policies. The results from public opinion research 
also do not suggest that the public is willing to pay higher taxes to house the 
poor. Overall, there little evidence showing that the public will support the 
construction of affordable housing in their neighborhoods, even if they 
abstractly support the need for or idea of such housing. 
Gaps in the Literature  
The research to date suggests that perceptions about the residents of 
affordable housing, ideological views toward social welfare policy, and self-
interest frame attitudes toward housing policy. Each of these factors needs to 
be incorporated into any study attempting to identify the determinants of 
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opposition to affordable housing. The fact that the statements made by 
NIMBY opposition in editorials or at public meetings may not reflect their 
true motivations holds particular significance, and that a complex set of issues 
determine attitudes (Fischel 2001; Pendall 1999; Stover 1994; Wheeler 1993). 
Public opinion is one of the driving forces behind the creation and 
maintenance of public policies. That racial and economic segregation 
continues to exist reflects the public’s ambivalence toward policies designed 
to promote racial and economic integration. Opposition to the development of 
low-income housing may be a product of this ambivalence, as the introduction 
of poor and minority households into otherwise homogenous neighborhoods 
often produces concern that the urban problems associated with concentrated 
poverty and racial minorities will be transferred to middle-class and affluent 
communities.  
Environmental and human services research recognizes that the 
NIMBY syndrome is much more complex than merely selfish, irrational 
responses to local controversies (Takahashi 1997). However, most of the 
studies on NIMBY attitudes toward affordable housing have not absorbed the 
conclusions reached by the research on waste or energy facilities, nor the 
public opinion research demonstrating how perception shapes social policy. 
Instead, they continue to assume that the driving force behind opposition is 
self-interest. Consequently, much of the housing-related NIMBY research 
constructs opposition to the siting of affordable housing primarily as a 
response mechanism to perceived negative externalities accompanying 
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proposed developments. (Koebel 2004; Stover 1994) However, it is unclear 
what particular aspects of affordable housing or its’ residents causes 
neighbors to consider it such an insidious threat.  
The existing survey data on housing issues has shed little light on the 
extent to which the public willingly accepts the development of affordable 
housing in their own neighborhoods or communities. The continued 
incidence of NIMBY battles over the siting of affordable housing casts doubt 
on the premise that the public is willing to share their neighborhoods with the 
individuals and families who benefit from affordable housing. Such attitudes 
reflect broader trends in public opinion in which, “There has been a dramatic 
increase in support for the principles of equality and integration, [yet] this 
positive trend has clearly not been extended to support for policies designed 
to implement these goals” (Hurwitz and Peffley 1992, 395). For the most part, 
attitude studies and measures have not been developed to determine the 
extent of these views, particularly in the realm of affordable housing. 
Understanding these broad, public attitude trends and their determinants 
could shed significant light on many urban issues – particularly land use 
conflicts. Such questions require the implementation of a broad public 
opinion study in order to achieve a greater understanding of how and why the 
public supports or opposes the construction of affordable housing in their 
cities, towns, and neighborhoods. Pursuing such research would provide a 
baseline of understanding that could be applied at the neighborhood level, 
rather than starting from scratch at each new land use conflict.  
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Two major concerns emerge when examining the existing survey data. 
The first is the notable lack of concrete information regarding the role that 
race and class play in shaping attitudes. While racial bias may lie behind 
opposition to affordable housing, these facts prove difficult to discern from 
existing polling data. As Chester Hartman recently pointed out, the extant 
surveys, “nowhere mention race, and frankly, my antennae go up when I see 
the consistently high levels of agreement in respondents’ statements of 
support for more affordable housing in their communities if the development 
‘fits with the area’” (Hartman 2008, 254). As in local siting battles, survey 
respondents seldom mention race as a factor in their opposition. Yet racial 
overtones often emerge in responses to questions about why families lack 
affordable housing, and why people hesitate to support its construction 
nearby (Dear 1992; Kean 1991; Pendall 1999). 
The ease with which support can be shaped or manipulated by question 
wording also provides ample cause for concern. Many of the existing polls 
were designed to test different frames for housing by using different language, 
which evokes particular groups or types of benefits of programs. The strongest 
support for affordable housing comes when questions emphasize the benefits 
of housing stability for children and for neighborhoods, or the self-help 
aspects of programs (Belden and Russonello 2003). Conversely, the weakest 
stemmed from respondent questions specifically asking about affordable 
rental housing or about housing types other than single family (Belden and 
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Russonello 2003). Discomfort with housing types other than single family 
may be another indication of opposition to rental housing. 
The continuing struggle over siting despite the lack of evidence proving 
neighborhood effects has led many researchers, developers, and advocates to 
believe that factors other than those publicly discussed may shape public 
attitudes. Numerous scholars have suggested that unspoken, underlying 
beliefs drive opposition, including stereotypes toward minorities and 
ideological views about housing and the role of government, and that these 
attitudes that influence opposition. (Pendall 1999; Wilton 2002) Much of the 
literature on social policy preferences recognizes that misconceptions, 
stereotypes, and ideology regarding the poor contribute to public support for 
these policies. Therefore, it is reasonable to extend similar assumptions to 
public attitudes toward affordable housing. Furthermore, widespread 
speculation exists in the field that NIMBY concerns regarding property values, 
crime, and school crowding are simply publicly professed concerns that serve 
to disguise privately held prejudice (Pendall 1999; Somerman 1993; 
Takahashi 1997; Wilton 2002). Regardless of the particular factors at play in 
each siting battle or NIMBY attitude, it remains important to understand who 
opposes affordable housing and why they hold such attitudes. Such research 
must incorporate race and class perceptions, as well as ideology, into the 
current body of literature on housing attitudes.  
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CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY 
This study seeks to determine whether attitudes toward minorities and 
the poor, as well as ideology, influence public attitudes toward affordable 
housing. The existing literature and secondary data fail to provide insight on 
links between stereotypes, ideology, and attitudes about affordable housing, 
as previous studies and surveys focused primarily on the “what” of housing 
attitudes rather than the “why”. Public opinion research focusing on 
determinants should prove extremely valuable in filling those gaps. By 
focusing on determinants of these attitudes, and in particular, identifying the 
role of ideology, race perceptions, and class perceptions in shaping those 
attitudes, this study breaks new ground in the field.  
I chose to implement a broad attitude survey as the primary research 
instrument. Quantitative methodology is appropriate to tackle this particular 
question because it tests theory, seeks to determine correlations between 
specific variables, and seeks generalizability. The biggest advantage of a 
survey is that it rates high in terms of external validity if probability sampling 
is applied. A survey also is also a widely used tool, making its results easy to 
interpret from any disciplinary position. While generalizability is one of the 
strengths of survey research, they “rarely achieve perfection on this 
dimension” (Groves et al. 2004, 33). Thus, survey research design typically 
focuses on minimizing the threats to external validity inherent in the survey 
construction process.  
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Because attitude surveys prove quite sensitive to question wording, 
question order, and framing effects, it remains especially important to 
mitigate any ambiguity before implementation. In cases such as this, where 
issues of language hold particular concern, focus groups prove useful prior to 
pre-testing in the field (Morgan 1996). Focus groups provide respondents 
with the ability to qualify their responses, rather than being subjected to an 
artificial set of answers on a survey (Stewart and Shamdasani 1990, 12). The 
focus groups conducted for this study pressed respondents to provide detailed 
information regarding their views on affordable housing, their 
neighborhoods, and what constitutes a threat to their self-interest. 
Investigating respondents’ reactions to various question styles and question 
wording in focus groups yielded a more sophisticated and accurate survey 
instrument, enhancing the validity of the conclusions drawn from the survey 
results (Morgan 1996). 
Stage 1: Focus Groups 
Focus groups are commonly applied as a preliminary method of 
investigating attitudes prior to a survey (Groves et al. 2004; Morgan 1996). 
“At an early stage of survey development, focus groups might help the 
researcher learn about the common nomenclature of concepts, how terms are 
used, what common perspectives are taken by the population on key issues, 
etc” (Groves et al. 2004, 244). Focus groups present three main advantages 
when applied as a precursor to survey development: 
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1. Determining what potential respondents know and do not know 
about the topic, and how they structure that knowledge.  
2. Identifying the terms that respondents use in discussing the topic 
and exploring how they understand these terms 
3. Getting a sense of the range of experiences or perceptions that 
respondents draw upon to form their answers (Groves et al. 2004, 
244-5).  
 
Focus groups complement survey research by providing, “a direct, sensitive, 
and interactive method of assessing public opinion, accomplishing what 
telephone studies cannot” (Luntz 1994, 2). In addition, focus group research 
presents a way of establishing (or fortifying) the validity of previous survey 
questions or indexes (Morgan 1996).  
 The primary goal of the focus groups in this particular case was to 
investigate attitudes toward the development of affordable housing in non-
poor areas, since these areas typically elicit the strongest negative response to 
such housing. When compared to previous studies, results from these focus 
groups, helped identify the main concerns of NIMBY opposition. These efforts 
served to hone the construction, wording, and order of the questions 
comprising the dependent variable. These results also provide context and 
depth to the survey responses. Conducting focus groups ensured that the 
survey construction utilized clear language that represents the underlying 
concepts that the questions intend to measure, thus improving the validity of 
the survey instrument as a whole. 
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How do participants interpret the terms, “affordable housing”; “low-
income housing”; “housing for low-income people”? 
2 
What are participants’ concerns about affordable housing being built 
close by? 
3 What sorts of people do participants believe live in affordable housing? 
4 
How close by would the housing need to be proposed in order for 
participants to be concerned? 
5 
Would participants consider moving if affordable housing were built 
nearby? 
6 
Are there certain neighborhoods where affordable housing should be 
constructed or avoided?  
7 How much does tenure matter?  
8 
How can affordable housing be built so as to avoid the problems or 
threats to neighboring property?  
*For Complete Focus Group Instrument, see Appendix 4 
 
 One of the primary goals of the focus groups was to more fully 
understand how respondents utilize and interpret the language of affordable 
housing. For instance, the conversation must qualify the meaning of terms 
like “community” and “neighborhood” to yield valid results. Should these 
terms appear on a survey instrument, a mutual understanding of their 
boundaries is essential in order to establish validity. This is equally important 
for the term “affordable housing.” Finally, this study explored views regarding 
the potential threats affordable housing poses to participants’ own self-
interest. These sessions resulted in a highly detailed depiction of public 
attitudes as expressed in participants’ own terms, which contributed greatly to 
the development of a robust survey instrument.  
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Selection of Participants 
Three focus groups convened a sample of people (8-12 individuals) 
from the general population – people who might one day be presented with a 
proposal for affordable housing in their neighborhood or who already have 
been through this type of experience. I selected participants by advertising the 
session in local media outlets (including craigslist), by placing flyers in 
various locations (i.e. libraries, bookstores, and coffee shops) and by offering 
a monetary incentive for participation ($25). I took every care to eliminate 
those with a personal or professional stake in the affordable housing debate. 
Thus, people who currently live in affordable housing or work in the field were 
screened out in order to ensure responses more representative of the general 
public. Each interested party completed a preliminary survey to determine 
their eligibility (see Appendix 3). All eligible and interested individuals 
received invitations to participate in the groups.  
Selection of Moderator(s) 
An impartial moderator was hired to conduct the focus groups in Texas 
and California, while the author moderated the Massachusetts group. 
Moderators received a detailed interview guideline (see Appendix 4) to ensure 
that the focus group leaders understood the terms used and the purpose of the 
sessions.  
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Location of Sessions 
The three focus groups convened in suburban areas of Austin, TX; 
Boston, MA; and San Diego, CA. I suspected that housing attitudes remain 
fairly consistent across regions, and therefore there would be only marginal 
variability in focus group responses. In order to test this hypothesis, I planned 
the focus groups in three different states. Each suburban community was 
chosen because of its rapid growth rate and urbanization, placing strain on 
the housing market. These states and municipalities have drastically different 
approaches to the development of affordable housing, ranging from state 
override of local zoning decisions (MA) to voluntary inclusionary zoning laws 
(CA) to state regulations banning inclusionary zoning (TX). Choosing such 
distinctive locations determines whether any significant regional variations in 
attitudes or understanding of terminology between different regions with 
different regulatory approaches to land use. Furthermore, since I designed the 
proposed survey for national implementation, I wanted to ensure that my 
terms held nationwide applicability. 
While the responses between the three locations exhibited mild 
variations between the three locations, the overall reactions to the questions 
stayed fairly consistent in the themes identified by participants. There was 
much concern about the high cost of housing in general, but little support for 
government-sponsored or financed low-income housing development. 
Participants expressed support for the development of smaller, “starter” 
homes without government subsidy, which they described as “affordable 
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housing” as well as for a vague policy goal of making housing “more 
affordable.”  
Focus Group Findings 
One of the primary goals of the focus groups was to determine what 
terminology should be used in the survey to describe affordable housing. 
Studies – both survey-based and otherwise – use a range of descriptors when 
investigating attitudes toward housing, including “affordable,” “low-income,” 
and “workforce.” Some research suggests that using terminology other than 
“affordable” or “low income” may increase support (Goetz 2008), but 
regardless of the terminology applied, any description remains subject to each 
individuals’ own perception and understanding of that term. Questions to the 
study participants also include their reactions to each of these terms, and 
whether they perceived them to be describing the same thing, or different 
things, and what constitutes those differences.  
Focus group participants largely expressed support for affordable 
housing, and recognized the need for it. However, questions regarding the 
actual definition of “affordable housing” elicited quite a range of responses. 
Some viewed it as, “Programs that help people buy houses, whether it’s 
lotteries where you sign up to win the opportunity to buy a condo or 
something like that.” Another respondent stated simply, “Affordable to me 
would be where the local workforce can live in the area.” When asked about 
those who might live in such housing; however, study participants offered less 
support. For example, “You do have more crime when you have more single 
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parents, and the people in low income housing are not necessarily going to be 
as law abiding as people who live in [our community].” Overall, focus group 
participants lacked clarity as to what constitutes “affordable housing.” but 
remained generally favorable toward single-family homes and starter homes 
while strongly negative toward anything that resembled “projects.” 
Such responses differed distinctly from participants’ perceptions of 
“low-income housing.” When asked how “low-income” housing might be 
different than “affordable” housing, respondents felt that “low income 
housing is more the idea of projects and community housing whereas 
affordable housing to me is more about housing for working families, first-
time homebuyers, that sort of thing.” Furthermore, respondents also equated 
“low-income” with both government subsidy and rental housing, “For me 
when I hear ‘low income housing’ I hear not only subsidy but that it’s rentals. 
As opposed to affordable housing, which is more homeownership.”  
Participants were not very familiar with the term, “workforce housing.” 
Most had not heard the term, but when asked what they thought it meant, 
applied a variety of meanings. For example, one participant ventured, “I guess 
I think of it in terms of . . . people coming in to do a job, so again you know 
with a lot of Hispanic people coming in, they’re here for a shorter period.” 
Another equated the term with company housing, “Where I grew up, there 
were housing developments that were created for the workforce that my 
father in law worked at. The company had lots of houses built in the 50s for 
the workers. That’s what I think of.” Thus, while respondents seemed 
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generally positive toward “affordable housing,” they expressed concern about 
the physical construction and residents of “low-income housing” and lacked 
familiarity with “workforce housing.”  
One of the most important findings from the focus groups stemmed 
from the data demonstrating that participants responded most positively to 
the term, “affordable housing.” However, they showed little agreement 
regarding the meaning of that term. Taking cues from these results, I chose to 
provide a definition of affordable housing in my survey. By including a 
definition, respondents all will receive a base level of information to utilize 
when responding to the survey questions. I researched and chose a definition 
that provides respondents with a clearer understanding of the term itself. The 
definition applied reads, “Housing developed through some combination of 
zoning incentives, cost-effective construction techniques, and governmental 
subsidies that can be rented or purchased by households who cannot afford 
market rate housing in the community.” This definition is neutral regarding 
housing tenure and financing mechanism, which holds the added benefit of 
not framing the following survey questions. However, because of its 
vagueness, the actuality of particular aspects of the nature of housings’ 
density, tenure, size, or appearance, remain open to the interpretation and to 
the discretion of the individual respondent. 
The results from the focus groups indicate that existing surveys may 
have misinterpreted their results due to the use of imprecise language, and by 
failing to properly define their terms. For the most part, the survey research 
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performed to date investigated the circumstances under which the general 
public supports affordable housing. However, since they do not define what 
they mean by affordable housing, it is difficult to draw concrete conclusions or 
use the results to shape policy or planning initiatives. In many of these 
surveys, the researchers conclude that the population supports the 
development of low-income housing (particularly, the development of units 
subsidized through LIHTC, HOME, and state and local programs) much more 
than typically thought. However, the focus groups demonstrate that while the 
public widely recognizes a need for more affordable housing and in some 
cases remains quite willing to live near it, they do not support housing 
subsidized through government programs, hold partiality to owner-occupied 
housing, and regard with suspicion and concern the people who may live 
there.  
This last issue actually invited the most passionate discussion in the 
focus groups. Respondents continually regarded with curiosity  “what kinds of 
people” would live in affordable housing, and how the particular 
demographics or behaviors of those people might affect not only their 
property values but also the quality of life in their neighborhoods. 
Furthermore, in most cases respondents’ support level depended in large part 
on the answers to those questions.  
Stage 2: Preliminary Survey Development 
Because a tested measure for the dependent variable – attitudes 
toward affordable housing – does not yet exist, the first step of this study is 
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development of a reliable measure of these attitudes. A number of previous 
surveys explored housing attitudes, but they have not been used to study 
underlying determinants. For the most part, such studies simply asked a 
variant of “do you support or oppose the development of affordable housing in 
your community?” Such a question invites social desirability and does not 
provide any ability to determine what aspects of affordable housing or its 
residents might prompt respondents to express support or opposition.  
Dependent Variable:  
The dependent variable aims to establish a measure for opposition to 
affordable housing, commonly referred to as “NIMBY.” Such a measure 
should incorporate all of the most common reasons that neighbors provide for 
opposing the development of such housing in their neighborhoods. Previous 
surveys showed that a number of such concerns, including declining property 
values, overcrowding schools, and increased traffic provide common 
explanations given for opposition to affordable housing. The focus groups 
corroborated many of these concerns, as respondents mentioned traffic, 
schools, property values, crime, changing community character, and 
attractiveness when discussing affordable and low-income housing.  
The focus group participants only mentioned one additional concern 
that did not appear in the literature, that of a deep concern about real estate 
developers taking advantage of affordable housing policies, a concept brought 
up frequently in the Boston area group. Such attitudes are likely a response to 
experiences with Massachusetts’ “Anti-Snob Zoning Law” (Chapter 40B). 
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Chapter 40B requires each city and town to develop enough subsidized 
housing so that ten percent of its housing stock is affordable to low and 
moderate income households (Cowan 2006). Any community that has not 
reached such a level can be subject to state intervention by barring developers 
(by zoning or other impediments) from pursuing affordable housing 
development in that community (Heudorfer 2003). This may have led to a 
belief among many residents that developers hold too much power over city 
regulations regarding the proposals of affordable housing.  
 Each concern evolved into a survey question, with the anticipation that 
a group of these questions could be incorporated into an index to validly and 
reliably represent “NIMBY” attitudes. The preliminary survey instrument 
presented the definition of affordable housing described previously, followed 
by each of the following questions (rated on a four point scale from ‘strongly 
agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’) 
1. People who live in affordable housing are good neighbors.  
2. Building affordable housing in my neighborhood would increase 
crime. 
3. Building affordable housing in my neighborhood would lower 
property values.  
4. Building affordable housing in my neighborhood would have a 
negative impact on local schools. 
5. New and rehabilitated affordable housing makes communities 
more attractive.  
6. Building affordable housing in my neighborhood would change the 
character of the community. 
7. Building affordable housing only benefits developers. 
8. Building affordable housing in my neighborhood would increase 
traffic. 
9. Building affordable housing is good for the local economy. 
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By asking the respondent whether they agree with these statements, these 
questions measure the propensity for that individual to view affordable 
housing as a threat to their personal or their neighborhood interests with the 
anticipation that the final index measures the respondent’s overall propensity 
to oppose affordable housing. The final index construction is discussed in 
detail in the “Data Analysis” section of this chapter.  
Independent Variables: 
The independent variables included in this survey include ideology, 
racial stereotypes, and poverty stereotypes. Most of these measures are based 
on indexes constructed by others, and used previously as variables in a variety 
of studies. However, no study has applied these particular variables to the 
investigation of housing attitudes. 
Ideology: Various ideology measures have been developed and 
applied in surveys. I included a number of measures of ideology, including the 
egalitarianism scale, a standard liberal-conservative item, and three questions 
that measure various aspects of trust in government. In addition, I chose 
these facets of ideology because each of them influence dependent variables 
related to social policy attitudes when applied in surveys. The most 
demonstrative of these was a 1991 study, which found that “both social 
responsibility and economic individualism influence social welfare policy 
attitudes” (Bobo 1991). In this case, the increment to the r-square for social 
responsibility (referred to in this study as egalitarianism) was .12, higher than 
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any other single variable in the model. (Bobo 1991, 82-83) Variants on the 
egalitarianism scale were also used in the General Social Survey (GSS) in 1988 
(these questions are coded in the GSS as “USCLASS” and “EQUAL”). 
Racial Stereotyping: To measure racial stereotyping, I used the 
“symbolic racism” scale developed by Henry and Sears (2002). Use of this 
index in surveys showed that many Americans view minorities as lazy and 
undeserving of special treatment or attention. Research that applied this scale 
(Tarman and Sears 2005; Sears et al. 1997) suggests that these underlying 
attitudes, which reflect discrimination, stereotyping, and misconceptions 
about minorities, are significant determinants of attitudes toward many social 
policies. According to the creators of the scale, two major assumptions 
inspired the scale’s construction: 1) Discriminatory attitudes toward 
minorities causes Americans to place minorities into the “undeserving poor” 
group; and 2) Americans typically view minorities and the poor as 
overlapping populations, thus policies aimed at the poor are overwhelmingly 
seen as targeting the “undeserving poor” (Henry and Sears 2002). Studies 
applying the scale to policy attitudes have shown fairly strong correlations 
between symbolic racism and race-targeted policy attitudes (correlation of 
.58) (Henry and Sears 2002). 
Poverty Stereotyping: Most surveys that incorporate attitudes about 
the poor utilize a set of questions about the causes of poverty. Essentially, 
such measures approach the issue in order to determine whether respondents 
view poverty as caused by individual choices or structural (institutional) 
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factors (Hunt 2004; Kluegel 1986). Most studies utilize the poverty index as a 
dependent variable, in which both ideology and respondent’s race are 
significant predictors of beliefs regarding the causes of poverty. Studies 
applying this measure also demonstrate that views regarding the causes of 
poverty maintained extreme stability over time, and do not vary based on the 
state of the economy.  
However, this particular study aimed to determine how stereotypes 
about the poor and stereotypes about minorities act, either separately or 
together, to predict attitudes about affordable housing. The poverty measures 
applied in most studies do not measure stereotypes about the poor, but rather 
measure beliefs about the causes of poverty. A thorough search revealed only 
two potential sets of questions for an index that measures poverty 
stereotyping – one in an unpublished poster presentation (Hoyt, Doyon, and 
Dietz-Uhler 1998); the other in a study on rape myth acceptance (Aosved and 
Long 2006). However, both scales contained questions that spoke to policy 
preferences as well as attitudes about the poor, which poses problems if 
applied as an independent variable in a regression analysis seeking 
determinants of policy attitudes. Therefore, a new index was developed from 
selected items from both scales that attempts to measure only attitudes and 
stereotypes toward the lower classes, not social or poverty policy preferences. 
A first draft of the scale included the following items:  
1. People who don’t make much money are generally unmotivated. 
2. Poor people commit more crimes than wealthy people. 
3. Poor people are lazy. 
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4. Most poor people should not have children until they can afford to 
take care of them. 
5. Most poor people aren’t very smart. 
6. If given the chance, a poor person would be able to keep a job. 
7. Most poor people can’t manage their money. 
8. People living in poverty would rather commit crimes for financial 
gain than work for a living. 
9. In general, poor people have the same moral values as other 
Americans. 
10. Poor people don’t supervise their children enough. 
 
Cognitive Interviews 
 The focus group sessions proved very helpful in pinpointing 
participant concerns about affordable housing, as well as in determining the 
most resonant wording of certain questions. However, focus research cannot 
help to predict potential issues of concern that may arise during survey 
implementation. The most important of these issues is the lack of information 
regarding the cognitive process involved in participant’ response generation. 
As Groves et al. point out, “A focus group is not a good venue for evaluating 
wording of specific questions or for discovering how respondents arrive at 
their answers…. assessing the wording of specific questions and evaluating the 
cognitive issues associated with the questions are done more easily with a 
one-on-one testing protocol” (Groves et al. 2004, 245). 
In order to compensate for this drawback, the next stage of survey 
development involved a process of “cognitive interviewing,” which is based on 
a technique called “protocol analysis.” Protocol analysis asks subjects to think 
aloud as they work on questions and, in turn, records their verbalizations 
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(Groves et al. 2004). With the application of cognitive interviewing, the 
survey researcher can more fully understand the thought-process of the 
respondent when thinking about a question. Such interviews cover a range of 
procedures including concurrent think-alouds – in which the respondent 
verbalizes how they come to an answer while responding; retrospective think-
alouds – in which the respondent answers the question, and then explains 
how he/she came to that answer; confidence ratings – in which the 
respondent rates their confidence in their answer, and in their understanding 
of the question; and paraphrasing – whereby the respondent paraphrases the 
question after they consider and answer it (Groves et al. 2004). 
In the five cognitive interviews I conducted, the survey questions were 
read to the respondents one at a time. I primarily used retrospective think-
alouds and confidence ratings during these sessions. Respondents were asked 
each survey question and reported the thought-process they used to come to 
an answer. After reading the questions, the respondents were asked to explain 
how they came to their answer, and to identify any difficulties that developed 
in answering the questions. Through the process of cognitive interviewing, I 
hoped to identify potential problems including unclear question wording, lack 
of information, tiring due to survey length, and framing effects prior to survey 
implementation and data collection. This process revealed instances where 
interviewees understood certain questions in a different way than intended, 
usually due to unclear or imprecise question wording. In other cases, it was 
clear that respondents answered some questions because earlier questions 
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framed their thoughts. In these cases, adjustments were made to the 
questionnaire to minimize such misunderstandings and question order 
effects.  
As a result of these interviews, a number of changes were made to 
survey questions to increase clarity (See Appendix 1 for final survey question 
wording). These included wording changes to A006 [Building affordable 
housing in my neighborhood would change the character of the community] 
in order to specify whether the change to the community’s character is 
positive or negative. The wording of question B005 was changed from [is it 
appropriate for the government to provide a certain standard of living for 
people who do not work] to [The government should provide a decent 
standard of living for the unemployed], and again to the final question 
wording: [The government should provide temporary assistance for the 
unemployed.]. This question proved particularly problematic due to its vague 
wording. The first version lacked specificity regarding what a “certain” 
standard of living was, as well as why the people in question did not work. In 
fact, respondents felt that the phrase “do not work” implied unemployment by 
choice, not unemployment due to circumstances beyond their control. Thus, I 
employed a more neutral wording of the question. The final version of the 
survey instrument was more specific, and alleviated the problems identified 
by the interviewees.  
Other questions changed along the way as well. The original scale of 
government trust was removed. This set of three questions originally asked 
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respondents to identify “the percentage of the time you can trust 
local/state/federal government.” Cognitive interviewees typically did not have 
a clear opinion either way, and tended to answer in the “middle” on these 
questions. When discussed, the cognitive interviewees (and dissertation 
committee) felt that a more direct approach to trust in government would be 
appropriate. Therefore, I included a new set of questions in pre-test version of 
the survey, adding items B007 (“How much of the time do you think you can 
trust the government to do what is right”); B008 (“Would you say that special 
interests have too much influence on the government, the right amount of 
influence, or not enough influence?”); and B009 (“Do you think that people in 
government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or 
don’t waste very much of it?”). These items were sourced from the National 
Election Study and consistently appeared as significant determinants of policy 
attitudes (Erikson and Tedin 2003; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sniderman and 
Carmines 1997). 
The cognitive interviews also revealed that the type of neighborhood 
one lives in also might influence perceptions of affordable housing. As a 
result, three questions were added to account for neighborhood type and 
satisfaction: A006 - Would you say that your neighborhood is very racially 
diverse, somewhat diverse, or not very racially diverse; A007 - Would you say 
that your neighborhood is mostly young people, a mix of ages, or mostly older 
folks; And A008 - Overall, would you say that your neighborhood is a great 
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place to live, a good place, an okay place, or would you say that where you live 
now is not a very good place to live? 
Finally, the cognitive interviews resulted in a number of changes to the 
question wording of the poverty stereotypes scale. As can be seen in the final 
survey instrument (Appendix 2), I changed some items to a less aggressive 
wording, including “most poor people aren’t very smart.” In the same vein, it 
seemed appropriate to delete the item “poor people are lazy” from the scale 
because it was deemed to be so strongly worded that it would be subject to 
social desirability.  
Pretests 
The goal of pre-tests is to identify problems with question wording or 
question order that may not have been captured in focus groups or cognitive 
interviews. According to Groves et al, pretests “Provide quantitative 
information based on the responses . . . The survey designer may look for 
items that have high rates of missing data, out of range values, or 
inconsistencies with other questions. In addition, items with little variance 
may be dropped or re-written” (Groves et al. 2004). Twenty-five pretests were 
conducted using the same methods and population as the final survey 
(random digit dialing telephone survey on a national sample). While focus 
groups and cognitive interviews provide qualitative information regarding the 
psychological processes of question response, pretest can reveal patterns in 
the survey responses that may constitute a threat to validity, as was the case 
with two variables. One of the dependent variable items: “affordable housing 
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only benefits developers” received no agreement in the pre-tests. This lack of 
variance demonstrated that this particular concern about affordable housing 
does not resonate with the public, which led to its removal from the final 
instrument. Since this issue only surfaced in the Boston focus group, it is 
likely a regional issue related to the particular policies in place in 
Massachusetts, rather than something indicative of more widespread 
attitudes regarding affordable housing development. Conversely, “A poor 
person can keep a job if given the opportunity” also lacked variance – no one 
disagreed with this statement. It, too, was deleted from the final instrument. 
Analyzing the pre-test results brought some unanswered questions to 
light. There was some concern among committee members that the closed-
ended questions comprising the dependent variable were too constraining, as 
the respondents were not given the chance to explain their opposition to 
affordable housing in their own words. To combat this issue, I added an open-
ended question (A011: “What is the primary reason you feel that way about 
affordable housing?”) to the final survey instrument. The results of this 
question also provide richness to the survey data, something often absent in 
purely quantitative methodology. Completing each of these steps – focus 
groups, cognitive interviewing, and survey pre-testing – allowed me to 
identify problems or concerns with the survey instrument prior to data 
collection. In each instance, individual questions, the survey as a whole, and 
interviewer protocols were adjusted to maximize validity and reliability of the 
final data.  
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Stage 3: Survey Implementation 
When constructing the final survey, I sought to minimize response 
bias, and thus, threats to validity. In particular, I strove to diminish social 
desirability, non-response, and satisficing. When constructing the survey, I 
utilized standard response categories using a 4-option likert scale (strongly 
agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree), along with a 
volunteered “don’t know” response option. Using a standard scale creates 
“easy” questions for the respondent, reducing the time needed to complete the 
survey, and potentially lowering refusal rates. Social Desirability was an initial 
concern since the survey asks questions about perceptions of race. However, 
cognitive interviewing and pre-testing demonstrated little hesitation on the 
part of the respondents when answering such questions, and therefore it was 
determined that incorporating a social desirability index was unnecessary. 
Survey researchers differ on the subject of providing a neutral response 
category. On one hand, providing a neutral category allows respondents who 
do not have concrete opinions about the question to accurately describe those 
views. On the other hand, a neutral response category can lead to satisficing 
on the part of the respondent. Satisficing involves taking cognitive shortcuts 
to answer a survey question, leading to a biased response (Groves et al. 2004, 
208). The number of responses offered, the presence of “no opinion” or “don’t 
know” options, and difficult question wording can cause respondents to 
satisfice. This can seriously undermine the validity of the survey instrument 
as a result of response error. Therefore, a neutral option was not provided but 
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rather a volunteered “don’t know” and “refused” option allowed the 
interviewers to appropriately code such responses. Lengthy questionnaires 
also can lead to satisficing on later questions as respondents become tired or 
bored with the survey. For this reason, I made the final instrument as 
parsimonious as possible and placed demographic and other easy to answer 
questions near the end of the survey.  
Sample Design 
The sample for this survey was purchased from Survey Sampling 
International (SSI). SSI takes their sample from a database of all “directory-
listed” households. Using area code and exchange data, the file is then cleaned 
and validated to eliminate disconnected or otherwise ineligible phone 
numbers. This survey used SSI’s “Random B” sampling technique. According 
to the company, “Allocation is at the county level based on established 
telephone households. Each exchange and working block will have a 
probability of selection equal to its share of listed telephone households” 
(Survey Sampling 2009). All blocks within a county are grouped in ascending 
order by area code, exchange, and block number. Once the quota has been 
allocated to all counties in the frame, a sampling interval is calculated by 
summing the number of listed residential numbers in each eligible block 
within the county and dividing that sum by the number of sampling points 
assigned to the county. From a random start between zero and the sampling 
interval, blocks are systematically selected in proportion to their density of 
listed households. Once a block has been selected, a two-digit number is 
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systematically selected in the range 00-99 and is appended to the exchange 
and block to form a 10-digit telephone number. (Survey Sampling 2008). 
Data Collection 
The University of Texas Office of Survey Research (OSR) implemented 
the survey under my supervision. OSR employs the most advanced computer 
technology available in collecting and analyzing data. Data collection and 
entry are implemented using Computer Aided Telephone Interviewing (CATI) 
facilities. Using CATI minimizes interviewer error, allows for flexible 
questionnaire wording, and increases the speed and accuracy of data entry 
and analysis (Groves et al. 2004). Using CATI requires programming 
telephone survey questionnaires and samples into the computer. Once 
completed, survey questions appear on each interviewer’s terminal screen and 
interviewers enter data directly into a computer file, reducing time and error 
in transferring data to a final data file (Provost 2008). 
OSR used within-household sampling once a call is successful to obtain 
a more appropriate population sample rather than the household-level sample 
obtained through random digit dialing. Once connected to a call, the 
interviewer asked the respondent how many persons live in the household, 
and used a date-of-birth method to select the household member to be 
interviewed. Thus, when someone answers the phone, the interviewer asks for 
the adult in the family who has had the most recent birthday, rather than 
simply interviewing the household member who answered the phone (Provost 
2008). While such methods may result in lower sample rates, due to 
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unavailable household members, using this technique increases the 
representativeness of, and thus the ability to generalize from, the final sample. 
Stage 4: Data Analysis 
The final dataset consisted of 303 cases. Since there was no given 
neutral category on the attitude variables, many volunteered “don’t know” 
responses. There were not many “refused” questions. However, five of the 
final 303 cases contained too many missing responses (greater than 50 
percent) to include in the final analysis. Thus, the final sample size was 298 
cases.  
Cleaning 
The first step in cleaning the data was determining the appropriate 
method for integrating (or removing) the missing (“don’t know” and 
“refused”) responses. Standard practice in survey methodology either 1) 
imputes the item mean when an item contains no response or 2) removes 
cases with missing items from the analysis (listwise deletion). In order to 
determine whether the missing items would significantly influence the end 
results, a sensitivity analysis was conducted on each variable that contained 
greater than 10 percent missing data. To determine whether the missing data 
adversely affects the ability to draw valid conclusions, I created a dummy 
variable in which 1=missing; 0=valid. This dummy variable was then 
regressed on the dependent variable along with the original variable (with the 
mean imputed for missing data). If the dummy variable appeared significant 
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in the regression analysis, or altered the coefficient of the original item, it 
indicates non-response bias. Non-response bias occurs when respondents 
answering “don’t know” (or refused) on that question show a pattern of 
attitude holding different from the population as a whole. Therefore, using 
such cases in an analysis incorporates bias into any model that includes those 
variables.  
The missing data analysis demonstrated that none of items used for the 
independent variables used in the model held properties that introduced bias 
into the analysis. One item in the potential index used for the dependent 
variable did demonstrate bias. Furthermore, this item was missing more than 
25 percent of its cases (Item A015 – “Residents of affordable housing make 
good neighbors”). Because the missing instances were so high for this item, it 
was not included in the model. Finally, any cases missing 50 percent or more 
of the remaining dependent variable items (i.e. more than two) were removed 
from the analysis. 13 such cases were identified, and removed from the 
sample. Thus, the final N used in the modeling and analysis was 285. All 
analysis performed using this final sample imputed the mean for missing 
items.  
Final Variable Creation 
Once the dataset was cleaned, I established the final version of 
variables to be used in the regression analysis. In some cases, this involved 
creating dummy variables to allow for the use of nominal-level items as 
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independent variables. This stage also established the items to be used in the 
indexes (NIMBY; Poverty Stereotypes; Racial Stereotypes). 
Dummy Variables Used 
A number of dummy variables were created in order to utilize nominal-
level data in the regression. The variables of interest created were the 
following: 




# Question Text Coding 
White E002 What is your race? If White then “1”; else “0”. 
Home-
owner 
A001 Do you own or rent your home? 
If own then “1”; if rent or 
other then “0” 
SF Home A004 How would you describe your home? 
If single-family home then 
“1”; else “0” 
SF NH A005 
How would you describe the houses 
in your neighborhood? 
If all single-family homes 




Do you have children under 18 living 
in your home? 
If yes then “1”; if no then 
“0” 
Suburb A003 
How would you describe the area in 
which you live? 
If “suburb” then “1”; else 
“0” 
Female INT2 Gender 
If female then “1”; if male 
then “0” 
Age > 65 E003 What is your age? If 65 > then “1”; else “0” 
Trust Gov B008 
How often can you trust the 
government to do what’s right 
“Almost Always” or “Some 
of the Time”=1; “Almost 
Never” =0 
Diversity A006 
How racially diverse is your 
neighborhood? 
If “not very diverse” then 
“1”; else “0” 
 
The first seven variables in Table 2 represent nominal level data. “Age 
> 65” is derived from a continuous measure of age in order to measure cohort 
effects. “Trust Gov” and “not diverse” are both ostensibly ordinal variables, 
but the distribution of the results was not normal, so I created dummy 
variables to produce a clearer measure of attitudes.  Trust in government was 
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particularly problematic in that its did not receive many responses to the 
option, “almost always trust the government to do what’s right.” As a result, it 
was not feasible to retain the variable as a three-response measure, and it 
instead was included as a dummy. 
Reliability Analysis 
Four index variables were created to use in this study. They include the 
dependent variable (NIMBY) and three independent variables (Race Index, 
Poor Index, and Egalitarianism Index). Each of these indexes was created by 
averaging the scores on each item included in the index. Using a mean index 
(rather than a sum index) allows more cases to be utilized in the study, 
because single cases missing on one or two items can still be used in the 
analysis. Using a sum index requires that every case included in the analysis 
include an answer for each variable. Because of the small sample size, it was 
necessary to keep as many cases in the final data set as possible, thus I 
produced a mean index for the dependent variable. 
Before conducting reliability tests, the components in each of the 
indexes applied in the regression analysis were normalized so that the 
questions were all coded in the same direction. A number of items were 
reverse-coded to achieve this outcome.  
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TABLE 3: NIMBY INDEX 
 




Building affordable housing in my neighborhood 
would lower property values 
YES 
A013 
Building affordable housing in my neighborhood 
would increase crime 
YES 
A014 
New and rehabilitated affordable housing makes 
communities more attractive 
YES 
A015 




Building affordable housing in my neighborhood 
would negatively impact the community’s character 
YES 
A017 
Building affordable housing in my neighborhood 
would increase traffic 
NO 
A018 
Building affordable housing in my neighborhood 
would have a positive impact on the local economy 
YES 
A019 
Building affordable housing in my neighborhood 
would have a negative impact on local schools 
YES 
 
The index used as the dependent variable in this study shows strong 
reliability as a 7-item index (alpha=.832). However, question A017 (“building 
affordable housing in my neighborhood would increase traffic”) showed only a 
.345 correlation with the remaining index items, and removing this item 
increases the alpha score to .846. Therefore, the stronger, more parsimonious 
6-item index will be used as the dependent variable. As previously discussed, 
Item A015 was deleted because of the high incidence of missing values in the 
dataset. 
The final index demonstrates strong validity, as it strongly correlates to 
questions A009 (“would you support the development of affordable housing 
in your city of town?”) and A010 (“would you support the development of 
affordable housing in your neighborhood”). The correlation between the index 
and the response to Question A009 was .652, while the correlation with 
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Question A010 was .697. This indicates that not only a strong relationship 
between the NIMBY index and professed support for affordable housing 
exists, but also that the correlation grows stronger as the proposed 
development grows closer, thus embodying the “NIMBY” response. 
Furthermore, the correlation between the index and question A010 is much 
stronger than what occurred between Question A010 and any of the individual 
items included in the index (correlations ranging from .471-.557). This 
indicates that the index as a whole provides a stronger measurement of 
opposition to affordable housing than any single item contained therein.  







B001 It is the responsibility of the government to reduce 
the differences in income between people with high 
incomes and those with low incomes 
YES 
B002 The government should provide more chances for 
children from poor families to go to college 
YES 
B003 The government should provide a job for everyone 
who wants one 
YES 
B004 The government should provide everyone with a 
guaranteed basic income 
YES 
B005 The government should provide temporary assistance 
for the unemployed 
NO 




The Egalitarianism index has been applied in numerous studies, as well 
as consistently appearing in the National Election Study. The six-item scale 
demonstrated strong reliability, with a Cronbach’s alpha score of .809. 
However, one item (“the government should provide temporary 
unemployment assistance”) had a substantially lower correlation with the 
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remaining items in the index (.378). Deleting this item increased the index’s 
alpha score to .818; thus, the final index consisted of five items.  








Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other ethnic 
minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way 
up. Other minorities should do the same 
YES 
C002 




Generations of slavery and discrimination have 
created conditions that make it difficult for many 
minorities to work their way out of the lower class 
YES 
C004 




Minorities are responsible for creating much of the 
racial tension that exists in the United States today 
YES 
C006 
Minorities generally do not complain as much as they 
should about their situation in society 
YES 
C007 
It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard 
enough; if minorities would only try harder they 
could be just as well off as Whites 
YES 
C008 
Discrimination against minorities is not longer a 
problem in the United States 
YES 
 
In previous studies, the Racial Stereotyping index demonstrated high 
reliability using an 8-item index. This was also the case here, where the 8-
questions included demonstrate high reliability, with a Cronbach’s Alpha 
score of .801. Therefore, all eight items were included in the final Racial 
Stereotyping index.  
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People who don’t make much money are generally 
unmotivated 
YES 
D002 Poor people commit fewer crimes than wealthy people YES 
D003 
Poor people should not have children until they can 
afford to take care of them 
YES 
D004 Wealthy people are generally smarter than poor people YES 
D005 Most poor people can’t manage their money YES 
D006 
People living in poverty would rather commit crimes 
for financial gain than work for a living 
YES 
D007 
In general, poor people have the same values as other 
Americans 
YES 
D008 Poor people don’t supervise their children enough YES 
 
The poverty-stereotyping index was more difficult to establish. A 
number of methods, including factor analysis, were applied to determine the 
strongest statistical measure for this variable. Reliability analysis 
demonstrates that the 8-item index holds together moderately well, with a 
Cronbach’s alpha score of .703. I applied factor analysis to determine whether 
the eight items consisted of more then one factor, and thus should be broken 
up into more than one variable. Factor analysis did not result in any 
conclusive evidence that the questions included in the variable should have 
been organized in a different manner, and Cronbach’s alpha analysis shows 
that removing any variable would reduce the reliability of the index. 
Therefore, the final poverty-stereotyping variable consists of the full eight 
items.  
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Modeling 
In order to test the main hypotheses, I applied Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) linear regression since the dependent variable is a mean index, and 
thus a continuous variable. The purpose of this study focuses on the 
determination of whether race stereotyping, class stereotyping, and ideology 
significantly relate to NIMBY opposition to affordable housing.  In the first 
model, only the hypothesized items of interest were regressed on the 
dependent variable (RACE index, POOR index, and the Ideology variables: 
EGAL, Lib-Cons, and Trust in Gov). Each of the independent variables is 
normally distributed and the data does not indicate a non-linear relationship 
between any of the independent variables and the dependent variable. Nor is 
there any reason to believe that there are high enough correlations between 
any of the independent variables to constitute multicolinearity (see 
Correlation Table in Appendix 4). The highest correlations between 
independent variables included in this study occur between “Race Index” and 
“Egalitarianism” (r=.533) and “homeowner” and “lives in single-family home” 
(r=.552). While both of these scores demonstrate a strong correlation, they 
are not in the .8 or higher range that would be considered problematic in 
terms of multicolinearity. In that the variables included in the model satisfy 
the basic OLS regression assumptions, OLS should provide the best, linear 
unbiased estimate of the relationships between the variables, as well as the 
strongest model of the effects the independent variables have on the 
dependent variable. 
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In order to minimize specification error and ensure that no important 
variables were excluded from the model, a second model was constructed to 
incorporate variables that have been mentioned in other studies as potential 
influencers upon attitudes toward social policy, neighborhood choice, and 
housing opposition. Many of these variables constitute indicators of “self-
interest.” The dominant theory in the NIMBY literature proffers that 
opposition to affordable housing results primarily from the perception that 
affordable housing constitutes a threat to self-interest. Thus, I include 
individual and neighborhood level variables that reflect self-interest in the 
second model. These include whether the respondent is a homeowner, 
whether they live in a suburban area, whether they live in a single-family 
home, whether their neighborhood constitutes only single-family homes, 
income, and the presence of children under 18 in the household.   
In addition to these indicators of self-interest were a number of 
demographic variables shown to influence policy attitudes. As Erikson and 
Tedin state, “group characteristics can clearly make a difference in how people 
see the political world. Belonging to a group is part of one’s self-identification” 
(Erickson and Tedin 2003, 205). One of the most common of these is age. 
Cohort, or generational effects, demonstrates a significant influence on policy 
attitudes – particularly opinions toward social policies (Erikson and Tedin 
2003). In order to capture the potential influence of these effects, a dummy 
variable measuring the retired cohort was also added to the model (Age is 
65+).  The public opinion literature also suggests that education is “strongly 
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correlated with political tolerance and support for democratic values…[and] 
college generally has a liberalizing effect on noneconomic political opinions” 
(Erikson and Tedin 2003, 127). Thus, education also warrants inclusion in the 
second model. Gender also plays an important role in shaping policy 
attitudes. For example, women are more likely than men to support public 
policies aimed toward social justice (Erikson and Tedin 2009). Finally, since 
this study measures racial attitudes, the race of the respondents is likely a 
strong determinant of policy preferences. A dummy variable for 
white/Caucasian respondents in the second model captures this potential 
effect. 
Methodological Limitations  
Despite the strong advantages of using survey research to measure 
public opinion, there still exist a number of limitations to survey research in 
general, including social desirability, non-attitudes, and satisficing. In 
addition to these limitations, this particular study presents some challenges 
that must be addressed and taken into consideration when weighing the 
results and conclusions of this research.  
Social Desirability 
Social Desirability involves, “the tendency to present oneself in a 
favorable light” (Groves et al. 2004, 208). When presented with an 
uncomfortable question, respondents may answer in a way that does not 
reflect their actual opinions; rather they respond in a way that they believe the 
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interviewer or researcher wants them to respond or that is most socially 
acceptable or politically correct. Questions regarding attitudes toward race are 
highly susceptible to this type of bias, as few respondents will answer 
questions in an overtly racist manner (Groves et al. 2004). I aimed to mitigate 
these issues by asking questions that were worded in such a way as to 
minimize social desirability effects, particularly by using questions previously 
tested and utilized in other academic studies. An active effort to limit these 
effects was made by asking questions that are balanced, not leading, and do 
not provide hints at social desirability.  
Another method of combating social desirability effects is to include a 
social desirability scale in the survey. Such a scale is used to measure the 
extent to which the respondent answers survey questions in an honest 
manner, and its inclusion in the model can correct for much of the social 
desirability bias inherent in the survey. The most likely questions at risk of 
social desirability are those that constitute the race stereotypes and poverty 
stereotypes scale. However, the results of the survey pre-tests demonstrated 
most respondents’ willingness to agree with most of these statements, 
indicating that they were not responding in a socially desirable manner. Thus, 
a social desirability scale was not included in this study. 
Question Non-Response 
Question non-response involves respondents skipping or refusing to 
answer questions. This suggests that a respondent deems a particular 
question unsavory, either because it is difficult to understand or asks 
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something the interviewer would rather not divulge such as income or sexual 
behavior (Krosnick 1991). Mitigating non-response is possible when utilizing 
telephone or in-person survey methodology – the interviewer can probe the 
respondent to obtain an answer, explain the question, or assure them of 
confidentiality. In this study, sensitive questions were placed near the end of 
the survey to minimize hang-ups and interviewers were trained to probe “I 
don’t know” answers and refusals to minimize question non-response. 
Satisficing 
Satisficing involves taking cognitive shortcuts to answer a survey 
question, leading to a biased response (Groves et al. 2004, 208). The number 
of responses offered, the presence of “no opinion” or “don’t know” options, 
and difficult question wording can cause respondents to satisfice. The 
instrument does not provide “no opinion” or “don’t know” options in the 
questionnaire, but these responses were included when volunteered. 
Questionnaires that are too long can also lead to satisficing on later questions 
as respondents become tired or bored with the survey. For this reason, the 
final instrument was kept as short as possible in order to minimize boredom. 
Furthermore, demographic and other easy to answer questions were placed 
near the end of the survey to avoid satisficing.  
A credible survey design must address any and all potential threats to 
validity potentially found in the question choice, question order, question 
wording, and response options. As Fowler states, “Designing a good survey 
instrument involves selecting the questions needed to meet the survey 
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objectives, testing them to make sure they can be asked and answered as 
planned, then putting them into a form that maximizes the ease with which 
respondents and interviewers can do their jobs” (Fowler 1993, 94). In order to 
produce valid results, the design process must be meticulous. Furthermore, 
survey design must ensure logical validity – do the measures or results make 
sense at face value (Babbie 2004, 141)? When analyzing survey responses, 
statistical conclusions prove meaningless if the questions do not logically link 
to the concepts they intend to measure.  
Response Rates 
Surveys typically do not have high response rates. In recent years, 
telephone surveys in particular experienced a sharp decline in response rates. 
This decline results primarily from larger percentages of unlisted phone 
numbers due to increased cell-phone use and to the public response to 
telemarketing; the public increasingly does not distinguish between 
telemarketing and sales calls and survey requests, and thus experience much 
higher refusal rates than in the past.  
There are a number of different ways to calculate response rate. Four 
are applied here. 
1. Response Rate: The response rates are the proportion of 
completed interviews in the total number of eligible respondents 
(includes no answers, calls going to voicemail and answering 
machines). Rate: 9 percent 
2. Cooperation rate - The proportion of all cases interviewed of all 
eligible units ever contacted (i.e. no-answers and answering 
machines not included). Rate: 15 percent 
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3. Contact rate – The number of eligible persons contacted, out of all 
eligible cases. Rate: 60 percent 
4. Refusal rate - The proportion of all cases in which a housing unit or 
the respondent refuses to be interviewed, or breaks-off an 
interview, of all potentially eligible cases. Rate: 50 percent 
 
These rates are low. A full 50 percent of those people to whom interviewers 
actually spoke refused to participate in the survey. Whether this resulted from 
a poor sample, training issues, or inadequate callbacks cannot be definitively 
concluded. The University of Texas Office of Survey Research operates using 
the guiding principles of the American Association of Public Opinion 
Researchers to establish criteria for their interviewers (Research 2009). Thus, 
OSR does not push those who refuse to participate in the survey to take the 
survey, or call back those who have previously refused. Other survey 
organizations may employ these tactics, which can often result in higher 
response rates and lower refusals.  
Another challenge stems from the small size of the sample. As with 
most small samples, the results skewed in certain ways. The chart below 
details broad demographic characteristics for the US population (18+); the 
population who voted in the 2004 election (self-reported); and the sample for 
this survey. I obtained all data for the US Population and US Voters categories 
from a report analyzing voting behavior in the 2004 Presidential election by 
the US Census Bureau (Holder 2006). 
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TABLE 7: SAMPLE ANALYSIS 
 
In this case, the respondents are slightly older, more educated, have a 
higher percentage of women, and a higher percentage of homeowners than 
the US population. However, when compared with the voting population, the 
sample matches up more closely. It is this population (voters) who are most 
  US Population US Voters Sample 
Age     
 18-24 12.9% 9.3% 3.9% 
 25-34 18.1% 14.5% 11.4% 
 35-44 20.0% 19.5% 16.0% 
 45-54 19.3% 21.3% 26.0% 
 55-64 14.0% 16.0% 23.5% 
 65+ 16.1% 19.0% 19.2% 
Gender     
 Men 48.1% 46.5% 36.9% 
 Women 51.9% 53.5% 63.1% 
Race     
 White 81.9% 84.8% 79.7% 
 Black 11.5% 11.1% 6.9% 
 Hispanic 12.6% 6.0% 8.7% 
Education     
 <HS 15.4% 8.1% 3.4% 
 HS Grad 31.8% 28.5% 29.0% 
 Some coll 27.3% 31.0% 19.6% 
 BA Degree 17.0% 21.1% 31.0% 
 Grad Degree 8.5% 11.3% 17.0% 
Income     
 <$25K* 11.6% 7.8% 14.1% 
 $25-$50K* 28.4% 26.0% 24.2% 
 $50-$75K 18.6% 21.1% 19.8% 
 $75K+ 26.0% 33.0% 32.1% 
 Unknown 15.0% 12.1% 9.7% 
Tenure     
 Owner 73.0% 81.8% 82.2% 
 Renter 27.0% 18.2% 17.4% 
*Measures for the lowest income tiers do not match up exactly 
     
156 
likely to participate in local elections and referenda, and most likely to voice 
their opinions regarding affordable housing when confronted with actual 
development (McDonald 2007). Furthermore, Dear (1992) found that those 
most likely to participate in NIMBY opposition are more likely to be higher 
educated and homeowners.  
The single-most likely predictor of NIMBY opposition according to 
Dear is income: “the more affluent tend to be less welcoming” (Dear 1992, 
293). As indicated by the asterisks in the table, income in the census is 
measured in slightly different categories than in my sample (the census 
bureau categories are <$20K; $20-50K; mine are <$25K; $25-50K) (Holder 
2006, 4) so the low-end of the income spectrum may match better than the 
table indicates. In many ways, this sample over-samples those whose 
demographics line up with the expected opposition to affordable housing. The 
sample also skews toward those with a conservative ideology. The 
respondents in this study are much more conservative (50 percent) than 
liberal (20 percent). According to the most recent National Election Study, 
(2004) the population self-identifies as 40 percent conservative and 29 
percent liberal, so our sample skews toward those expressing a more 
conservative ideology. 
These drawbacks must be kept in mind when interpreting the results 
and conclusions detailed in the following chapters. Such conclusions cannot 
be generalized to the population as a whole. A much larger and more 
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representative survey sample should be collected before suggesting that the 
American public as a whole expresses the opinions reflected by this study. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS 
Land use policies, financial policies, and racial policies have promoted 
segregated and exclusionary residential living patterns, limiting access to 
opportunity for the poor and minorities. Public opposition to affordable 
housing presents a considerable barrier to the creation of inclusionary policies 
as well as their implementation. The approach undertaken in this study 
provides an opportunity to examine not only what the public thinks about 
affordable housing, but also why they hold these views and how they express 
their opinions. Where we live relates to socioeconomic status and both of 
these factors shape attitudes on a variety of issues. Results from this study 
shed light on the extent to which the American public is willing to share their 
neighborhoods with different races and classes. It demonstrates that people 
seem supportive of affordable housing, yet uncertain about its development 
nearby. It strongly suggests that stereotypes  shape this uncertainty, 
particularly negative perceptions of the poor and racial minorities.  
The survey used in this study was designed specifically to investigate 
the determinants of attitudes toward affordable housing. As detailed in 
Chapter 5, the dependent variable is a six-item, mean index of attitudes about 
affordable housing. Each item measures agreement with a specific concern 
regarding the development of affordable housing nearby. The index therefore 
represents an overall measure of the intensity of opposition toward the 
development of affordable housing in one’s neighborhood, or “NIMBY.”  This 
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index showed strong reliability, and should inspire a high level of confidence 
in its validity to measure opposition to the development of affordable housing 
in one’s community. 
The telephone survey was implemented on a national scale, and 
received 285 valid responses. As noted in the previous chapter, respondents 
differ from the general public on several demographic measures that may 
affect their views of affordable housing. However, differences between the 
respondent pool and people who vote are much smaller. Thus, the respondent 
pool closely resembles those who actively participate in the democratic 
process and thus public discussions surrounding the development of 
affordable housing.  
The respondents are overwhelmingly homeowners. Eighty-two percent 
own their homes, and 46 percent have lived in those homes for more than 10 
years. Most respondents (60 percent) live in metropolitan areas (large city, 
small city, or suburb) and the overwhelming majority (80.4 percent) resides 
in a single-family home in a predominantly single-family neighborhood (65.8 
percent). Not surprisingly, almost all of the respondents consider themselves 
“middle class” (84 percent), and nearly all of the respondents think their 
neighborhood is a great (42.3 percent) or good (44 percent) place to live. 
Respondents also state that they live in diverse areas. More than half (53.7 
percent) say they live in a “somewhat” (35.2 percent) or “very” (18.5 percent) 
racially diverse neighborhood. They also live in neighborhoods that consist of 
a mix of ages, and 35 percent have children under 18 living in their home.  
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The survey results discussed below explain how these predominantly 
middle-class homeowners view various aspects of affordable housing. First, I 
will discuss how survey respondents view affordable housing and its 
residents. Following this section is a discussion of participants’ responses 
regarding their general ideology and agreement with egalitarian principles; 
their attitudes toward racial minorities; and their attitudes toward the poor. 
Following those descriptive results is a discussion of the regression models 
employed in order to analyze the variables that may influence attitudes. 
Finally, I discuss the results of the two models and how these findings 
correspond or diverge from how people openly express their opinions about 
affordable housing and the people who live there. 
Attitudes toward Affordable Housing 
TABLE 8: DIRECT SUPPORT FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
 
As found in the previous surveys discussed in Chapter 4, respondents 
typically state that they would support the development of affordable housing, 
even if it were proposed nearby. Despite this finding, a significant proportion 
of respondents to our survey do not express support affordable housing. 
Question 
Definitely (1) or 
Probably (2) 
Would 
Definitely (4) or 
Probably (3) Would 
not 
Mean 
If affordable housing were 
proposed in your town would you 
say that you would or would not 
support it? 
78% 22% 1.96 
If affordable housing were 
proposed in your neighborhood 
would you say that you would or 
would not support it? 
66% 34% 2.16 
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Twenty-two percent of respondents said they would not support the 
development of affordable housing in their city or town, and 34 percent stated 
opposition to development of affordable housing in their neighborhoods. The 
rise in opposition as the proposed housing moves spatially closer to the 
respondent is consistent with the literature on NIMBY attitudes, which 
asserts that concerns or perceptions of risk will grow stronger as the 
unwanted land use moves closer. 
Specific Concerns about Affordable Housing 










Building affordable housing in my neigh-
borhood would lower property values 
62% 38% 2.8 
Building affordable housing in my 
neighborhood would increase crime 
43% 57% 2.5 
Affordable housing makes communities 
more attractive** 
64% 36% 2.3 
People who live in affordable housing 
make good neighbors*** 
72% 28% 2.3 
Building affordable housing in my 
neighborhood would negatively affect the 
community’s character 
38% 62% 2.4 
Building affordable housing in my 
neighborhood would increase traffic*** 
67% 33% 2.8 
Building affordable housing in my 
neighborhood would have a positive 
impact on the local economy** 
63% 37% 2.3 
Building affordable housing in my 
neighborhood would have a negative 
impact on local schools 
32% 68% 2.3 
*     Index mean = 2.41 
**   Items were reverse-coded during index construction to ensure uni-directionality 
*** Items were not included in the NIMBY index due to a lack of correlation with the remaining      
       items. Scores on these items are also not reflected in the “index mean” score. 
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The survey data also demonstrates strong concerns about both the 
housing type and the residents. Despite widespread support for developing 
affordable housing nearby, when paired with specific questions regarding the 
potential negative externalities affordable housing may bring, support 
decreases. For instance, 62.5 percent of respondents agree that building 
affordable housing in their neighborhoods would lower property values (22.7 
percent strongly agree) And 43.6 percent of respondents are concerned that 
developing affordable housing nearby would increase crime (12.7 percent 
strongly agree). Numerous respondents also agree that affordable housing 
might burden local infrastructure or community services. Sixty-seven percent 
are concerned about increased traffic associated with affordable housing (17.6 
percent strongly so) and 32 percent worry that building affordable housing 
would negatively impact local schools (11.3 percent strongly agree). 
Respondents also agreed with a number of less tangible concerns: thirty-eight 
percent agree that developing housing nearby would negatively impact the 
community’s character.  
Despite these numerous concerns, the public certainly does not 
universally oppose to affordable housing. Seventy-two percent agree that 
residents of affordable housing would make good neighbors (5.6 percent 
strongly agree). Respondents also see the potential benefits of developing 
affordable housing in their communities. Sixty-five percent agree that new 
and rehabilitated affordable housing improves the appearance of 
neighborhoods (11.9 percent strongly agree) and Sixty-three percent agree 
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that building affordable housing would have a positive impact on the local 
economy (10.3 percent strongly agree). 
When asked directly why they felt the way they did about affordable 
housing (Question A011, open ended: Why do you feel that way about 
affordable housing?), most respondents identified fairness and access to 
opportunity as the primary reasons for their support. For example, one 
respondent stated, “I think it’s important to give people equal opportunity 
regardless of their background. People need assistance from time to time.” 
Respondents also recognize the potential benefits of developing affordable 
housing in their communities, particularly how important stable housing is 
for children. One particular respondent supports the development of 
affordable housing, “because I am a real advocate for children and it’s not 
their fault their families don’t have money. I want them to have a home in a 
decent area. And have the same start as other children in the area.”  
Other respondents looked beyond their immediate neighborhoods, 
pointing out the harm that a lack of affordable housing can wreak on entire 
regions. As one respondent explained, “people can’t live here without 
affordable housing. People are leaving the state.” Such responses indicate that 
many individuals do recognize the link between housing and regional 
economies, as well as the need for housing affordable to the local workforce. 
These responses indicate that many people in the country value opportunity 
and support housing as a means to achieving access to that opportunity.  
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Such agreement with providing opportunity does not necessarily 
translate into support for building affordable housing in one’s own 
neighborhood, however. One respondent felt that affordable housing “brings 
low income people to one place which brings crime and brings down the 
quality of area that you are living in.” Another stated, “People who are 
authorized to be taken into these housings are riff raff. They bring problems 
into the neighborhood.” Such replies may indicate that, while Americans may 
be in favor of giving the poor greater opportunities, they do not necessarily 
favor providing those opportunities in their own backyards. 
Potential Determinants of Housing Attitudes 
Research on housing opposition has speculated as to the underlying 
determinants of neighborhood opposition, but has not presented any 
definitive conclusions. As one study stated, “Primarily, the contest is rooted in 
several interrelated factors that contribute to the NIMBY reaction: fear of 
adverse impacts on property values, anti-government sentiment, anti-poor 
sentiment, and racial prejudice and segregation” (Koebel 2004, 3). Others 
suggested that concerns regarding property values have become a proxy for 
racial prejudice (Pendall 1999; Wilton 2002) or that, “Not In My Back Yard” 
has become the symbol for neighborhoods that exclude certain people because 
they are homeless, poor, disabled, or because of their race or ethnicity” (Ross 
2000, i). With this study, I intend to determine which of these potential 
factors truly shape neighborhood opposition to affordable housing. The main 
variables tested here include ideology, racial prejudice, and poverty prejudice.  
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Ideology 
Respondents’ answers to numerous questions regarding their ideology, 
agreement with egalitarian values, and willingness to support government 
intervention to achieve equality also indicate the degree to which they value 
access to opportunity. The responses indicate that attitudes in favor of 
egalitarianism are not particularly widespread, and there is even less support 
for the government enabling or guaranteeing equality of outcomes.  
TABLE 10: QUESTIONS COMPRISING “EGALITARIANISM” INDEX* 
 
Sixty-nine percent of respondents do not feel that it is appropriate for 
government to reduce inequality, and 75 percent do not believe that it is the 
government’s responsibility to provide everyone with a guaranteed income. 
These responses suggest that the sample represents a fairly conservative 
Question 







It is the responsibility of the 
government to reduce the differences in 
income between people with high 
incomes and those with low incomes 
31% 69% 2.1 
The government should provide more 
chances for children for poor families to 
go to college 
78% 22% 3.0 
The government should provide a job 
for everyone who wants one 
43% 57% 2.4 
The government should provide 
everyone with a guaranteed basic 
income 
25% 75% 2.1 
The government should provide 
temporary assistance for the 
unemployed*** 
83% 27% 3.0 
The government should spend less on 
benefits for the poor** 
20% 80% 2.9 
*     Index mean = 2.41 
**   Item was reverse coded during index construction to achieve uni-directionality 
***Item was not included in the Egalitarianism index due to a lack of correlation with the    
      remaining items. 
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ideology, and this is corroborated by where respondents placed themselves on 
the liberal-conservative continuum seen in Figure 2, where 1= “extremely 
liberal” and 7= “extremely conservative.” 
FIGURE 2: LIBERAL CONSERVATIVE-SCALE 
 
Recent polling data indicates that the population is evenly distributed 
along the political spectrum, with roughly one-third self-identifying as 
“liberal” “moderate” and “conservative.” That such a high instance of 
respondents in this survey self-identify as conservative indicates that the 
sample skewed toward a more conservative ideology than the population as a 
whole. This may affect responses not only on the lib-cons scale, but also the 
egalitarianism index questions as well as Trust in Government. 
Despite this lean toward a conservative ideology, there is significant 
support for improving access to opportunity through government action. As is 
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seen in Table 10 indicating responses to the questions constituting the 
Egalitarianism Index, 42.7 percent believe that the government should see to 
it that everyone who wants a job can have one, and 78 percent believe that the 
government should provide more opportunities for poor children to attend 
college. Furthermore, the respondents strongly support government 
assistance to the poor and temporary assistance to the unemployed: 80 
percent and 82.5 percent respectively support maintaining funding for these 
government programs. Many of these questions that received support specify 
a “worthy” recipient of help – children or the temporarily unemployed – 
support for these policies and programs may high due to the perception that 
the recipients are deserving of assistance.  
Survey results also show that overall, the public remains cautious in 
their trust of government. Forty percent of respondents state that they can 
“almost never” trust the government to do what is right, with only 4 percent 
agreeing that they can “almost always” do so. The remaining 56 percent feel 
they can trust the government “some of the time.” Respondents also feel that 
the government does not spend tax dollars efficiently or effectively. Seventy-
six percent of respondents believe that the government wastes “a lot” of their 
tax dollars, with only 2 percent saying “not very much.” Eighty percent of 
respondents also feel that special interests have too much influence over 
government.  
Trust in government, or lack thereof, also emerges in the open-ended 
responses. When asked why they do or do not support affordable housing, 
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many respondents indicated that government involvement shaped their 
views.  One respondent conditioned his support for affordable housing by 
stipulating that, “it depends on whose fingers are in the pie.” Furthermore, 
attitudes about affordable housing appear to be linked to negative attitudes 
toward social policy and government spending.  One individual stated, “Tax 
dollars should not pay for poor people or beggars. Tax dollars are going to 
people who can’t speak English. They should get their own jobs.” Another 
respondent expressed the view that the, “government does too much already 
and taxpayers have to pay for it” while another explained that he opposes 
affordable housing, “because you’re taking tax payers money. People that earn 
money don’t want to be subsidizing people’s lifestyles who really can’t afford it 
in the first place.” Together, the closed and open-ended survey results suggest 
many people significantly oppose affordable housing due to government 
involvement.  
Racial Attitudes 
More than half of the respondents state that they live in racially diverse 
areas (54.7 percent), yet significant numbers hold negative views toward 
racial minorities. Contact theory suggests that those who live near people 
different from them will hold a more positive attitude toward those groups 
(Emerson, Kimbro, and Yancey 2002), and yet the attitudes expressed in this 
survey do not support that conclusion. These results may be skewed because 
neighborhood diversity is self-reported (A006: Would you say that your 
neighborhood is racially diverse?). Thus, the public may perceive their 
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neighborhood to be racially diverse, when it may not truly be. It would be 
necessary to compare such results with census data in order to determine the 
extent to which contact with minorities really influences attitudes. Regardless 
of the type of neighborhood where respondents live, the population is very 
willing to express agreement with a number of negative perceptions of 
minority individuals and groups.  
Results from the “Racial Prejudice” scale presented below suggest that 
the public broadly opposes special privileges for minority groups, and feel that 
individual responsibility is most realistic path to racial equality.  










Many other ethnic minorities overcame 
prejudice and worked their way up. 
Other minorities should do the same. 
87% 13% 3.1 
Minorities work just as hard to get ahead 
as most other Americans** 
82% 18% 2.0 
Generations of slavery and 
discrimination have created conditions 
that make it difficult for many minorities 
to work their way out of the lower class** 
49% 51% 2.5 
Minority groups demand too much from 
the rest of society 
51% 49% 2.5 
Minorities are responsible for creating 
much of the racial tension that exists in 
the US today 
42% 58% 2.4 
Minorities generally do not complain as 
much as they should about their 
situation in society** 
27% 73% 2.8 
It’s really a matter of trying hard enough. 
If minorities would only try harder they 
could be just as well off as Whites 
50% 50% 2.5 
Discrimination against minorities is no 
longer a problem in the US** 
11% 89% 1.8 
*    Index Mean = 2.44 
**  Item was reverse-coded during index construction to achieve uni-directionality 
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The public also cleaves regarding the recognition of structural and 
institutional racism. Just under half (48.9 percent) of respondents agree that 
“generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make 
it difficult for minorities to work their way out of the lower class.” Yet almost 
all respondents (89 percent) feel that racial discrimination continues to be a 
problem in this country. Furthermore, a considerable percentage of 
respondents express frustration with the behavior and/or rhetoric of 
minorities regarding the economic and social situation. Just under half (48.6 
percent) feel that minorities “demand too much from the rest of society,” and 
42 percent believe that minorities are “responsible for creating much of the 
racial tension that exists in the United States today.” Moreover, nearly three-
quarters of respondents feel that minorities complain more than they should 
“about their situation in society.” The high incidence of agreement indicates a 
fairly widespread frustration with the current dialogue about and around race 
in this country. 
While the vast majority of respondents agree that racial discrimination 
exists, their responses to the other questions on this scale indicate that they 
do not view it as an insurmountable barrier to achieving equality through self-
reliance. Eighty-seven percent of respondents feel that minorities should 
“work their way up” just as earlier immigrant groups did, and half (50.4 
percent) feel that minorities simply need to try harder in order to get ahead. 
Such responses indicate an adherence to American ideology – that access to 
opportunity might not be perfectly equal, but hard work will overcome 
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obstacles. These responses indicate that many Americans feel that individual 
effort is all that is needed to overcome structural barriers to opportunity. 
While many Americans recognize the presence of racial discrimination, they 
also appear to feel that minorities spend too much effort criticizing society 
and their place in it.  
Poverty Attitudes 
Since previous research demonstrated that the public tends to associate 
racial status with poverty status, it is important to measure poverty 
stereotypes as well as racial stereotypes in order to control for separate effects 
poverty stereotyping may have on public opinion toward affordable housing.  










People who don’t make much money are 
generally unmotivated 
24% 76% 2.1 
Poor people commit fewer crimes than 
wealthy people** 
57% 43% 2.4 
Poor people should not have children 
until they can afford to take care of them 
50% 50% 2.5 
Wealthy people are generally smarter 
than poor people 
19% 81% 2.0 
Most poor people can’t manage their 
money 
24% 76% 2.2 
People living in poverty would rather 
commit crimes for financial gain than 
work for a living 
14% 86% 2.0 
In general, poor people have the same 
moral values as other Americans** 
89% 11% 1.9 
Poor people don’t supervise their 
children enough 
19% 81% 2.1 
*   Index Mean = 2.15 
** Item was reverse coded during index construction to ensure uni-directionality 
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For the most part, it seems that respondents have more intense 
negative attitudes toward racial minorities than toward the poor. Unlike the 
high instance of agreement with negative perceptions and stereotypes toward 
racial minorities, questions regarding the poor receive much more positive 
responses. For example, 75 percent of respondents disagree that poor people 
are unmotivated, and only 24 percent of respondents think the poor cannot 
manage their money. Moreover, 81 percent of respondents feel that the poor 
are just as smart as wealthy people are, and 89 percent agree that the poor 
have the same values as other Americans. There are, however, some concerns 
about the poor and their behavior. While just 18.6 percent feel that the poor 
don’t supervise their children enough, almost half (49.6 percent) of 
respondents believe that poor people should not have children until they can 
afford to support them.  
Overall, the respondents to this survey do not seem to have strong 
negative views toward the behavior and motivation of the poor. Despite this, 
many respondents expressed their concern over affordable housing in classist 
terms when given the opportunity to explain their views. One respondent 
stated that she opposed affordable housing to, “keep the different classes of 
people out.” Another stated, “I don’t want the low income mentality in my 
town.” Still another respondent stated that, “affordable housing in this area 
tends to bring in a lower class of people.”  
While clearly some participants viewed affordable housing in classist 
terms, the responses to the poverty prejudice questions indicate that 
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Americans may view the poor as being like them, rather than substantively 
different from them in important ways. This may indicate that prejudice 
toward the poor is not an insurmountable obstacle to developing affordable 
housing in non-poor neighborhoods. In fact, many people indicate the need 
for a “leg-up” as the reason for their support of affordable housing. As one 
respondent stated, “[affordable housing] makes for a more stable, healthy 
community.” Another stated, “Everyone should have a chance to mix among 
other people; everyone should be able to live in a safe neighborhood.” People 
seem to perceive the poor as being similar to “regular” Americans, who simply 
need a little help in order to succeed.  
Given the low instance of poverty stereotyping found in this study, 
along with the high instance of minority stereotyping, it is possible that the 
classist reasons provided to explain opposition to affordable housing may 
actually be obscuring a concern about race by employing a more politically 
correct concern about the lower classes. Whether race or the class of the 
target population constitutes the main perceived threat inherent in affordable 
housing, these results suggest that the root cause of concern for many people 
lies in their perceptions about the type of person that may reside in affordable 
housing, not the size, density, or appearance of that housing. 
Clearly, there exist a range of attitudes and beliefs regarding affordable 
housing as well as the poor, racial minorities, and the role of government. 
However, it is not clear whether these concerns stem from the potential 
resident’s race, class, or behavior – as one respondent stated, many 
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respondents are simply, “afraid of who comes with that.” One respondent 
opposed affordable housing because she felt it “draws bad segment of society.” 
As one respondent stated, she would not support affordable housing because, 
“the people that it would bring into town are not good people.” Such vague 
responses do not provide us with enough information to draw conclusions 
regarding the root concern of many respondents.  
Using statistical analysis will allow us to identify the relationships 
between various potential indicators and views toward affordable housing. 
This study seeks to determine how these variables relate to one another. Table 
13 explains the coding of each variable, as well as the hypothesized direction 
of the relationship between variables and the NIMBY Index. 
TABLE 13: HYPOTHESIZED VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
 
Variable Description Mean  Hypothesis 
NIMBY 
Index 
6-Item index used as the dependent variable. A 
higher score indicates stronger negative 




8-item index measuring attitudes toward 
minorities. A higher score on this index 
indicates stronger negative feelings toward 
racial minorities 
2.45 Strong + 
POOR 
Index 
8-item index measuring attitudes toward the 
poor. A higher score on this index indicates 
stronger negative feelings toward the poor. 
2.14 Strong + 
EGAL 
Index 
6-Item index measuring agreement with 
egalitarian beliefs. A higher score on this index 
indicates more agreement with egalitarian 
values 
2.40 Strong - 
Lib-Cons Respondents self-select their place on a seven-
point range. A higher score indicates more 
conservative ideology. 
4.55 Weak + 
Trust Gov Dummy variable derived from the question, 
“How much of the time do you think you can 
trust the government to do what is right?” 
where 1= “almost always” or “sometimes” and 
0=”almost never” 
0.60 Weak - 
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Correlations provide a baseline determination of the strength of the 
relationship between variables. The table below presents bivariate 
correlations between these key variables, applying Pearson’s r (two-tailed) to 
represent the linear relationship between the two variables.  
TABLE 14: CORRELATIONS FOR VARIABLES INCLUDED IN MODEL 1 
The correlations demonstrate moderately strong relationships between 
the dependent variable (NIMBY Index) and the independent variables of 
interest (correlations for all of the independent variables discussed in this 
study can be found in Appendix 3). Furthermore, the NIMBY Index shows a 
strong relationship to the direct questions about support for affordable 
housing. These correlations strengthen the validity of the index, 
demonstrating that professed concerns regarding affordable housing are 
borne out in expressed opposition.  
As was anticipated, both Racial Stereotyping and Poverty Stereotyping 
correlate with both the direct support questions and the NIMBY Index, 
 Support AH 
in Town 
Support 















1.000 .830** .652** .416** .293** .438** .266** -.088 
Support AH 
in NH 
.830** 1.000 .697** .463** .252** .488** .258** -.041 
NIMBY 
Index 
.652** .697** 1.000 .489** .353** .408** .292** -.054 
RACE Index .416** .463** .489** 1.000 .447** .533** .368** -.006 
POOR Index .293** .252** .353** .447** 1.000 .252** .251** -.013 
EGAL Index .438** .488** .408** .533** .252** 1.000 .323** .003 
Lib-Cons  .266** .258** .292** .368** .251** .323** 1.000 -.096 
Trust Gov -.088 -.041 -.054 -.006 -.013 .003 -.096 1.000 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level 
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showing that there is, indeed, a relationship between the social construction 
of the residents of affordable housing and opposition to its development 
nearby. Poverty Stereotyping and Racial Stereotyping present a moderately 
strong correlation (.447). These results indicate that, as expected, race and 
poverty stereotypes are linked with opposition to affordable housing, but also 
likely relate to one another.  
Furthermore, the race index and the egalitarianism index also strongly 
correlate (.533). In fact, these two variables present the strongest correlation 
between any of the independent variables included in either model. The 
Racial Prejudice index includes a number of questions that allude to self-
reliance and individual responsibility – something directly measured by the 
egalitarianism index. It is not surprising, then, that these two measures 
present a strong relationship. Future studies may consider parsing out the two 
indexes in order to more clearly establish exactly how both racial stereotyping 
and egalitarianism relate to opposition to affordable housing.  
The correlation table demonstrates that the anticipated relationships 
between the independent variables and the dependent variable exist, and 
correlate strongly enough to produce confidence that the independent 
variables will serve as important determinants of attitudes toward affordable 
housing.  
Construction of Regression Models 
The correlations demonstrate a statistically significant relationship 
between the independent variables of interest and the NIMBY dependent 
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variable. In order to determine what factors influence attitudes toward 
affordable housing, I applied Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Two 
OLS regression models are constructed in order to foster a more sophisticated 
understanding of how and why respondents hold negative attitudes toward 
affordable housing. The first model applies only the hypothesized variables of 
interest to the NIMBY index: attitudes toward minorities; attitudes toward the 
poor; and ideology (Coding of the variables and hypothesized direction of 
influence can be found in Table 13, p. 173). This approach allows us to view 
how these variables directly influence attitudes toward affordable housing: 
Previous studies demonstrate that neighbors are seldom forthcoming 
as to the specific reasons they do not want affordable housing developed 
nearby. Even those who are willing to discuss their concerns about property 
values or neighborhood decline seldom explain what aspects about the 
proposed housing development prompt them to express such concerns. Using 
the less loaded questions in the NIMBY Index limits the instance of socially 
desirable answers. By pairing this index with questions regarding the 
hypothesized determinants of opposition, we can analyze the underlying 
indicators of opposition to affordable housing without relying solely upon the 
respondents’ stated views.  
When analyzed using scatterplots, all of the index variables 
demonstrate normal distribution and exhibit a linear relationship to the 
dependent variable. The liberal-conservative variable skews slightly toward 
the higher end of this scale, but not so much to warrant modification. 
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However, analyzing the distribution of other variables reveals some cases of 
abnormal distribution and non-linear relationships to the dependent variable. 
Trust in government skews strongly toward a lack of trust in government. 
Only 11 out of the 279 valid responses on this variable say they can “almost 
always” trust the government to do what is right. Thus, instead of applying 
this variable as an ordinal-level measure, a dummy was constructed so that 1= 
“sometimes” or “almost always”; 0=”almost never.” This variable does not 
correlate to the dependent variable, but it is included in the model to control 
for its influence on the other independent variables – particularly the liberal-
conservative scale and egalitarianism index. When implementing both 
regression models, I entered variables normally and replaced missing cases 
with the mean. 
Model 1: Hypothesized Determinants of NIMBY Attitudes 
TABLE 15: REGRESSION MODEL 1 
 
Dependent Variable: NIMBY Index 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Model R-square: .298; F=23.712 (sig=.000) B Std. Error T Sig. 
(Constant) .559 .194 2.883 .004 
RACE Index .332*** .075 4.429 .000 
POOR Index .232*** .084 2.758 .006 
EGAL Index .191*** .060 3.185 .002 
Liberal Conservative Scale .031 .021 1.434 .153 
Trust Gov -.052 .061 -.847 .398 
*** significant <.01 
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This model produces an R2 of .298, indicating that the independent 
variables predict a fair amount of the change in dependent variable. This 
analysis demonstrates that these variables are likely influential in determining 
NIMBY attitudes. All of the index variables are statistically significant, in the 
hypothesized direction. By far, the most powerful predictor of NIMBY 
attitudes in this model is Racial Stereotyping. Respondents who agree with 
stereotypes about racial minorities also largely agree with negative 
perceptions of affordable housing. This is also the case for poverty prejudice, 
albeit to a lesser extent. Thus, racial prejudice is a stronger predictor of 
NIMBY attitudes than poverty prejudice.  
While the liberal-conservative scale and trust in government both have 
small coefficients and are not statistically significant, it is likely that 
ideological attitudes also play a role. Egalitarianism is strongly significant in 
the model, demonstrating that those who hold strong egalitarian ideologies 
are less likely to perceive affordable housing as a threat. Contrary to my 
hypotheses, the liberal-conservatism measure is not significant in this model. 
Previous studies found that respondents to this particular question tend to 
moderate their responses. Thus, those who actually reside at the more 
extreme ends of the spectrum will respond in a slightly more moderate way, 
so as not to appear radical (Berry 1993). Thus, because lib-cons is a self-
identified scale, respondents may not accurately identify their ideology. The 
egalitarian index, which asks specific questions about ideological positions, 
may offer a more powerful and a more valid predictor of ideology.  
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The trust in government variable also lacks significance, although when 
analyzed in its original, three-pronged ordinal form, it demonstrated a 
significant correlation to the dependent variable (r=-.133, significant at the 
.05 level). Due to the small number of respondents who answered “almost 
always” to this question, it was not feasible to retain this variable in its ordinal 
form. Despite these challenges, this variable should be considered in other 
studies using the NIMBY index, as a larger sample may provide a better 
distribution on “Trust in Government” that might allow it to be included as an 
ordinal variable, and may very well present a significant relationship to 
NIMBY opposition.  
The primary purpose of this study is to determine whether there is a 
relationship between stereotyping, ideology, and opposition to affordable 
housing. The results from this first model indicate the presence of a strong 
relationship between both racial and class prejudice and NIMBY, as well as 
egalitarianism and NIMBY. In order to ensure that these relationships are 
valid, and not merely masking other potential indicators, it is necessary to 
produce a fuller depiction of  NIMBY attitudes before drawing conclusions. 
Model 2: Hypothesized Variables and Alternatives 
Model two presents a more robust test of what factors might influence 
NIMBY opposition to affordable housing. The dominant theory in the 
literature maintains that NIMBY opposition primarily results from a self-
interested response to perceived or real threats emanating from proposed 
housing developments. Thus, individual and neighborhood level variables that 
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reflect self-interest are included in the second model. These include whether 
the respondent owns a home, whether they live in a suburban area, whether 
they live in a single-family home, whether their neighborhood constitutes only 
single-family homes, household income, and the presence of children under 
18 in the household.   
TABLE 16: SELF-INTEREST INDICATORS 
 
I anticipate that these “self-interest variables” will have some influence 
on housing attitudes, but will not present as strong an influence as prejudice 
and ideology. These variables indicate that the respondent has a strong self-
interest in the quality, safety, and value of their property and neighborhoods. 
Homeowners and those who live in single-family neighborhoods have a high 
stake in the continued quality of those neighborhoods, and therefore likely 
respond in a more protective manner when they perceive a threat to their 
property values or neighborhood quality. In addition, income affects the size 
and location of the house in which one lives, as well as the type of 
Variable Description Mean Hypothesis 
SF NH 
Dummy variable where 1= lives in a neighborhood 
where housing is “almost all single-family homes.”  
.65 Weak + 
SF Home 
Dummy variable where 1= “lives in a single-family 
home” 
.80 Weak + 
Homeowner Housing tenure. Dummy variable where 1=own .82 Strong+ 
Kids under 
18 
Whether children under 18 are present in the 




Scale variable indicating how long respondent has 
lived in the current home. 
15 years Weak + 
Suburb 
Dummy variable where 1=respondent lives in an 
areas described as a “suburb” 
.22 Weak + 
Income Income, measured in ranges $50-57K Strong + 
Diversity 
Dummy variable in response to the question, “how 
racially diverse is your neighborhood?” where 1= 
“very” or “somewhat” and 0= “not very” diverse 
.57 Weak - 
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neighborhood one resides in. Based on Dear’s (1992) expectations of NIMBY 
demographics, higher-income respondents are those most likely to oppose 
affordable housing. Other studies suggest that higher income residents are 
expected to oppose affordable housing because of both their increased social 
distance from the poor as well as their propensity to have a high stake in the 
quality of the neighborhood (Chong, Citrin, and Conley 2001).  
Since literature on housing opposition often sites both neighborhood 
safety and school quality, respondents with young children presumably hold a 
stronger negative view toward affordable housing. For the same reason, a 
dummy variable for those who indicated that they live in “suburbs” warranted 
inclusion, since families and those concerned with safety and school quality 
are likely to live in what they deem to be a suburban environment. In 
addition, more established, long-term families may also hold stronger views 
about changes to their neighborhoods, so the length of time one has lived in 
the current home also is included in the model. Finally, since many associate 
affordable housing with multi-family housing, I expect that respondents living 
in neighborhoods with primarily single-family homes will likely oppose the 
development of multi-family housing nearby. This is also consistent with 
historical opposition to mixing housing types found in previous research.  
The correlation chart below demonstrates the strength of relationships 
between the “self-interest” set of variables and the dependent variable.  
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1.000 .257** .192** .115* .113* .095 -.004 .181** -.045 
Lives in 
SF NH 
.257** 1.000 .464** .368** .104 -.022 .109 .227** -.168** 
Lives in 
SF Home 
.192** .464** 1.000 .552** .121* .028 .077 .374** -.072 
Home-
owner 
.115* .368** .552** 1.000 .124* .074 .182** .365** -.132* 
Suburb .113* .104 .121* .124* 1.000 -.059 -.136* .254** .086 
Kids <18 
at Home 
.095 -.022 .028 .074 -.059 1.000 -.250** .101 -.113 
Years in 
Home 
-.004 .109 .077 .182** -.136* -.250** 1.000 -.052 -.028 
Income .181** .227** .374** .365** .254** .101 -.052 1.000 .007 
Diversity -.045 -.168** -.072 -.132* .086 -.113 -.028 .007 1.000 
*   Correlation is significant at the .05 level 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level 
 
A number of the variables in this matrix significantly correlate to the 
dependent variable, although the degree of correlation is (for the most part) 
modest. Home and neighborhood type clearly relate to attitudes toward 
affordable housing, including living in a single-family home, in a suburb, and 
in a single-family neighborhood. Socioeconomic indicators are also important 
factors, as both income and homeownership present significant relationships 
to the dependent variable. Furthermore, a number of interesting correlations 
between independent variables deserve attention. Homeownership correlates 
to income as well as to a number of the neighborhood-type indicators. 
Income, as well, clearly relates to the type of neighborhood and community in 
which respondents live.  
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Also interesting is that living in a “suburb” has a weaker correlation to 
a number of variables than would be expected – particularly living in a single-
family neighborhood and the presence of children. It was expected that 
respondents indicating that they live in single-family neighborhoods and have 
young children would likely reside in suburbs, but the results indicate that 
they do not overwhelmingly reside in these communities. The high incidence 
of respondents who live in small towns and rural areas likely explains this lack 
of a statistical relationship (See Figure 3). Most of these respondents also 
likely live in single-family homes located in primarily single-family 
neighborhoods.   
FIGURE 3: COMMUNITY TYPE 
 
 
An additional variable included here is “neighborhood diversity.” 
Contact theory suggests that people who have more contact with minorities or 
the poor will be more accepting of their presence in their neighborhood 
(Emerson, Kimbro, and Yancey 2002). Thus, it is possible that increased 
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racial diversity in neighborhoods will decrease opposition to affordable 
housing. As is seen by the correlation table, those who perceive their 
neighborhood as a diverse place also are less likely to live in an entirely single-
family neighborhood. They are also less likely to be homeowners, however. 
This may indicate a close relationship between racial diversity and diversity of 
housing type and tenure. Because each of these variables exhibit a 
relationship either to the dependent variable or to each other, they all warrant 
inclusion in model 2. 
In order to minimize specification error and ensure inclusion of all 
important variables in the model, the second model also includes variables 
mentioned in other studies as potential influencers upon attitudes toward 
social policy, neighborhood choice, and housing opposition. These variables 
indicate identification with a particular group or cohort. As Erikson and Tedin 
state, “group characteristics can clearly make a difference in how people see 
the political world. Belonging to a group is part of one’s self-identification” 
(Erickson and Tedin 2003, 205).  
TABLE 18: GROUP IDENTITY INDICATORS 
 
One of the most common ways individuals self-identify is age. Cohort, 
or generational effects, has been shown to have a significant influence on 
Variable Description Mean Hypothesis 
Age 
Dummy variable where 
1=respondent is 65 years or older 
.19 Weak + 
Race 
Respondent’s Race. Dummy variable 
where 1=White 
.79 Weak + 




Gender Dummy variable where 1=female .63 Weak - 
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policy attitudes – particularly opinions toward social policies (Erikson and 
Tedin 2003). In order to capture the potential influence of these effects, I 
added a dummy variable measuring the retired cohort to the model (Age is 
65+). Gender also plays an important role in shaping policy attitudes. Women 
are more likely than men to support public policies designed to foster social 
justice (Erikson and Tedin 2009). The public opinion literature also suggests 
that education is “strongly correlated with political tolerance and support for 
democratic values…[and] college generally has a liberalizing effect on 
noneconomic political opinions” (Erikson and Tedin 2003, 127). Thus, I also 
included education in the second model.  
Finally, since this study measures racial attitudes, the race of the 
respondent likely determines policy preferences. The inclusion of a dummy 
variable for white respondents captures this potential effect. Since it is 
hypothesized that attitudes toward minorities influence attitudes toward 
housing, it is probable that minorities themselves will hold different views 
than Whites. However, there is conflicting theoretical evidence as to whether 
those views are likely to be more or less supportive. The correlation table 
below indicates how these group variables relate to the dependent variable 
and to each other.  
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TABLE 19: CORRELATIONS FOR MODEL 2 – INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Because of the weak relationships seen in the correlation matrix, I do 
not expect that these individual characteristics will have much of a direct 
impact on housing attitudes. However, I anticipate that some individual 
characteristics affect other attitudes, and it is important to control for the 
effects of these variables to grasp a clear understanding of the relationship 
between the dependent variable and the independent variables of interest. 
TABLE 20: REGRESSION MODEL 2 
 NIMBY Index Age > 65 Race is White Education Gender 
NIMBY Index 1.000 -.004 .017 .034 .135* 
Age is Over 65 -.004 1.000 .092 -.172** .015 
Race is White .017 .092 1.000 .014 .033 
Education .034 -.172** .014 1.000 .121* 
Gender .135* .015 .033 .121* 1.000 
*  Correlation is significant at the .05 level (two-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (two-tailed) 
Dependent Variable: NIMBY Index 
U.S. Coefficients Model R-Square: .356; F=9.275 (sig=.000) 
B Std. Error 
t Sig. 
(Constant) .394 .235 1.674 .095 
RACE Index .378*** .077 4.920 .000 
POOR Index .238*** .084 2.824 .005 
EGAL Index .120* .065 1.837 .067 
Trust Gov -.090 .060 -1.485 .139 
Liberal Conservative Scale .040* .021 1.881 .061 
Age is Over 65 -.070 .083 -.844 .399 
Female -.020 .062 -.329 .742 
Education .023 .021 1.077 .283 
Race is White -.128* .077 -1.673 .095 
NH Not Diverse .021 .061 .337 .736 
Income .040 .029 1.366 .173 
Lives in Single-Family Home .030 .096 .318 .751 
Lives in SF Neighborhood .113 .073 1.547 .123 
Homeowner -.049 .096 -.509 .611 
Has Children < 18 at Home .011 .068 .166 .868 
Suburb .180*** .073 2.475 .014 
*** Variable is significant at the .01 level 
**   Variable is significant at the .05 level 
*     Variable is significant at the .1 level 
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The second model’s R-square increases by just under .06, even after 
adding twelve new independent variables. Not surprisingly, most of these new 
variables present very weak coefficients, and most lack statistical significance. 
The most notable relationship can be found with the variable “suburb,” a 
dummy variable indicating that the respondent lives in an area considered a 
suburb. Interestingly, neither housing type nor housing tenure is significant, 
thus the type of community one lives proves a more important predictor of 
NIMBY attitudes than whether one owns that home, or in what type of home 
one lives. These results suggest that the type of community in which one lives 
can affect attitudes, but that homeownership, income, and other “self-
interest” measures do little to explain opposition to affordable housing. While 
respondents living in homogeneous areas may feel they have more to lose 
when it comes to developing affordable housing nearby, the threats they 
perceive appear to be shaped by negative perceptions and stereotypes of the 
poor and minority groups.  
In this second model, the “liberal-conservative” variable becomes 
significant at the .1 level, albeit with a low (.040) coefficient. This indicates 
that the inclusion of one of the additional variables in Model two enhances the 
importance of the Lib-Cons variable as a predictor of “NIMBY.” It is likely that 
the moderating variables here are “education” and “income.” Thus, 
conservatism may have been obscured by other variables included in the first 
model. Once income and/or education are accounted for, its influence 
becomes more clear.  
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Analyzing the impact of the EGAL index captures a similar effect. 
When applying the first regression analysis, the EGAL index demonstrates 
strong predictive value and significance. However, when incorporating both 
income and education to the model, they have both a separate and a 
combined effect that moderates the impact of Egalitarianism upon housing 
attitudes, moving it from a variable significant at the .01 level in the first 
model to one significant only at the .1 level in the second model (sig=.002 in 
model 1; .067 in model 2). Thus, it appears that both income and education 
suppress the impact of egalitarianism upon opposition to affordable housing, 
meaning that as income and education rise, it minimizes the effect of 
egalitarian ideology upon affordable housing attitudes. 
The only cohort or demographic variable significant in the model is the 
respondent’s race being white, albeit only at the .1 level. Surprisingly, it is 
negatively associated with NIMBY opposition. However, race was positively 
correlated to the NIMBY index (although not significantly, and with a very 
small coefficient) when looking only at a bivariate relationship. In the 
regression, race becomes significant and changes its sign. This suggests that 
the race variable accounts for an indirect effect not captured by this model. 
When excluding the race variable from the model, there is no noticeable 
change in the relationship between any other variables in the model, so the 
relationship reflected in the race variable may reflect an important factor not 
present in this model. While including this variable in the model presents 
some interpretation challenges, it certainly warrants inclusion in future 
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studies to determine more accurately the extent to which the race of the 
respondent factors into attitudes toward affordable housing. 
Interpretation of Results  
The predominant questions guiding this study are whether racial and 
class stereotyping influence the public’s views about affordable housing. 
Research on NIMBY attitudes nearly always suggest that racism and classism 
influence opposition to nearby development (Stein 1996; Pendall 1999). 
However, such theories have not been empirically tested. The analysis 
provided in this study illustrates a clear relational pattern between 
stereotypes about the potential residents of affordable housing and propensity 
to oppose its construction nearby. Furthermore, it is racial stereotyping, not 
poverty stereotyping, that presents strongest predictor of NIMBY attitudes.  
When exploring the responses to the open-ended question, only one 
respondent directly connected racial discrimination with housing, stating, “I 
teach in the inner city. Most of my children live in dangerous areas. Their 
parents of the children are taking up 2 or 3 jobs so they should be given a 
chance. It furthers racism if people keep turning down affordable housing.” 
Yet, the connection between opposition to affordable housing and racial 
attitudes permeates into public opinion, even if it is not always expressed. The 
survey results in this study suggest that racial prejudice may underlie 
opposition to a much greater extent than previously thought, despite the fact 
that it is seldom mentioned as a factor by those who oppose the construction 
of affordable housing nearby. 
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While poverty stereotyping, and to a lesser extent, views regarding 
inequality, also play a role, attitudes toward minorities demonstrate far 
stronger predictive value. These results confirm the hypotheses set forth at 
the beginning of this analysis. Race stereotyping, ideology and poverty 
stereotyping all serve as important predictors of NIMBY opposition to 
affordable housing. While this study also shows that socioeconomic factors 
and neighborhood characteristics play a role in shaping how respondents view 
affordable housing and the potential impacts it might have on their 
neighborhoods, far fewer variables than expected held significance.  
While the public certainly does not universally oppose to affordable 
housing, such agreement with providing opportunity does not necessarily 
translate into support for building affordable housing nearby. One respondent 
who indicated support for affordable housing in town, but not in his 
neighborhood stated, “Well, I bought and I own my own property – values 
would go down.” Others reiterate such concern, as another respondent stated, 
“We purposely chose an upscale neighborhood for the school system and the 
continually increasing value of homes. To bring in subsidized housing would 
lower the value of the suburb and our own home.” Another stated, affordable 
housing “brings low income people to one place which brings crime and 
brings down the quality of area that you are living in.” While many genders, 
incomes, and education levels all recognize the need for affordable housing, 
perceived threats to their own self-interest or well-being limits the extent to 
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which they are willing to support the development of affordable housing in 
their own neighborhoods and communities.  
However, this research clarifies that the perceived threat that 
affordable housing so often incurs likely emanates from fears about the people 
who might reside in those homes. Negative ideas about the poor and 
minorities clearly shape attitudes about affordable housing. Thus, the threats 
so often mentioned when gathering opinions regarding affordable housing 
presumably emanate from the residents themselves. Furthermore, 
preconceived notions based on stereotypes and prejudice toward the poor and 
minority groups largely influence opinions regarding those who live in 
affordable housing. These findings hold significant implications for housing 
policy, planning practice, advocacy, and future research on housing attitudes. 
We will discuss these implications in the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
The lack of understanding regarding when and why the public opposes 
affordable housing proves particularly important when public opposition 
stems not from rational or legitimate concerns, but from less politically 
correct issues such as racial prejudice or elitism. Neighborhood opposition to 
affordable housing remains a major obstacle to the successful implementation 
of federal, state, and local housing policies. As Charles Field points out, “social 
concerns about race, class, and neighborhood quality severely complicate the 
situation. When these factors are in play, opposition to affordable housing 
becomes extremely difficult to overcome (Field 1997, 825). The research often 
suggested that concerns about property values, crime, and community fit have 
become proxies for racial and class prejudice, yet the existing research on this 
subject has largely failed to incorporate racial and class views into their 
studies. 
The development of affordable housing outside of poor areas provides 
one of the few available tools for increasing spatial access to opportunity for 
low-income families. Neighborhood opposition to the development of 
affordable housing often hinders the ability of government, private, and non-
profit entities to build affordable housing. When such opposition is driven by 
stereotypes and perceptions of the potential problems that affordable housing 
or its residents might bring to a neighborhood, rather than evidence and 
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concrete facts, NIMBY opposition reinforces the spatial inequality that 
plagued US communities throughout the last century.  
Devolution placed the onus for affordable housing construction on 
municipalities; retrenchment removed many of the resources formerly at their 
disposal (Davis 2006; Mueller and Schwartz 2008). Municipal governments 
are thus placed in a position where they must compete with each other to 
expand their tax base. Providing affordable housing and other social services 
does not directly aid the city coffers – rather, it is perceived as  a burden on 
precarious city finances. Cities therefore often feel pressed to choose between 
affordable housing and economic development mechanisms, with affordable 
housing seldom claiming victory (Goetz 1995; Basolo 2000). 
In the absence of direct government provision of housing, private 
developers are charged with the task of implementing policies designed to 
construct housing for the many income strata that cannot afford to purchase 
market-rate homes (Keyes et al. 1996; Bockmeyer 2003). However, program 
guidelines and profit-motivation often prevent such firms from producing 
housing directed toward the neediest populations (Bratt 2008; Mueller and 
Schwartz 2008). Community Development Corporations (CDCs) and other 
non-profit housing providers are the only agencies developing housing that 
for-profit companies avoid; namely, housing in declining neighborhoods and 
housing for very low income families (Bratt 2009; Krumholz 2004). 
Nevertheless, limited capacity and competing interests often prevent such 
agencies from achieving these goals (Keyes et al. 1996; Koschinsky 1998). 
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The current policy and planning framework results from disjointed and 
complex financing programs, land use regulations that impede affordable 
housing development, and heavy dependence on private and non-profit 
developers with little guidance or resources from the government (Downs 
2004; Krumholz 2004; Stegman 1989). This system produces a development 
context that leaves housing producers extremely vulnerable to public 
opposition. The need to layer finance often forces developers to take on bridge 
and gap loans to move forward through the many stages of development 
(Goetz 1995; Davis 2006). Land use regulations often prevent the dense 
development required to make affordable housing feasible, requiring a zoning 
variance that is typically subject to public approval (Pendall 2000). Any 
public concerns or fears may prevent the granting of a variance, leading to 
costly delays. Such delays increase the chances that the development will fail. 
Failed projects often receive negative media attention, which can impact an 
agency’s reputation in the city, increasing the chances that any future projects 
or proposals will not move forward (Dear 1992; Mickey and Soll 1996). 
Planning and policy guidelines emphasize the promotion of a decision-
making environment that values public participation (Lowry 1997; Friedmann 
1998; Brooks 2002). This present context stems largely from years of top-
down planning and policy decisions that adversely affected many 
neighborhoods and communities (Fainstein 2000; Hall 1988). However, the 
emphasis on public participation has given neighborhoods and communities 
much power over land use decisions, leading to situations where private 
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interests may trump public needs (Fort, Rosenman, and Budd 1993; Chong, 
Citrin, and Conley 2001). It is imperative that decision-makers study and 
understand the factors that influence public opinion in land use matters in 
order to appropriately distinguish between genuine concern for a community 
and self-interested opposition to neighborhood change.  
Because of the lack of concrete evidence regarding why Americans 
often oppose the development of affordable housing, planners, researchers, 
and developers in the field rely on information gathered at town meetings, 
from local politicians, and from other anecdotal sources rather than on survey 
data (Field 1997; Stein 1992). Thus, instead of approaching a potential conflict 
with as much information as possible, those supporting the development of 
affordable housing enter into negotiation and marketing sessions without a 
thorough knowledge of how the public views affordable housing, its residents, 
or housing policy in general. This approach makes it extremely difficult to 
pursue coalition and consensus building through either education or 
negotiation, since the core concerns of the neighbors are not entirely clear.  
Summary of Findings 
Despite the significant progress already made toward de jure equality 
for all, de facto discrimination continues to plague the lives of the poor and 
minority populations; an institutional inequality reflected in public opinion. A 
significant segment of the American public clearly views racial minorities and 
the poor in a negative light, and these perceptions undermine the success of 
public policies designed to increase or improve access to opportunity. Various 
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factors contribute to the perception that one’s self-interest is threatened, 
many of which are only tangentially related to the size, appearance, and 
location of proposed housing.  
It is not surprising that people living in suburban neighborhoods are 
more likely to be suspicious of affordable housing. The home is the greatest 
single investment for most American families. Thus, homeowners have a lot to 
lose when faced with the potential devaluation of this primary asset. Despite 
evidence showing that the construction of affordable housing typically yields 
no impact on nearby property values, such fears and perceptions take root 
based on the perceived and real characteristics of affordable housing. 
Affordable housing carries an implication of low or moderate-income status. 
By definition, affordable housing is cheaper than the existing housing in an 
area. Thus, it follows that those who hold negative views toward the poor are 
not likely to want to enable more poor people to live in their neighborhoods. 
However, individuals of all tenure types and income levels show 
significant higher opposition to affordable housing when they live in a 
suburban area. This suggests that those who live in areas with more diversity 
of housing types more readily accept affordable housing, regardless of 
whether they rent or own their own home. This evidence of neighborhood-
level effects on attitudes should be investigated further in order to more 
accurately identify the relationship between neighborhood type and attitudes 
about development. While causality remains indistinguishable in this study, 
this finding indicates the possibility that individuals choosing to reside in 
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neighborhoods with a diversity of housing types appear more willing to live 
near affordable housing than their counterparts residing in the suburbs. 
It is not surprising that people who do not trust the government, and 
do not hold egalitarian ideologies are not particularly supportive of 
government-sponsored housing policies. While ideological opposition to 
affordable housing did not represent the strongest factor mentioned by 
respondents, a large segment of the American public certainly does not trust 
the government, resists attempts to enlarge the government, and seeks to 
limit incursion by the government into the private market. People holding 
such views would certainly not support the development of affordable housing 
anywhere, especially not in their towns or neighborhoods. 
However, the association between opposition to affordable housing and 
negative attitudes toward minorities is neither rational nor intuitive. 
Affordable housing offers no explicit connotations as a race-targeted public 
policy. However, as Chester Hartman points out in a recent critique of a study 
on housing attitudes, “race lurks, insufficiently recognized, behind the 
housing issue, as it does behind so many issues and problems in our society” 
(Hartman 2008, 253), which the results of this study corroborate. Regression 
analysis showed that racial stereotyping was an exceptionally strong predictor 
of NIMBY opposition. Regardless of how many independent variables the 
model included, or which variables we included or removed, racial 
stereotyping remained a strong predictor with undeniable statistical 
significance. These results demonstrate and demand that any study of 
     
199 
opposition to affordable housing incorporate variables measuring racial 
attitudes. 
Furthermore, this survey produced results similar to those of previous 
research done on the connection between racial attitudes and support for 
social policies such as welfare and affirmative action. Many of the same 
determinants found to influence attitudes toward other social policies shape 
public attitudes toward affordable housing. Despite being a race-neutral 
policy prescription, the public clearly associates affordable housing with the 
race of its potential residents. This association of affordable housing with 
minorities correlates to less support for affordable housing, and greater 
concern about negative outcomes emanating from the development of such 
housing nearby.  
These results suggest that middle and upper class America continues to 
regard the poor and minorities with suspicion, and that they do not wish to 
share their neighborhoods with such populations. The concerns about 
affordable housing mirror those expressed during the 1930s public housing 
debate, the 1960s civil rights era, and the 1970s busing debate. Americans 
continue to believe that minorities and the poor lack motivation, take 
advantage of government programs, and do not care for their personal 
property. When land use conflicts over the construction of affordable housing 
arise, the concerns voiced by neighborhood residents reflect these stereotypes 
and perceptions. Thus, Americans associate “Affordable Housing” with 
minority and poor populations. When these populations are viewed as lazy, 
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not invested in the community, and predisposed to criminality, it is no 
wonder that Americans do not wish to have them as neighbors.  
Implications for Planning Practice 
The field of urban planning does not often utilize broad public opinion 
studies; however, this research shows that Americans’ attitudes toward 
affordable housing take shape from internal factors, including ideology and 
racial and class stereotyping, rather than external factors, such as density and 
appearance, that might influence local opposition. Since application of the 
negotiation and education techniques typically used by planners occurs at the 
local level, applied to a single project or development, such techniques may 
not address the core concerns driving opposition. Instead of concentrating on 
negotiating with neighborhood groups over density, appearance, or size of the 
projects, it may be more appropriate to concentrate on discussions regarding 
the demographics of potential residents.  
The findings discussed herein suggest that those who felt that NIMBY 
opposition to affordable housing contained some element of racial prejudice 
were on the right track. This is not to say that every NIMBY battle represents 
opposition to racial integration, but such questions must be asked whenever a 
conflict over housing siting arises. Allowing affordable housing opposition to 
thwart its development hinders the government’s ability to successfully 
implement the goals of our national housing policies. Accepting the 
arguments of NIMBY opposition as righteous and valid gives such groups the 
power to continue to exclude the poor and minorities from their 
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neighborhoods. When racial stereotypes and negative perceptions about the 
poor shape concern about affordable housing, this opposition directly 
conflicts with the professed ideals of our society, as well as with the legal 
framework established by the Civil Rights Act and Fair Housing Act. Allowing 
such opposition to impede inclusionary housing efforts undermines the 
progress we have made thus far toward residential racial integration. 
The American Planning Association describes in its AICP code of ethics 
two main tenets affected by the results of this study. The first states that 
planners should “give people the opportunity to have a meaningful impact on 
the development of plans and programs that may affect them. Participation 
should be broad enough to include those who lack formal organization or 
influence” (American Planning Association 2005). The second states, “We 
shall seek social justice by working to expand choice and opportunity for all 
persons, recognizing a special responsibility to plan for the needs of the 
disadvantaged and to promote racial and economic integration. We shall urge 
the alteration of policies, institutions, and decisions that oppose such needs” 
(American Planning Association 2005). Neighborhood opposition to 
affordable housing presents a conflict between these two professed goals.  
While it is important to incorporate the first goal of community 
participation into development plans, it is imperative that this participation 
does not impede the second goal of racial and economic integration. As Susan 
Fainstein states, “The appropriate criterion for evaluating a group’s claims 
should not be procedural rules alone; evaluation must comprise an analysis of 
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whether realization of the group’s goals is possible and, if so, whether such 
realization leaves intact the principle of social justice. Democracy is desirable, 
but not always” (Fainstein 2000, 469). Planners must strike a balance 
between democratic participation and advocacy on behalf of those who cannot 
participate. Undertaking such action promotes the achievement of racial and 
economic integration through the development of affordable housing, and 
ensures that deference to community or neighborhood preferences does not 
become an excuse for exclusionary attitudes and practices.  
Furthermore, dealing with local land use conflicts requires addressing 
regional and public needs. The very purpose of urban planning is to mediate 
between the private market and the public sector in order to promote policies 
and programs that enhance the livability, affordability, and economic viability 
of cities and regions. Neighborhood-level land use decisions can thwart 
policies and plans designed to improve entire metropolitan areas. Rather than 
negotiating solely with single neighborhoods, planners must take a broader 
approach, incorporating the needs of the city as a whole. While public 
participation certainly represents a necessary aspect of the planning process, 
planners should take care when defining whom the “public” is that is 
participating, for there is never a single “public opinion” in land use planning. 
Multiple stakeholders produce multiple opinions. The role of planners is to 
balance those opinions with the needs of the city as a whole. This holds 
particularly true when grappling with the siting of unwanted land uses such as 
affordable housing.  
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Implications for Housing Policy 
The opposition to entitlement programs and housing assistance that 
pervaded policymaking throughout the 20th century continues to manifest 
itself through public opinion. The development of affordable housing in 
middle-class neighborhoods meets with fervent opposition due to economic 
concerns as well as a perception that the provision of such housing conflicts 
with the basic American values of self-reliance. In the twenty-first century, 
“Affordable Housing” is most often privately built and publicly subsidized. 
While politically expedient, and in line with American values, this system does 
not perform without resistance. Not surprisingly, public opposition to low-
income housing development is entrenched in the same ideologies that 
shaped federal housing policy.  
Federal devolution created a situation where a small local opposition 
can thwart the development of affordable housing, undermining the needs of 
a regional housing market. Reliance on non-profit agencies to provide 
affordable housing for the poor proved to be untenable, particularly as 
funding for government housing programs dwindles. This study demonstrates 
that the public responds to proposed affordable housing projects in ways that 
run counter to the goals of public policy, the needs of regional housing 
markets and the ethics of the planning field.  Promoting the development of 
affordable housing that conforms to the policy goals of deconcentration of 
poverty and enhanced access to opportunity will require increased state or 
federal regulation.  
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A more comprehensive federal or state approach to housing would 
achieve the goal of dramatically increasing the number of families living in 
quality housing. However, any such proposal may still meet local opposition. 
While the policy environment of the twenty-first century may prove more 
conducive to stronger regulatory measures to promote fair housing goals, the 
success of such a program will depend on the extent to which it conforms to 
the ideological views of the American public. It also would likely require a 
strong federal hand to induce municipalities to implement fair housing goals. 
In order to successfully achieve these goals, a comprehensive housing strategy 
should promote: 
• Limited government involvement by requiring placing the majority of the 
administrative burden on states and/or municipalities rather than the 
federal government; 
• Free-market supremacy by encouraging private-sector production of 
housing rather than direct government production; 
• Equality by developing housing throughout regions, rather than 
concentrate affordable housing in marginal areas; and 
• Self-reliance through the provision of increased opportunities for low-
income families to live in areas with better job, school, and amenity access. 
 
Inclusionary or “fair share” housing could provide such a framework. 
The principle objective of such policies is to increase the supply of affordable 
housing in a manner that fosters greater economic integration yet prevents 
any neighborhood or community from bearing an excessive burden.  A 
number of states already have statewide mechanisms to encourage the equal 
distribution of affordable housing across municipalities, including California, 
Massachusetts, Florida, and New Jersey.  These programs can serve as a 
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model for other states, but in order to be most effective, federal housing policy 
should require, or at least promote, the adoption of such measures 
nationwide.  
A national inclusionary housing ordinance, if executed properly, could 
dramatically increase the number of low-income families living in quality 
housing. Furthermore, it can be crafted so that it conforms to ideology by 
achieving each of the four criteria discussed previously. Because 
implementation of inclusionary housing ordinances occurs at the state and/or 
local level, federal involvement is restricted to limited oversight and possibly 
funding. This achieves the goal of limited federal involvement, and avoids 
some of the missteps of historical housing programs. Furthermore, 
inclusionary housing programs do not typically include the direct production 
or provision of housing by any level of government. It simply implements a 
regulatory system that requires the private – or non-profit – sector to produce 
affordable housing. Thus, the scope of government involvement – as well as 
government finance – remains limited, ensuring the primacy of the private 
market.  
Inclusionary housing also fosters equity. Such programs encourage or 
require the fair distribution of affordable housing throughout a state or 
region, thus avoiding the concentration of housing in particular areas. It can 
also be argued that inclusionary housing fosters self-reliance by increasing the 
opportunities of low-income families. To some extent, any housing policy can 
face opposition with the argument that it fosters dependency, but by 
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deconcentrating poverty, inclusionary housing provides significant 
opportunities for low-income families to find better work opportunities, 
attend better schools, and have access to community amenities such as 
improved transportation, public parks, and neighborhood programs.  
Implications for Advocates  
This study shows the majority of Americans supports the development 
of affordable housing, recognizes the need for it, and is not universally 
opposed to government involvement in its construction or financing. Survey 
respondents recognize the potential benefits of developing affordable housing 
in their communities. However, American housing policy continues to suffer 
from the negative perceptions and poor reputation resulting from past 
mistakes. While marketing and advertising can contribute marginally, 
advocates and researchers themselves must promote affordability and access 
to opportunity as important pillars that encourage self-reliance.  
Such rhetoric may include emphasizing how the government subsidizes 
middle and upper-income families through housing subsidies, including the 
mortgage interest deduction, mortgage insurance, and the secondary 
mortgage market. Each of these should continually and strongly be framed as 
a government subsidy. This may help to frame affordable housing differently, 
potentially overcoming some of the negative stereotypes that trigger 
opposition to housing policies and development. Should Americans begin to 
see affordable housing as a means to achieving access to opportunity, rather 
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than a government handout, they may follow with more support of housing 
policies as well as developing such housing in their neighborhoods. 
Furthermore, the greater community benefits of affordable housing 
must also be stressed, including greater access for the poor to improved 
educational and economic opportunities. Previous survey research showed 
that when framed as an economic development tool, providing a necessary 
resource for first responders, educators, and other integral community 
members, Americans respond positively to affordable housing. In order to 
achieve effective implementation of any comprehensive housing policy, the 
American public must recognize how affordable housing improves 
opportunities for low income Americans, for the concept of opportunity is the 
link between the conflicting values of equality and individualism. When 
affordable housing is framed as promoting equality of opportunity, rather 
than equality of outcomes, it may enhance the potential for increased 
neighborhood support.  
However, marketing efforts applied in many cases thus far yielded a 
limited effect. When affordable housing faces particularly strong opposition, 
and there is significant evidence of racial discrimination, legal action is 
warranted. For the most part, demonstrating racial discrimination proves 
extremely difficult, given the race-neutral stance of affordable housing policy. 
However, the findings of this study may provide some evidence that housing 
opposition possesses a racial element, even when that element is not overtly 
expressed. This study may provide some impetus for the strengthening of 
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existing fair housing laws in order to apply them more aggressively in cases of 
exclusionary zoning, denial of variances, or other techniques that thwart 
affordable housing. 
Implications for Future Research 
This research filled a major gap in the literature on NIMBY attitudes. 
However, the conclusions made herein must be tempered until a much more 
extensive study can follow. Further research on NIMBY attitudes absolutely 
must incorporate racial and class attitudes in their studies, but such research 
needs to build upon this study in a number of areas. Obviously, stratifying the 
data to produce a more nuanced and sophisticated analysis of how different 
populations (for instance, different genders, races, or classes) might view 
affordable housing, would require a much larger sample size.  
One of the most important contributions of this study is the 
construction of a reliable and easily replicated measure for “NIMBY” 
attitudes. By presenting “NIMBY” as a collection of concerns regarding the 
potential impact of affordable housing rather than a simple measure of 
support or opposition to its development nearby, the NIMBY Index measures 
the propensity to oppose affordable housing much more accurately than 
single questions used in previous studies. As made clear by the results, most 
people are strongly supportive of affordable housing, but they express many 
concerns and fears regarding negative externalities. These externalities and 
the perceived costs they bring to neighborhoods and communities drive 
NIMBY opposition. Researchers interested in housing attitudes, planners 
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seeking community input, and advocates searching for support should 
consider using this index as a more nuanced and accurate measure of 
community opposition in their work. 
In addition, research can branch off from this study in a number of 
ways to develop a deeper understanding of the determinants of housing 
attitudes. First, there may be regional variations in attitudes or regional 
determinants of racial and class stereotyping not incorporated into this study. 
While previous research on social policies demonstrated little instance of 
regional variation in attitudes, the housing market is inherently local in 
character. Thus, housing attitudes may very well depend upon regional or 
local factors such as the strength of the housing market, age of the housing 
stock, and density of the city. While the neighborhood type and area type 
variables incorporated into this study did not demonstrate any predictive 
strength, more sophisticated measures of area determinants may be necessary 
to draw conclusions about regional variation.  
One of the drawbacks of this study was the lack of a previously tested 
measure for poverty stereotyping. Most research on class attitudes utilizes a 
set of questions that measures beliefs in the causes of poverty. However, there 
is no good measure of stereotypes about the poor. Future research should 
work to develop such a measure (or measures) and incorporate the causes of 
poverty index as well. Utilizing such measures together may provide a much 
more nuanced understanding of how the public views the poor. Since this and 
previous studies clearly indicate that such attitudes relate to views about 
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minorities, such research should also incorporate the racial stereotyping 
measure to establish the individual relationships between these items and 
housing attitudes.  
This research also revealed a dichotomy of attitudes toward rental and 
owner-occupied housing. The survey research undertaken herein did not 
distinguish between owner-occupied and rental housing – both can be 
“affordable.” However, the open-ended survey questions and some comments 
made in the focus groups demonstrated much stronger negative attitudes 
toward rental housing than owner-occupied housing. Whether such 
opposition rests in the housing type – renters are typically perceived to live in 
multi-family dwellings while owners are perceived to live in single-family 
dwellings – or with the behavior or social status of the residents themselves 
remains unclear. Furthermore, it is also unclear whether attitudes toward 
affordable rental housing or renters substantially differ from attitudes toward 
affordable homeownership or owners.  
This study’s findings also left unclear how community type shapes 
opposition to affordable housing; living in a suburb was the only significant 
neighborhood-level variable in the model. Future research should investigate 
further the extent to which living in a diverse neighborhood influences 
attitudes. Whether that diversity is racial, economic, or based on housing type 
may influence opinions about affordable housing. While these variables did 
not appear significant in this study, living in a suburb did. This item may 
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indicate that living in different types of areas influences perceptions of 
neighbors and neighborhoods.  
The recognition that housing opposition correlates with stereotypes 
about the poor and minorities may provide an impetus for increased federal 
regulation governing the spatial distribution of affordable housing, or even 
the application of Fair Housing laws to siting conflicts. To date, the 
application of Fair Housing laws to siting conflicts has resulted in little 
progress, since explicit discrimination is seldom proven. This study may 
provide some evidence that NIMBY opposition is based in part on racial 
prejudice. Expanding this research could result in greater ability to apply fair 
housing laws to siting conflicts.  
Whether via a concrete inclusionary housing ordinance or another 
measure, municipal governments must promote regional housing needs even 
if it means over-ruling public opinion. As Rolf Pendall (1999) states, “racist 
and classist antihousing action—still a common occurrence—must be 
distinguished from other opposition to housing, if only because policy 
responses to prejudice-based opposition will differ markedly from those based 
on the real impacts of new housing on neighborhood quality” (p. 115). The 
findings from this study provide a framework for beginning to distinguish 
between “legitimate” opposition to affordable housing and that based on 
misperceptions and fear. Future research on housing attitudes must continue 
to incorporate perceptions of race and class into their studies in order to move 
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toward a more complete and sophisticated understanding of the NIMBY 
response to affordable housing. 
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Appendix I: Survey Instrument 
[INTRODUCTION] 
 
Hello, I’m [NAME] from the Office of Survey Research at the University of 
Texas at Austin. We’re surveying people in your area to ask their opinions 
about some issues relating to housing and poverty.  
 
The survey takes about 20 minutes to complete. Your participation is 
anonymous and voluntary, and all your answers will be kept completely 
confidential. Would you participate in our survey? 
 




<2> NO [END INTERVIEW] 
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SECTION A: HOUSING 
 
First I’d like to ask you a few questions about your home and neighborhood.  
 









>A002< How many years have you lived in your current home? 
   
<1-97>   
<1>    Less than one year 
<99> All my life 




>A003< How would you describe your city or town? Would you describe 
  it as a large city; a small city; a suburb; a small town; or a rural 
  area? 
 
<1>  LARGE CITY 
<2> SMALL CITY 
<3> SUBURB 
<4>  SMALL TOWN 





>A004< How would you describe the place you live? Is it an apartment, a 
  single family home; a duplex, or something else (please specify) 
  ______________?  
 
<1> APARTMENT 
<2>  SINGLE-FAMILY HOME 
<3> DUPLEX or THREE-FAMILY 
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[QxQ – “apartment” is any multi-family dwelling, whether owned or rented 
including a “condo” or “condominium”] 
 
[QxQ – if respondent says they live in a “triplex” or “three-family,” code a “3”] 
[If something else, please specify “other”] 
 
>A005< How would you describe the houses in your neighborhood? 
Would you say it has all single-family homes; mixed single and multi-family 
residential; mostly multi-family residential; residential mixed with 
commercial uses, or something else? ____________ (please specify) 
 
<1> ALL SINGLE-FAMILY 
<2>  MIXED RESIDENTIAL 
<3> MOSTLY MULTI-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL 
<4> RESIDENTIAL MIXED WITH COMMERCIAL 





[QxQ – multi-family residential includes duplexes, tri-plexes, and apartment 
buildings. ] 
[Commercial uses include businesses, office buildings, restaurants, and 
shops] 
 
>A006< Would you say that your neighborhood is very racially diverse, 
somewhat diverse, or not very racially diverse? 
 
<1> VERY DIVERSE 
<2>  SOMEWHAT DIVERSE 





>A007< Would you say that your neighborhood is mostly young people, 
a mix of ages, or mostly older folks? 
 
<1> MOSTLY YOUNG 
<2>  MIX OF AGES 
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>A008< Overall, would you say that your neighborhood is a great place 
to live, a good place, an okay place, or would you say that where 
you live now is not a very good place to live? 
 
<1> A GREAT PLACE 
<2>  A GOOD PLACE 
<3> AN OK PLACE 





Now I’d like to ask you a few questions about affordable housing. When 
answering these questions, please keep the following definition in mind.  
 
[DEFINITION] Affordable Housing is housing that is developed through 
some combination of incentives, cost-effective construction techniques, and 
governmental subsidies that can be rented or purchased by households who 
cannot afford housing in the community.  
 
Is there anything you don’t understand about this definition, or would you 
like me to read it again?  
 
[QxQ: if respondent asks, please re-read DEFINITION] 
[QxQ: “Incentives” include such things as property tax relief and fee waivers] 
[QxQ: “Cost-Effective Construction techniques” include building smaller units   
 or using less expensive materials] 
[QxQ: “Governmental Subsidies” include loans and grants provided by the 
federal, state, or local government.] 
 
Thank you. If you would like to hear the definition again at any time, please 
let me know.  
 
>A009< If affordable housing were proposed in your town, Would you 
  say you definitely would support that, you probably would, you 
  probably would not, or you definitely would not support  
  affordable housing in your town? 
 
<1> DEFINITELY WOULD 
<2> PROBABLY WOULD 
<3> PROBABLY WOULD NOT 
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>A010< If affordable housing were proposed in your neighborhood,  
  Would you say you definitely would support that, you probably 
  would, you probably would not, or you definitely would not  
  support affordable housing in your neighborhood? 
 
<1> DEFINITELY WOULD 
<2> PROBABLY WOULD 
<3> PROBABLY WOULD NOT 










Thank you. Now, I’m going to read a number of statements to you, Please tell 
me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly 
disagree with these statements. 
 
>A012< Building affordable housing in my neighborhood would lower 
property values. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, 
somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 





>A013< Building affordable housing in my neighborhood would increase 
  crime.  
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 





>A014< New and rehabilitated affordable housing makes communities 
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  more attractive.  
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 





>A015< People who live in affordable housing make good neighbors. Do 
  you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?  
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 






>A016< Building affordable housing in my neighborhood would  
  negatively affect the community’s character. 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 






>A017< Building affordable housing in my neighborhood would increase 
  traffic. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly  
  disagree? 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
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>A018< Building affordable housing in my neighborhood would have a 
  positive impact on the local economy 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 





>A019< Building affordable housing in my neighborhood would have a 
negative impact on local schools. 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 






SECTION B: IDEOLOGY 
 
Now, I want to ask you some questions about the role of the government. 
Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with 
these statements. 
 
>B001<  It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the 
differences in income between people with high incomes and 
those with low incomes. 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
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>B002< The government should provide more chances for children from 
  poor families to go to college. Do you strongly agree, agree,  
  disagree, or strongly disagree? 
  
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 





>B003< The government should provide a job for everyone who wants 
  one. 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 





>B004< The government should provide everyone with a guaranteed  
  basic income 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 





>B005< The government should provide a temporary assistance for the 
  unemployed. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly 
  disagree? 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
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>B006< The government should spend less on benefits for the poor. 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 





>B007< How much of the time do you think you can trust the   
  government to do what is right 
   
<1> ALMOST ALWAYS 
<2> SOME OF THE TIME 





>B008< Would you say that special interests have too much influence on 
  the government, the right amount of influence, or not enough 
  influence? 
 
<1> TOO MUCH 
<2> JUST RIGHT 





>B009< Do you think that people in government waste a lot of the money 
  we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don’t waste very much of it? 
   
<1> A LOT 
<2> SOME OF IT 
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>B010< We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. 
  Think of a 7-point scale where one means extremely liberal and 
  seven means extremely conservative. Where would you place 
  yourself on this scale? 
 
<1> EXTREMELY LIBERAL       
<2>                 
<3>                 
<4>                
<5>               
<6>                  





SECTION C: RACE 
 
Now I’d like to ask you some questions about racial minorities. By this, I mean 
African Americans, Hispanic Americans, or other non-White Americans. 
Please let me know if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, 
or strongly disagree with each of the following statements.  
 
>C001< Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other ethnic minorities 
overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Other minorities 
should do the same.  
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 





>C002< Minorities work just as hard to get ahead as most other  
  Americans. 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
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>C003< Generations of slavery and discrimination have created  
  conditions that make it difficult for many minorities to work  
  their way out of the lower class. Do you strongly agree,  
  somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 





>C004< Minority groups demand too much from the rest of society. Do 
  you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or  
  strongly disagree? 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 





>C005< Minorities are responsible for creating much of the racial  
  tension that exists in the United States today. 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 





>C006< Minorities generally do not complain as much as they should 
  about  their situation in society.  
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
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>C007< It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if 
minorities would only try harder they could be just as well off as 
Whites 
   
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 





>C008< Discrimination against minorities is no longer a problem in the 
United States.  
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 





SECTION D: POVERTY 
 
Now I’m going to read some statements that other people have made about 
poor people in the United States. Please answer whether you strongly agree, 
somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with each of these 
statements.  
 
>D001< People who don’t make much money are generally unmotivated. 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
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>D002< Poor people commit fewer crimes than wealthy people. 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 






>D003< Poor people should not have children until they can afford to 
take care of them 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 





>D004< Wealthy people are generally smarter than poor people 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 





>D005< Most poor people can’t manage their money 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
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>D006< People living in poverty would rather commit crimes for 
financial gain than work for a living 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 





>D007< In general, poor people have the same moral values as other 
Americans. 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 





>D008< Poor people don’t supervise their children enough. 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 





>D009< In general, wealthy people have the same moral values as other 
Americans. 
 
<1> STRONGLY AGREE 
<2> SOMEWHAT AGREE 
<3> SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
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SECTION E: DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
Finally, I’d like to ask you some questions about you. This is last section. 
 
>E001< Are you of Spanish or Hispanic origin or descent? 
 
<1>  YES 





>E002< What is your race?  




<4> AMERICAN INDIAN 
<5> HISPANIC 
<6>  MIXED RACES 
<7> OTHER (SPECIFY)___________________ 
 
<R> REF 
<D> DK  
 
[QXQ: If respondent does not know, read the response categories] 
 
>E003< Do you have children under the age of 18 living in your home? 
 
<1>  YES 





[QxQ: any children under 18 count as “YES” whether own children, 
grandchildren, foster children or other relationship.] 
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>E004< What is the highest level of education you have achieved? 
 
<1>  LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL               
<2>  HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA , GED       
<3>  ASSOCIATE DEGREE (AA)    
<4> SOME COLLEGE    
<5>  BACHELOR’S DEGREE (BS, BA)        
<6>  MASTER’S DEGREE  
<7> LAW DEGREE (LLB, JD) 
<8>  DOCTORAL DEGREE (PhD, DFA, DPHIL, MD, DDS, DVM, 
DO)  
 
<R>  REF            
<D>  DK  
 
[QXQ: If respondent answers, “graduate school,” code as “6”] 
[QXQ: If respondent answers, “college graduate” code as “5”] 
 







>E006< We hear a lot these days about social class. What social class do 
  you consider yourself? Would you say you are in the upper class, 
  in the middle class, or in the lower class? 
 
<1> UPPER CLASS 
<2> MIDDLE CLASS 
<3> LOWER CLASS 
  
<R> REF 
<D>  DK 
 
>E007< At any time in your life, have you ever considered yourself poor? 
  
<1>  YES 
<5>  NO 
 
<R> REF 
<D>  DK 
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>E008< Finally, in which of the following categories does your household 
income fall. Would you say it is less than $25,000; $25000-
$50,000; $50,000-$75,000; $75,000-$150,000; $150-250K or 
over $250,000? 
 
<1> LESS THAN $25K 









Those are all the questions I have for you today. Thank you so much for your 
time, and have a great [morning, afternoon, evening]. 
 
>INT2< Gender of Respondent 
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Mode: 1 (own) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Own (1) 233 81.8 82.0 82.0 
Rent (5) 51 17.9 18.0 100.0 
Valid 
Total 284 99.6 100.0  
Missing System 1 .4   
Total 285 100.0   
 
A002: Years in Home (categorized) 
Mean: 15 (2.48) 
Mode: 1 (<5) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
< 5 100 35.1 35.1 35.1 
6-10 54 18.9 18.9 54.0 
11-20 68 23.9 23.9 77.9 
21-30 20 7.0 7.0 84.9 
> 30 43 15.1 15.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 285 100.0 100.0  
 
A003: Community Type 
Mean: 2.98 
Mode: 4 (Small Town) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Large City 52 18.2 18.2 18.2 
Small City 55 19.3 19.3 37.5 
Suburb 65 22.8 22.8 60.4 
Small Town 73 25.6 25.6 86.0 
Rural Area 40 14.0 14.0 100.0 
Valid 
Total 285 100.0 100.0  
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A004: Housing Type 
Mean: 1.97 
Mode: 2 (Single-family home) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Apartment 35 12.3 12.3 12.3 
Single-Family Home 229 80.4 80.4 92.6 
Multi-Family Home 15 5.3 5.3 97.9 
Mobile Home/Trailer 6 2.1 2.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 285 100.0 100.0  
 
A005: Neighborhood Type 
Mean: 1.59 
Mode: 1 (All Single-family homes) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
All SF Homes 187 65.6 65.8 65.8 
Mixed Residential 55 19.3 19.4 85.2 
Mostly Multi-Family 
Residential 
13 4.6 4.6 89.8 
Residential & Commercial 29 10.2 10.2 100.0 
Valid 
Total 284 99.6 100.0  
Missing System 1 .4   
Total 285 100.0   
 
A006: Neighbors’ Race 
Mean: 2.28 
Mode: 3 (Not Very Diverse) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Very Diverse 52 18.2 18.5 18.5 
Somewhat Diverse 99 34.7 35.2 53.7 
Not Very Diverse 130 45.6 46.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 281 98.6 100.0  
Missing System 4 1.4   
Total 285 100.0   
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A007: Neighbors’ Age 
Mean: 2.11 
Mode: 2 (Mix of Ages) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Mostly Young 9 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Mix of Ages 234 82.1 82.4 85.6 
Mostly Older 41 14.4 14.4 100.0 
Valid 
Total 284 99.6 100.0  
Missing System 1 .4   
Total 285 100.0   
 
A008: Neighborhood Satisfaction 
Mean: 3.26 
Mode: 3 (A Good Place) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Not a Good Place 8 2.8 2.8 2.8 
An OK Place 31 10.9 10.9 13.7 
A Good Place 125 43.9 44.0 57.7 
A Great Place 120 42.1 42.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 284 99.6 100.0  
Missing System 1 .4   




Mode: 5 (No) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Yes (1) 22 7.7 7.9 7.9 
No (5) 258 90.5 92.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 280 98.2 100.0  
Missing System 5 1.8   
Total 285 100.0   
 
 





Mode: 5 (College Graduate) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Less than HS 9 3.2 3.2 3.2 
HS Diploma 82 28.8 28.9 32.0 
Associates Degree 10 3.5 3.5 35.6 
Some College 48 16.8 16.9 52.5 
Bachelor’s 88 30.9 31.0 83.5 
Graduate Degree 47 16.5 16.5 100.0 
Valid 
Total 284 99.6 100.0  
Missing System 1 .4   




Mode: 1 (White) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
White 220 77.2 79.4 79.4 
Black 19 6.7 6.9 86.3 
Asian 5 1.8 1.8 88.1 
Amer Indian 6 2.1 2.2 90.3 
Hispanic 24 8.4 8.7 98.9 
Mixed Races 3 1.1 1.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 277 97.2 100.0  
Missing System 8 2.8   
Total 285 100.0   
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E003: Kids at Home 
Mean: 3.69 
Mode: 5 (No) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Yes (1) 99 34.9 34.9 34.9 
No (5) 186 65.1 65.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 285 100.0 100.0  
Total 285 100.0   
 
E005: Age (Categorized) 
Mean: 51 years (4.12) 
Mode: 4 (45-54) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
18-24 9 3.2 3.2 3.2 
25-34 34 11.9 12.1 15.3 
35-44 45 15.8 16.0 31.3 
45-54 73 25.6 26.0 57.3 
55-64 66 23.2 23.5 80.8 
65+ 54 18.9 19.2 100.0 
Valid 
Total 281 98.6 100.0  
Missing System 4 1.4   
Total 285 100.0   
 
E006: Social Class 
Mean: 2.05 
Mode: 2 (Middle Class) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Upper Class 15 5.3 5.3 5.3 
Middle Class 236 82.8 84.0 89.3 
Lower Class 30 10.5 10.7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 281 98.6 100.0  
Missing System 4 1.4   
Total 285 100.0   
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E007: Ever Considered Yourself Poor 
Mean: 2.53 
Mode: 1 (Yes) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Yes (1) 176 61.8 61.8 61.8 










Mode: 4 ($75-$150K) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
<$25K 38 13.3 14.7 14.7 
$25K-$50K 70 24.6 27.1 41.9 
$50K-$75K 58 20.4 22.5 64.3 
$75K-$150K 71 24.9 27.5 91.9 
$150-$250K 15 5.3 5.8 97.7 
>$250K 6 2.1 2.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 258 90.5 100.0  
Missing System 27 9.5   
Total 285 100.0   
 
INT2: Gender 
Mean: 2.47  
Mode 1 (Female) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Female (1) 180 63.2 63.2 63.2 
Male (5) 105 36.8 36.8 100.0 
Valid 
Total 285 100.0 100.0  
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Housing Attitudes 
A009: Support AH in Town 
Mean: 1.96 
Mode:  2 (Probably Would) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Definitely Would 97 34.0 35.0 35.0 
Probably Would 119 41.8 43.0 78.0 
Probably Would Not 35 12.3 12.6 90.6 
Definitely Would Not 26 9.1 9.4 100.0 
Valid 
Total 277 97.2 100.0  
Missing System 8 2.8   
Total 285 100.0   
 
A010: Support AH in Neighborhood 
Mean: 2.17 
Mode: 2 (Probably Would) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Definitely Would 82 28.8 29.6 29.6 
Probably Would 101 35.4 36.5 66.1 
Probably Would Not 60 21.1 21.7 87.7 
Definitely Would Not 34 11.9 12.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 277 97.2 100.0  
Missing System 8 2.8   
Total 285 100.0   
 




A014: AH Improves Appearance 
Mean: 2.28 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Agree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Agree 32 11.2 11.9 11.9 
Somewhat Agree 142 49.8 52.6 64.4 
Somewhat Disagree 78 27.4 28.9 93.3 
Strongly Disagree 18 6.3 6.7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 270 94.7 100.0  
Missing System 15 5.3   
Total 285 100.0   
 
 
A012: AH Lower Values 
Mean: 2.80  
Mode 3 (Somewhat Agree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 13 4.6 4.8 4.8 
Somewhat Disagree 88 30.9 32.7 37.5 
Somewhat Agree 107 37.5 39.8 77.3 
Strongly Agree 61 21.4 22.7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 269 94.4 100.0  
Missing System 16 5.6   
Total 285 100.0   
A013: AH Increase Crime 
Mean: 2.48 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Disagree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 21 7.4 7.9 7.9 
Somewhat Disagree 132 46.3 49.4 57.3 
Somewhat Agree 80 28.1 30.0 87.3 
Strongly Agree 34 11.9 12.7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 267 93.7 100.0  
Missing System 18 6.3   
Total 285 100.0   
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A015: AH Residents Good Neighbors 
Mean: 2.28 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Agree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Agree 12 4.2 5.6 5.6 
Somewhat Agree 142 49.8 66.7 72.3 
Somewhat Disagree 47 16.5 22.1 94.4 
Strongly Disagree 12 4.2 5.6 100.0 
Valid 
Total 213 74.7 100.0  
Missing System 72 25.3   
Total 285 100.0   
 
A016: AH Lessens Character 
Mean: 2.38 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Disagree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 28 9.8 10.3 10.3 
Somewhat Disagree 142 49.8 52.0 62.3 
Somewhat Agree 73 25.6 26.7 89.0 
Strongly Agree 30 10.5 11.0 100.0 
Valid 
Total 273 95.8 100.0  
Missing System 12 4.2   
Total 285 100.0   
 
A017: AH Increases Traffic 
Mean: 2.82 
Mode: 3 (Somewhat Agree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 7 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Somewhat Disagree 84 29.5 30.1 32.6 
Somewhat Agree 139 48.8 49.8 82.4 
Strongly Agree 49 17.2 17.6 100.0 
Valid 
Total 279 97.9 100.0  
Missing System 6 2.1   
Total 285 100.0   
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A018: AH Improves Economy 
Mean: 2.33 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Agree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Agree 27 9.5 10.3 10.3 
Somewhat Agree 139 48.8 53.1 63.4 
Somewhat Disagree 79 27.7 30.2 93.5 
Strongly Disagree 17 6.0 6.5 100.0 
Valid 
Total 262 91.9 100.0  
Missing System 23 8.1   
Total 285 100.0   
 
A019: AH Worsens Schools 
Mean: 2.34 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Disagree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 25 8.8 9.4 9.4 
Somewhat Disagree 155 54.4 58.5 67.9 
Somewhat Agree 55 19.3 20.8 88.7 
Strongly Agree 30 10.5 11.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 265 93.0 100.0  
Missing System 20 7.0   
Total 285 100.0   
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Attitudes Toward Government 
EGAL reduce inequality 
Mean: 2.13 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Disagree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 76 26.7 27.9 27.9 
Somewhat Disagree 112 39.3 41.2  69.9 
Somewhat Agree 57 20.0 21.0 90.1 
Strongly Agree 27 9.5 9.9 100.0 
Valid 
Total 272 95.4 100.0  
Missing System 13 4.6   
Total 285 100.0   
 
EGAL poor kids college 
Mean: 3.01 
Mode: 3 (Somewhat Agree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 14 4.9 5.0 5.0 
Somewhat Disagree 47 16.5 16.8 21.9 
Somewhat Agree 139 48.8 49.8 71.7 
Strongly Agree 79 27.7 28.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 279 97.9 100.0  
Missing System 6 2.1   
Total 285 285 100.0  




EGAL guaranteed income 
Mean: 2.09 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Disagree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 60 21.1 21.9 21.9 
Somewhat Disagree 146 51.2 53.3 75.2 
Somewhat Agree 51 17.9 18.6 93.8 
Strongly Agree 17 6.0 6.2 100.0 
Valid 
Total 274 96.1 100.0  
Missing System 11 3.9   
Total 285 285 100.0  
 
EGAL unemployment assist 
Mean: 2.97 
Mode: 3 (Somewhat Agree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 7 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Somewhat Disagree 42 14.7 15.0 17.5 
Somewhat Agree 183 64.2 65.4 82.9 
Strongly Agree 48 16.8 17.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 280 98.2 100.0  
Missing System 5 1.8   
Total 285 285 100.0  
 
EGAL job for everyone 
Mean: 2.39 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Disagree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 45 15.8 16.4 16.4 
Somewhat Disagree 112 39.3 40.9 57.3 
Somewhat Agree 81 28.4 29.6 86.9 
Strongly Agree 36 12.6 13.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 274 96.1 100.0  
Missing System 11 3.9   
Total 285 100.0   
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EGAL spend less on poor 
Mean: 2.93 
Mode: 3 (Somewhat Disagree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Agree 11 3.9 4.3 4.3 
Somewhat Agree 40 14.0 15.6 19.8 
Somewhat Disagree 162 56.8 63.0 82.9 
Strongly Disagree 44 15.4 17.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 257 90.2 100.0  
Missing System 28 9.8   
Total 285 285 100.0  
 
Trust Gov to do What’s Right 
Mean: 1.64 
Mode: 2 (Some of the Time) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Almost Never 111 38.9 39.8 39.8 
Some of the Time 157 55.1 56.3 96.1 
Almost Always 11 3.9 3.9 100.0 
Valid 
Total 279 97.9 100.0  
Missing System 6 2.1   
Total 285 285 100.0  
 
Special Interest Influence? 
Mean: 1.29 
Mode: 1 Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Too Much 213 74.7 81.3 81.3 
Just Right 21 7.4 8.0 89.3 
Not Enough 28 9.8 10.7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 262 91.9 100.0  
Missing System 23 8.1   
Total 285 100.0   
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Gov Waste Tax Dollars? 
Mean: 1.26 
Mode: 1 Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
A Lot 216 75.8 76.1 76.1 
Some of It 63 22.1 22.2 98.2 
Not Very Much 5 1.8 1.8 100.0 
Valid 
Total 284 99.6 100.0  
Missing System 1 .4   
Total 285 100.0   
 
Liberal Conservative Scale 
Mean: 4.55 
Mode: 4 (Moderate) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Extremely Liberal 13 4.6 4.7 4.7 
2 12 4.2 4.3 9.1 
3 32 11.2 11.6 20.7 
4 80 28.1 29.0 49.6 
5 65 22.8 23.6 73.2 
6 39 13.7 14.1 87.3 
Extremely Conservative 35 12.3 12.7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 276 96.8 100.0  
Missing System 9 3.2   
Total 285 100.0   
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Attitudes toward Minorities 
RACE minorities work way up 
Mean: 3.09 
Mode: 3  Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 5 1.8 1.9 1.9 
Somewhat Disagree 29 10.2 11.2 13.2 
Somewhat Agree 161 56.5 62.4 75.6 
Strongly Agree 63 22.1 24.4 100.0 
Valid 
Total 258 90.5 100.0  
Missing System 27 9.5   
Total 285 100.0   
 
RACE minorities work equally hard 
Mean: 2.03 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Agree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Agree 47 16.5 17.7 17.7 
Somewhat Agree 170 59.6 64.2 81.9 
Somewhat Disagree 41 14.4 15.5 97.4 
Strongly Disagree 7 2.5 2.6 100.0 
Valid 
Total 265 93.0 100.0  
Missing System 20 7.0   
Total 285 100.0   
 




RACE minorities demand too much 
Mean: 2.47 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Disagree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 25 8.8 9.7 9.7 
Somewhat Disagree 108 37.9 41.7 51.4 
Somewhat Agree 104 36.5 40.2 91.5 
Strongly Agree 22 7.7 8.5 100.0 
Valid 
Total 259 90.9 100.0  
Missing System 26 9.1   
Total 285 100.0   
 
RACE minorities create tension 
Mean: 2.37 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Disagree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 33 11.6 12.5 12.5 
Somewhat Disagree 120 42.1 45.3 57.7 
Somewhat Agree 92 32.3 34.7 92.5 
Strongly Agree 20 7.0 7.5 100.0 
Valid 
Total 265 93.0 100.0  
Missing System 20 7.0   
Total 285 100.0   
 
RACE slavery to blame 
Mean: 2.49 
Mode: 3 (Somewhat Disagree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Agree 39 13.7 14.4 14.4 
Somewhat Agree 93 32.6 34.4 48.9 
Somewhat Disagree 105 36.8 38.9 87.8 
Strongly Disagree 33 11.6 12.2 100.0 
Valid 
Total 270 94.7 100.0  
Missing System 15 5.3   
Total 285 100.0   
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RACE minorities don’t complain 
Mean: 2.84 
Mode: 3 (Somewhat Disagree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Agree 14 4.9 5.6 5.6 
Somewhat Agree 52 18.2 20.9 26.5 
Somewhat Disagree 143 50.2 57.4 83.9 
Strongly Disagree 40 14.0 16.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 249 87.4 100.0  
Missing System 36 12.6   
Total 285 100.0   
 
RACE minorities need try harder 
Mean: 2.53 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Disagree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 23 8.1 9.4 9.4 
Somewhat Disagree 98 34.4 40.2 49.6 
Somewhat Agree 94 33.0 38.5 88.1 
Strongly Agree 29 10.2 11.9 100.0 
Valid 
Total 244 85.6 100.0  
Missing System 41 14.4   
Total 285 100.0   
 
RACE discrimination not a problem 
Mean: 1.82 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Disagree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 87 30.5 30.9 30.9 
Somewhat Disagree 164 57.5 58.2 89.0 
Somewhat Agree 25 8.8 8.9 97.9 
Strongly Agree 6 2.1 2.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 282 98.9 100.0  
Missing System 3 1.1   
Total 285 100.0   
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Attitudes Toward the Poor 
POOR unmotivated 
Mean: 2.11 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Disagree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 45 15.8 16.2 16.2 
Somewhat Disagree 165 57.9 59.6 75.8 
Somewhat Agree 59 20.7 21.3 97.1 
Strongly Agree 8 2.8 2.9 100.0 
Valid 
Total 277 97.2 100.0  
Missing System 8 2.8   
Total 285 100.0   
 
POOR commit fewer crimes than wealthy 
Mean: 2.37 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Agree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Agree 29 10.2 10.9 10.9 
Somewhat Agree 123 43.2 46.4 57.4 
Somewhat Disagree 98 34.4 37.0 94.3 
Strongly Disagree 15 5.3 5.7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 265 93.0 100.0  
Missing System 20 7.0   
Total 285 100.0   
 




POOR not as smart as wealthy 
Mean: 2.01 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Disagree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 51 17.9 18.6 18.6 
Somewhat Disagree 172 60.4 62.8 81.4 
Somewhat Agree 49 17.2 17.9 99.3 
Strongly Agree 2 .7 .7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 274 96.1 100.0  
Missing System 11 3.9   
Total 285 100.0   
 
POOR can’t manage money 
Mean: 2.17 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Disagree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 23 8.1 8.6 8.6 
Somewhat Disagree 180 63.2 67.4 76.0 
Somewhat Agree 59 20.7 22.1 98.1 
Strongly Agree 5 1.8 1.9 100.0 
Valid 
Total 267 93.7 100.0  
Missing System 18 6.3   
Total 285 100.0   
 
POOR no kids until can afford 
Mean: 2.49 
Mode: 2 and 3 (Split) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 25 8.8 9.5 9.5 
Somewhat Disagree 107 37.5 40.8 50.4 
Somewhat Agree 107 37.5 40.8 91.2 
Strongly Agree 23 8.1 8.8 100.0 
Valid 
Total 262 91.9 100.0  
Missing System 23 8.1   
Total 285 100.0   
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POOR rather commit crimes than work 
Mean: 1.95 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Disagree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 53 18.6 19.9 19.9 
Somewhat Disagree 176 61.8 66.2 86.1 
Somewhat Agree 34 11.9 12.8 98.9 
Strongly Agree 3 1.1 1.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 266 93.3 100.0  
Missing System 19 6.7   
Total 285 100.0   
 
POOR same values as other Americans 
Mean: 1.93 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Agree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Agree 55 19.3 19.9 19.9 
Somewhat Agree 191 67.0 69.2 89.1 
Somewhat Disagree 25 8.8 9.1 98.2 
Strongly Disagree 5 1.8 1.8 100.0 
Valid 
Total 276 96.8 100.0  
Missing System 9 3.2   
Total 285 100.0   
 
POOR don’t supervise children enough 
Mean: 2.08 
Mode: 2 (Somewhat Disagree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 34 11.9 13.4 13.4 
Somewhat Disagree 172 60.4 68.0 81.4 
Somewhat Agree 40 14.0 15.8 97.2 
Strongly Agree 7 2.5 2.8 100.0 
Valid 
Total 253 88.8 100.0  
Missing System 32 11.2   
Total 285 100.0   
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Wealthy same values as other Americans 
Mean: 2.54 
Mode: 3 (Somewhat Agree) Frequency % Valid % Cum. % 
Strongly Disagree 23 8.1 8.6 8.6 
Somewhat Disagree 91 31.9 34.1 42.7 
Somewhat Agree 139 48.8 52.1 94.8 
Strongly Agree 14 4.9 5.2 100.0 
Valid 
Total 267 93.7 100.0  
Missing System 18 6.3   
Total 285 100.0   




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 3: Correlations  - All Independent Variables 
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Appendix 4: Focus Group Eligibility Survey 
Screening Form 
Thank you for your interest in the Affordable Housing Study focus groups. 
Please answer the following questions, and a member of our research team will 
be in touch with you shortly to let you know whether you have been selected to 
participate. All selected participants will receive $25 in cash following their 
participation in the focus group. Food and beverages will be provided at the 
sessions. If you have any further questions about the sessions, or have problems 
filling out the form, please email housingstudy@gmail.com. Thank you for your 
time. 
4. What is your age? ________________________ 
5. In what city and state do you live? ________________________ 




7. Are you employed in a field related to housing construction or 




! Not Sure 
 
8. If yes or unsure, please specify your job role and the type of 
organization you work for 
 




9. Do you volunteer for any groups affiliated with affordable housing, 
community development, or neighborhood advocacy? 
! Yes 
! No 
! Not Sure 
 
10. If yes or unsure, please specify what type of volunteering you do, and 
for what agency. 
 
 
11. Have you ever lived in public housing, received section 8 vouchers, or 
purchased a home through an affordable housing program?  
! Yes 
! No 
! Not Sure 




13. We will need to contact you regarding potential times and dates of the 
session, as well as confirm your residence in the town of [TOWN]. 
Please provide the following information in the space below. This 
information will not be shared with any other parties: 
a. Your first and last names 
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of contact) 
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Appendix 5: Focus group interview guide 
Good morning. I am [MODERATOR], the moderator of today’s focus 
group. Thank you for coming. We would like to talk about your opinions about a 
variety of issues relating to housing in [city], your past experiences, and your 
current attitudes. This discussion is part of a larger study on housing issues 
undertaken by Rosie Tighe, who is here observing, as part of her doctoral 
research at the University of Texas of Austin.  
This discussion is confidential—we won’t be associating your names with 
what you say here—which means I would like everyone to use first names only 
today. Because this discussion is confidential, I ask that during our discussion 
you not use specific names of individuals, and this includes neighbors, relatives, 
or acquaintances. When the discussion is over, please respect the privacy of your 
fellow group members and do not repeat comments others make during our 
discussion to anyone outside of this group. 
We are taping this discussion today so we don’t have to take notes. Does 
anyone have any objection to this taping? 
Only people working on this project will ever hear any of the recordings or 
read the notes we take. Your participation is voluntary and confidential, and you 
may refuse to comment on any question that is asked. Nothing you say about a 
particular issue will ever be made public or reported in any way that will allow 
you to be identified. So feel free to say whatever is on your mind. 
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Before we begin I want to emphasize that you are the experts here today. 
There are no right or wrong answers. We want to hear what you think. I’m not 
planning on doing most of the talking. I do want to make sure that we cover a 
number of topics in a limited amount of time, so I’ll try to keep things moving. 
There is no need to raise hands. Speak right up. But please respect others when 
they are talking. 
This discussion may last up to 90 minutes. Is there anyone who can’t 
stay? 
Before we begin, are there any questions about how we will be conducting 
this discussion? 
Now let’s begin. 
14. Let’s start by going around the room and introducing yourself. Please 
tell us three things about yourself: (1) Your first name, and (2) how 
long you have been living in Georgetown. 
15. Great. Now I’d like to ask you a question about AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING. What do you think of when I say AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING?  
Probe:  
a) What about the physical aspects of the housing?  
b) What about the people who live there – any thoughts on 
who the residents of Affordable Housing are? 
 
16. What about different terminology, such as LOW-INCOME HOUSING? 
Is this the same as “AFFORDABLE HOUSING”?  
Probe:  
a) What about the physical aspects of the housing?  
b) What about the people who live there? 
 
17.  What about “WORKFORCE HOUSING” – does this make you think 
of anything different?  
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Probe:  
c) What about the physical aspects of the housing?  
d) What about the people who live there? 
 
18. If affordable housing were proposed in your neighborhood, would you 
be concerned?  
Probe: 
e) Any other concerns you might have? 
f) Anything different?  
 
19. How close by would the housing need to be proposed for you to 
become concerned?  
Probe:  
g) How far away would the housing need to be so that it 
wouldn’t pose any concern to you – would that be in 
your city/town? In your neighborhood? How many 
streets away? 
 
20. Would any of you consider moving out of your neighborhood if 
affordable housing was built nearby? 
Probe: 
h) Are there any other actions you might take?  
 
21. What kind of neighborhoods should affordable housing should be 
constructed in?  
Probe: 
i) Are there any types of neighborhoods where affordable 
housing should not be built?  
 
22. Do you think it matters whether affordable housing is for homeowners 
or renters? Would you be more supportive of one or the other? 
23. Do you have any suggestions as to how affordable housing might be 
located or managed so as to avoid the problems and concerns you 
have mentioned tonight? 
 
Great! Those are all the questions I have scheduled for the tonight. Thank 
you very much for helping us out today. Your feedback will be very useful to us as 
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we put together the next stages of our research on attitudes toward affordable 
housing. It is all right to talk to others about what we discussed here today, but 
please remember to respect each other’s privacy, and don’t mention anyone’s 
name outside this room. 
Finally, we will be conducting several of these focus groups in order to 
gather valuable information from people like you. I’d like you to fill out this 
comment form.  
If you would like more information about the study, or if you would like to 
discuss any of these issues further, please don’t hesitate to contact us by phone or 
email: (512) xxx xxxx or housingstudies@gmail.com. Thanks again, and have a 
great evening.  
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Appendix 6: Consent Form 
Title: Public Attitudes toward Affordable Housing IRB PROTOCOL # 2007-01-0003 
Conducted By: Jenna (Rosie) Tighe  
Of The University of Texas at Austin: Program in Community and Regional Planning 
Telephone: TBD     Email: housingstudies@gmail.com 
 
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study. This form provides 
you with information about the study. The person in charge of this research will 
also describe this study to you and answer all of your questions. Please read the 
information below and ask any questions you might have before deciding 
whether or not to take part. Your participation is entirely voluntary. You can 
refuse to participate without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are 
otherwise entitled. You can stop your participation at any time and your refusal 
will not impact current or future relationships with UT Austin or participating 
sites. To do so simply tell the researcher you wish to stop participation. The 
researcher will provide you with a copy of this consent for your records. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate attitudes toward affordable 
housing in suburban areas 
If you agree to be in this study, we will ask you to do the following things: 
• participate in a focus group with 7-9 other people 
• fill out a post-session comment form 
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The total estimated time to participate in this study is 90 minutes 
This focus group may involve risks that are currently unforeseeable. If you 
wish to discuss the information above or any other risks you may experience, you 
may ask questions now or call the Principal Investigator listed on the front page 
of this form. 
You will be provided with light refreshments and non-alcoholic beverages. 
In addition, you will receive $25 for your participation in the session. 
The data resulting from your participation may be made available to other 
researchers in the future for research purposes not detailed within this consent 
form. In these cases, the data will contain no identifying information that could 
associate you with it, or with your participation in any study. 
The records of this study will be stored securely and kept confidential. 
Authorized persons from The University of Texas at Austin, members of the 
Institutional Review Board, and the project sponsors have the legal right to 
review your research records and will protect the confidentiality of those records 
to the extent permitted by law. All publications will exclude any information that 
will make it possible to identify you as a subject. Throughout the study, the 
researchers will notify you of new information that may become available and 
that might affect your decision to remain in the study. 
This research session will be audio recorded. In order to protect your 
privacy, the cassettes used will be coded so that no personally identifying 
information is visible on them. Furthermore, they will be kept in a secure, locked 
place, will be used only for research purposes by the investigator and his or her 
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associates; and will be retained for the sole use of the primary investigator after 
they are transcribed and coded.  
If you have any questions about the study please ask now. If you have 
questions later, want additional information, or wish to withdraw your 
participation call the researchers conducting the study. Their names, phone 
numbers, and e-mail addresses are at the top of this page. If you have questions 
about your rights as a research participant, complaints, concerns, or questions 
about the research please contact Jody Jensen, Ph.D., Chair, The University of 
Texas at Austin Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects 
at (512) 232-2685 or the Office of Research Compliance and Support at (512) 471-
8871 or email: orsc@uts.cc.utexas.edu. 
You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records. 
Statement of Consent: 
I have read the above information and have sufficient information to make 
a decision about participating in this study. I consent to participate in the study 
and give permission for the audiotape made for this research study to be also used 
for educational purposes 
Signature: _______________________________ Date: __________________ 
 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent _________________________ Date: __________ 
 
Signature of Investigator: __________________________ Date: __________________  
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Appendix 7: IRB Approval 
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